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Deutsche Zusammenfassung
Die vorliegende Dissertation widmet sich mit Hilfe kontrollierter Laborexperi-
mente der übergeordneten Frage, wie menschliche Kooperation in Situationen er-
möglicht werden kann, in denen die materiellen Anreize egoistisches, nicht grup-
pendienliches Verhalten begünstigen. Diese Frage wird in der ökonomischen Li-
teratur spätestens seit der Veröffentlichung von Samuelson (1954) zur Unterfunk-
tion freier Märkte bei der Bereitstellung öffentlicher Güter und jener von Har-
din (1968) zum Allmende-Problem an prominenter Stelle diskutiert. Sie ist allein
schon aufgrund der Omnipräsenz von Kooperationsproblemen in Wirtschaft und
Gesellschaft von höchster Relevanz. Beispiele, die das zentrale Problem, das so-
ziale Dilemma, verdeutlichen, finden sich den internationalen Maßnahmen zum
Klimaschutz, der Bereitstellung öffentlicher Parks, der Überfischung der Meere
oder Trittbrettfahrerverhalten bei Teamarbeit.
Lösungsansätze für soziale Dilemmas unterscheiden sich maßgeblich darin,
ob sie sich dem Menschenbild des Homo oeconomicus, des rational und gewinn-
maximierend handelnden Agenten, verschreiben oder nicht (Kollock, 1998a). Die
vorliegende Dissertation beschäftigt sich ausschließlich mit sogenannten moti-
vationsbasierten Lösungsansätzen, welchen die Annahme zugrunde liegt, dass
menschliches Handeln oftmals von anderen Argumenten als einzig dem eige-
nen monetären Gewinn geprägt ist. In der experimental-ökonomischen Litera-
tur findet sich klare Evidenz für diese Annahme. Beispielsweise zeigen Experi-
mente zu Öffentlichen-Guts-Spielen, dass etwa die Hälfte aller Teilnehmer das Ver-
folgen eigener Gewinnmaximierung zugunsten kooperativen Handelns zurück-
stellt, sofern andere Teilnehmer dieselbe Bereitschaft zeigen (Fischbacher et al.,
2001, Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010). Aus der Perspektive solch “bedingt Ko-
operierender” können selbst Situationen, in denen der Homo oeconomicus un-
abhängig vom Verhalten anderer unkooperativ handeln würde, den Charakter
von Koordinationsspielen besitzen, in denen sowohl gegenseitige Kooperation
als auch das Gegenteil – gegenseitige Defektion – Verhaltensgleichgewichte dar-
stellen (Rabin, 1993, Fehr and Schmidt, 2006).
Das einleitende Kapitel der vorliegenden Dissertation nimmt eine Einord-
nung in die Literatur vor und diskutiert grundsätzliche Überlegungen zu koope-
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rativem Verhalten in sozialen Dilemmas. Anschließend werden vier Studien be-
schrieben, die jeweils als in sich geschlossene Kapitel verfasst sind. Alle vier Stu-
dien verwenden das Öffentliche-Guts-Spiel als experimentelles Paradigma, wel-
ches individuelle und kollektive Gewinnmaximierung scharf kontrastiert. Das
Öffentliche-Guts-Spiel bildet eine Situation ab, in der jedes einzelne Mitglied ei-
ner Gruppe vor die Entscheidung gestellt ist, welchen Anteil seiner Anfangsaus-
stattung es in ein gemeinsames Projekt einbringen will. Die Entscheidung, eine
beliebige Einheit der Anfangsausstattung privat zu konsumieren (zu defektie-
ren), ist dabei – unabhängig vom Handeln anderer Gruppenmitglieder – immer
mit einem höheren individuellen materiellen Nutzen verbunden, als diese Ein-
heit in das Gruppenprojekt einzubringen (zu kooperieren). Von positiven Bei-
trägen profitieren hingegen alle Mitglieder der Gruppe und zwar in einem Ma-
ße, das die individuellen Kosten des Beitragenden überkompensiert. In einem
Öffentlichen-Guts-Spiel wäre die für den Homo oeconomicus dominierende Ak-
tion, selbst nichts zum Projekt beizutragen. Aus der Perspektive des Kollektivs
hingegen würde genau solches Verhalten zum geringstmöglichen materiellen Ge-
winn führen.
Kapitel 2 trägt den Titel “Leading by Words: A Voluntary Contribution Experi-
ment with One-Way Communication”. Es basiert auf einer gleichnamigen Studie,
die in Zusammenarbeit mit Vittoria Levati und Anastasios Koukoumelis durch-
geführt wurde und bei der Zeitschrift Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
zur Veröffentlichung akzeptiert ist. Darin untersuchen wir nicht-bindende Kom-
munikation als Lösungsansatz für erfolgreiches kollektives Handeln. Aus der
Sicht rational und gewinnmaximierend handelnder Agenten kann so modellierte
Kommunikation weder in einmaliger noch in endlich wiederholter Interaktion zu
erhöhter Kooperation führen, da sie keine bindenden Zusagen für kooperatives
Handeln erlaubt. In der experimentellen Verhaltensforschung ist die Wirksamkeit
von Kommunikation jedoch unumstritten. Unklar bleibt trotz 50 Jahren inten-
siver Forschung aber, weshalb Kommunikation freiwillige Kooperation fördert.
Der gegenwärtige Stand der Forschung besagt, dass Kommunikation zur Koope-
ration ermutigt, da sie ermöglicht, gegenseitige und glaubhafte Kooperations-
Versprechen abzugeben. Diese Erklärung steht im Einklang mit der Sichtweise,
dass Kommunikation bedingt Kooperierenden erlaubt, sich bezüglich bestimm-
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ter Beiträge zum gemeinsamen Projekt zu koordinieren (Fehr and Fischbacher,
2002, Mohlin and Johannesson, 2008). Gegenseitige Versprechen sind aber keines-
falls das einzig denkbare Koordinationsinstrument. Deshalb stellt sich die Frage
ihrer Notwendigkeit für kooperationsfördernde Kommunikation. Um diese Fra-
ge beantworten zu können, konzipierten wir ein Experiment, das Kommunikati-
on ermöglicht, den gegenseitigen Austausch von Kooperations-Versprechen aber
ausschließt. Dies wird erreicht, indem nur einseitige Kommunikation zulässig ist.
Einseitige Kommunikation gestattet einem einzigen Mitglied einer Gruppe, eine
schriftliche Nachricht an seine Mitspieler zu senden. Erst nachdem die Nachricht
von allen Gruppenmitgliedern aufgenommen wurde, ist jedes einzelne dazu auf-
gefordert, eine bindende Entscheidung bezüglich seines Beitrags zu dem gemein-
samen Projekt zu treffen. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Versuchsbedingungen
mit einseitiger Kommunikation im Vergleich zu solchen ohne Kommunikation
sowohl in einmaliger als auch in endlich wiederholter Interaktion zu signifikant
erhöhter Kooperation führen. In endlich wiederholter Interaktion ist zudem kein
Unterschied im Verhalten zu beobachten, wenn die Möglichkeit zur einseitigen
Kommunikation entweder ausschließlich vor der ersten oder vor jeder Interakti-
on gegeben ist. Eine Analyse der Kommunikationsinhalte ergibt, dass die meisten
Versender von Nachrichten genaue Vorschläge bezüglich der Beitragsentschei-
dung abgeben und dass diesen Vorschlägen überwiegend Folge geleistet wird.
Unsere Ergebnisse erscheinen damit konsistent zu der Sichtweise, dass Kommu-
nikation koordiniertes Verhalten ermöglicht. Sie zeigen allerdings auch, dass ge-
genseitige Versprechen nicht notwendig sind, um freiwillige Kooperation zu för-
dern.
Kapitel 3 trägt den Titel “A Voluntary Contribution Experiment with One-
Way Communication and Endowment Asymmetry”. Es basiert auf einer Studie,
die in Zusammenarbeit mit Vittoria Levati und Anastasios Koukoumelis durch-
geführt wurde und in der Zeitschrift Applied Economics Letters veröffentlicht wer-
den wird. Darin erweitern wir die Untersuchung aus Kapitel 2, indem wir asym-
metrische Anfangsausstattungen zulassen. In experimentellen Studien sind sym-
metrisch parametrisierte Entscheidungssituationen ein gängiger Ausgangspunkt.
Asymmetrische Entscheidungssituationen außer Acht zu lassen, kann aber dazu
führen, wichtige Merkmale menschlichen Entscheidungsverhaltens zu übersehen
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(Güth et al., 2004). In Situationen, die kollektives Handeln erfordern, sind ver-
schiedene Formen von Asymmetrie denkbar. Die von uns untersuchte Form asym-
metrischer Anfangsausstattungen steht beispielsweise stellvertretend für Unter-
schiede bei der Verfügbarkeit von Mitteln für die Finanzierung öffentlicher Gü-
ter. Sie ist für unsere Studien von Interesse, da frühere Experimente zeigen, dass
asymmetrische Anfangsausstattungen sowohl mit als auch ohne Kommunikati-
onsmöglichkeiten zu geringerer Kooperation führen können (Isaac and Walker,
1988a, Cherry et al., 2005). Außerdem bedingt die effiziente Bereitstellung des
öffentlichen Gutes bei asymmetrischen Anfangsausstattungen auch unterschied-
lich hohe Beiträge der einzelnen Akteure. Die Wirksamkeit einseitiger Kommu-
nikation könnte also vermindert sein, falls sich der Vorschlag, effizient beizu-
tragen, also die komplette Anfangsausstattung einzusetzen, nicht durchsetzen
lässt. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass einseitige Kommunikation in endlich wie-
derholter Interaktion auch bei asymmetrischen Anfangsausstattungen zu signi-
fikant erhöhter und stabiler Kooperation führt. Ein wichtiges Merkmal unserer
Daten ist, dass das Beitragsverhalten mit Bezug auf die Anfangsausstattung von
der Versuchsbedingung abhängt. Ohne einseitige Kommunikation scheinen alle
Teilnehmer einer unausgesprochenen Regel zu folgen, die gleiche Beiträge unab-
hängig von der Anfangsausstattung vorschreibt. Mit einseitiger Kommunikation
hingegen entwickeln sich die Beiträge proportional zur Anfangsausstattung des
jeweiligen Teilnehmers.
Die in Kapitel 4 vorgestellte Studie ist in Eigenarbeit entstanden und trägt den
Titel “Leading by Words in Privileged Groups”. Hierin wird untersucht, ob sich
einseitige Kommunikation auch dann positiv auf kooperatives Verhalten aus-
wirkt, wenn Nachrichten keinen Bezug zur Entscheidungssituation aufweisen
oder wenn Kooperation zu ungleichen Auszahlungen führt. Die erste Frage soll
klären, ob einseitige Kommunikation allein deshalb wirksam ist, weil sie ein so-
zial günstigeres Entscheidungsumfeld schafft. Zur Klärung dieser Frage werden
eine Kontrollbedingung ohne und zwei Versuchsbedingungen mit (einseitiger)
Kommunikation verglichen. Von letzteren erlaubt nur eine Bedingung Nachrich-
ten mit Bezug zum Experiment. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass nur experimentbezo-
gene Nachrichten zu erhöhter Kooperation führen und legen deshalb nahe, dass
der Mechanismus, welcher effektiver einseitiger Kommunikation unterliegt, im
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Inhalt der Nachrichten begründet sein muss. Die diesbezüglich auffälligste Be-
obachtung aus den Kapiteln 2 und 3 ist, dass die Mehrzahl der Nachrichten spe-
zifische Aufforderungen enthält, die komplette Anfangsausstattung beizutragen.
Ein einheitliches Handeln gemäß solcher Aufforderungen hatte in den bisheri-
gen Studien auch einheitliche Auszahlungen zur Folge. Diese Tatsache könnte
wichtig für die Effektivität von einseitiger Kommunikation sein, falls Versuchs-
personen eine Abneigung gegen ungleiche Auszahlungen hegen. Um zu unter-
suchen, ob einseitige Kommunikation (mit Bezug zum Experiment) auch dann
zu erhöhter Kooperation führt, wenn daraus ungleiche Auszahlungen resultie-
ren, wird die Effektivität von Kommunikation in normalen und in “privilegier-
ten Gruppen” verglichen (Olson, 1965). Letztere unterscheiden sich von ersteren
dadurch, dass eines der Gruppenmitglieder für jede bereitgestellte Einheit des
öffentlichen Gutes ein zusätzliches Einkommen erhält. Als Folge führen einheit-
liche Beiträge in normalen Gruppen zu gleichen, in privilegierten Gruppen aber
zu ungleichen Auszahlungen. Ein Vergleich zwischen beiden Arten von Grup-
pen ohne Kommunikationsmöglichkeiten ergibt, dass die Anwesenheit eines pri-
vilegierten Mitglieds zu geringeren Beiträgen aller anderen Gruppenmitglieder
führt. Die Ergebnisse zeigen aber auch, dass einseitige Kommunikation selbst in
privilegierten Gruppen zu erhöhter Kooperation führt, indem gerade jene Ver-
suchsteilnehmer zur Kooperation ermutigt werden, die davon am wenigsten be-
günstigt sind.
Kapitel 5 basiert auf der in alleiniger Autorschaft durchgeführten Studie “Lea-
ding by Example in Intergroup Competition: An Experimental Approach”. Die-
se Studie widmet sich der Frage, wie sich gute Beispiele auf kooperatives Ver-
halten auswirken, wenn sich zwei Gruppen in einem Konflikt gegenüberstehen.
Die Auswirkung guter Beispiele wird durch den Vergleich von Beitragsverhal-
ten zwischen Gruppen ermittelt, in denen die Entscheidungen entweder simul-
tan oder semi-sequentiell getätigt werden. Semi-sequentiell bedeutet, dass der
Beitrag eines Erstentscheiders allen übrigen Gruppenmitgliedern mitgeteilt wird,
bevor diese ihre Beiträge als Zweitentscheider simultan und unabhängig vonein-
ander bestimmen. Die Anwendung der Strategiemethode ermöglicht eine Cha-
rakterisierung der Zweitentscheider anhand ihrer Reaktionen auf unterschied-
liche Beiträge des Erstentscheiders. Unsere Ergebnisse legen nahe, dass die in
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der Literatur übliche Beobachtung, dass Zweitentscheider im Mittel weniger als
Erstentscheider beitragen, auf typenspezifisches Verhalten zurückzuführen ist.
Während sich viele Zweitentscheider reziprok zu Beiträgen von Erstentscheidern
verhalten, sind auch reine Trittbrettfahrer und bedingungslos Beitragende zu be-
obachten. Ein nicht zu vernachlässigender Teil der Zweitentscheider bestraft gute
Beispiele durch antireziprokes Verhalten sogar. Wie sich zeigt, hat die Präsenz ei-
nes Konflikts zwischen Gruppen differenzierte Auswirkungen. Erstentscheider
bleiben unaffektiert. Zweitentscheider hingegen reagieren kooperativer auf Bei-
träge von Erstentscheidern. Bei mehrmaliger Interaktion verfehlen gute Beispiele
in isoliert handelnden Gruppen ihre Wirkung. In Verbindung mit einem Konflikt
zwischen Gruppen, führt beispielhaftes Verhalten hingegen zu erhöhter Koope-
ration.
Kapitel 6 der vorliegenden Arbeit beinhaltet eine Zusammenfassung sowie
abschließende Überlegungen.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
“Your corn is ripe today; mine will be so tomorrow. ’Tis profitable
for us both, that I should labour with you today, and that you should
aid me tomorrow. I have no kindness for you, and know you have as
little for me. I will not, therefore, take any pains upon your account;
and should I labour with you upon my own account, in expectation
of a return, I know I should be disappointed, and that I should in vain
depend upon your gratitude. Here then I leave you to labour alone;
You treat me in the same manner. The seasons change; and both of us
lose our harvests for want of mutual confidence and security.”
DAVID HUME, “TREATISE ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING”, 1739, BOOK
III, PART II, SECTION V
1.1 Social Dilemmas
How to promote voluntary cooperation in situations such as the one described
by Hume? This shall be the overarching question to whose answer this thesis
attempts to contribute. The collective action problem that Hume’s farmers face
is intricate. What is to be gained collectively are the fruits of cooperation. Every
farmer would be better off if both of them assisted in the harvest of the other. This
is evident to both parties. However, as the narrating farmer notes, doing so is not
in his own interest since he could not expect reciprocation for his help if he chose
to assist on the first day. In the absence of binding commitment opportunities
both farmers are trapped in an instance of what is called a social dilemma.1
1According to Dawes (1980), a social dilemma is characterized by two properties: (i) regardless
of the behavior of other actors, an individual’s monetary payoff for a non-cooperative choice
(defection) is always greater than that for a cooperative choice, but (ii) everyone is worse off
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The challenges posed by social dilemmas are as relevant today as they were
at the times of the enlightenment (and throughout human history). One exam-
ple where social dilemmas are apparent is in the provision of public goods such
as climate stability, public parks, or public television, to name just a few. Public
goods are non-rival in consumption, i.e., someone’s use of a public good does not
diminish its availability to anyone else, and non-excludable, i.e., no one can be
excluded from their use (Samuelson, 1954).2 The latter property implies that the
consumption of the public good is free once it has been made available. Since
contributing to the public good is costly, a rational and self-regarding decision
maker prefers to spare the cost and to free ride on the contributions by others.3
However, if everyone behaves in this way, the public good is not provided, and
everybody is worse off. This point was made famous by Olson in his book “The
Logic of Collective Action” in 1965. Another form of social dilemmas is exempli-
fied in phenomena such as the overuse of irrigation water or the over-harvesting
of natural resources such as fish or wood (for an overview, see Ostrom, 1990). The
basic problem was already addressed by Aristotle (“Politics”, Book II, Chapter 3)
but is inseparably linked to the parabola of the tragedy of the commons (Hardin,
1968). Hardin describes a group of herders who all have access to the same com-
mons. Assuming that herdsmen are rational and self-regarding, he concludes
that every herder will prefer more of his own cattle grazing on the commons as
the benefits from such actions accrue to the individual herder while the costs in
form of grazed pasture are born by the collective. Since the capacity of a com-
mons is finite, overgrazing and a depletion of the natural resource will be the
consequence if all herders follow this approach. In contrast to public goods, the
use of a commons is characterized by rivalry in consumption since, e.g., every
fish can only be eaten once.
Due to its central role for the understanding of human cooperation, social
if all individuals choose to defect than if they all choose to cooperate. See Kollock (1998a) for
a definition which does not impose that defection is a dominating choice.
2Pure public goods are truly non-rival and non-excludable. However, many public goods exhibit
these two properties to varying degrees, for example in the form of significant costs associated
with the exclusion of single individuals.
3The term self-regarding will be used throughout this thesis in order to describe behavior that
is geared towards the maximization of own monetary benefits. It stands in contrast to other-
regarding behavior which gives a strictly positive weight to the monetary outcomes of indi-
viduals other than the decision maker.
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dilemmas figure prominently in empirical research of many social sciences such
as psychology, political science, sociology, and economics (for overviews, see
Dawes, 1980, Ostrom et al., 1994, Kollock, 1998a). Social dilemmas are typically
studied using the commons dilemma and the public goods game as canonical
(N>2 player) game form representations of the tragedy of the commons and the
problem of public good provision. The third central model in this field is the
prisoner’s dilemma game. It corresponds to Hume’s farmer example in that it
involves two actors who face the binary decision between cooperation and defec-
tion, but is usually described as a game with simultaneous rather than sequential
decisions.4
Extensive field work as well as laboratory experiments have immensely con-
tributed to our understanding of how humans cope with social dilemma prob-
lems. Field studies, mostly investigating common pool resources, have gener-
ated important insights, for example with regard to the institutional and organi-
zational arrangements which are conducive to the protection of natural resources
(Ostrom, 1990).5 A prominent theme in laboratory and field experiments is to
identify ways that may facilitate cooperative behavior in collective action prob-
lems. Such solutions to social dilemmas differ in whether they imply changes
to the basic structure of the decision situation and whether they are feasible for
rational and self-regarding actors (Kollock, 1998a).
Structural solutions modify the basic decision situation in such a way that the
social dilemma is alleviated or even entirely eliminated. Arguably the most radi-
cal such solution is to establish a central authority which manages the commons
– an idea based on Hobbes’ concept of the Leviathan. Hardin (1968) picks up on
the same concept acknowledging that the necessary interventions in the freedom
of the individual might be greatly unjust. Another commonly discussed topic is
the reallocation of property rights. Like establishing a central authority (for an
experiment, see, e.g., Samuelson and Messick, 1986), this approach assumes that
individuals can be effectively excluded from the commons. Other structural solu-
4The simultaneous prisoner’s dilemma game was developed in 1950 by Marrill Flood and
Melvin Dresher – two scientists at RAND cooperation. It owes its name to Albert Tucker
who invented the story of two accused criminals who, being interrogated individually, can
choose to blame the other (defect) or remain silent (cooperate).
5Poteete et al. (2010) provide an extensive overview on the methods used in field research on the
commons.
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tions extend the decision situation to allow for rewards or punishment. Already
Caldwell (1976), Komorita (1987), and Yamagishi (1986) observe that cooperation
is more likely if defecting individuals may be sanctioned.6 This result is far from
being trivial since the activity of punishing is itself a (second order) public good.7
Intergroup competition can also be considered to be a structural solution to intra-
group cooperation problems since exogenous prices may be used to create incen-
tives for cooperative acts (see, e.g., Bornstein et al., 1990).8 Some other structural
factors that are relevant for behavior include group size (Isaac and Walker, 1988a)
and the marginal costs for cooperative choices (Marwell and Ames, 1979).
Strategic solutions to social dilemmas do not alter the structure of the game
and are feasible to rational and self-regarding individuals. They are confined to
repeated interaction since they rely on strategic behavior. Arguably most impor-
tant in this respect are the computer tournaments designed by Axelrod (1984)
which show, among other things, that a reciprocal strategy such as Tit-for-Tat
may encourage cooperation among rational and self-regarding actors.
Motivational solutions to collective action problems do not modify the social
dilemma situation and may only affect cooperation if (some) actors are motivated
by concerns other than their own monetary outcomes. As social psychologists
have known for a long time, elevating an individual’s sense of group member-
ship is such a motivational solution (see, e.g., Tajfel and Turner, 1986). This in-
sight led to experiments which show that identifying with a group can lead to
more restraint in a commons dilemma (Brewer and Kramer, 1986) or that exer-
cises designed to foster group identification can yield more cooperative behavior
in public goods games (Eckel and Grossman, 2005).9 Introducing leadership is
6Following Fehr and Gächter (2000), this field of research also received a lot of attention in eco-
nomics.
7Institutions that allow for sanctioning are often considered problematic as the benefits of in-
creased cooperation usually fail to outweigh the costs inflicted by punishment. In this context,
Sääksvuori et al. (2011) were the first to demonstrate that group competition may enhance the
effectiveness of sanctioning.
8Bornstein and Ben-Yossef (1994) showed that intergroup competition has a second, purely mo-
tivational effect on intragroup cooperation. This distinction will be of importance for the study
presented in Chapter 5.
9The mechanisms that drive the effects of group identification are still subject to controversial
discussion (see, e.g., Simpson, 2006, Yamagishi and Mifune, 2008). The core of the dispute
is whether group identification affects individuals’ preferences, their beliefs, or both. For an
excellent review on this discussion, see Guala et al. (2009). For economic studies on group
identity, see, e.g., Akerlof and Kranton (2000) and Chen and Li (2009).
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another motivational solution. It is distinct from formal authority in that leaders
do not have the power to make decisions on behalf of other actors (Hermalin,
1998). In economics, leadership has mainly been studied in the form of leading
by example, where the only means by which a leader can motivate cooperative
behavior from others is his own exemplary effort. A continuing stream of exper-
imental studies shows that leading by example can be conducive to cooperation
(Moxnes and van der Heijden, 2003, Güth et al., 2007, Levati et al., 2007), espe-
cially when the act of leading is voluntary (Rivas and Sutter, 2011).
The most widely replicated result with respect to motivational solutions is
that costless, non-binding, and non-verifiable communication has a positive effect
on cooperation (for surveys of relevant work in psychology and economics, see
Kopelman et al., 2002, Bicchieri and Lev-On, 2007, respectively). Despite the fact
that this form of communication is nothing but “cheap talk,” the behavioral effect
of communication proves to be astonishingly robust. It has been demonstrated
in commons, public goods and prisoner’s dilemmas, for repeated as well as for
one-shot interaction, and for various ways of transmitting the communication
content, e.g. face-to-face or through electronic media.10 While the effect of com-
munication on the propensity to act collectively was already shown by Deutsch
(1958), its underlying mechanisms are still subject to vivid discussion. At present,
the two leading explanations are (i) that communication creates group identifica-
tion and (ii) that communication facilitates the mutual exchange of promises to
cooperate which are then reinforced by a social norm of promise-keeping (for a
survey on the possible explanations, see Shankar and Pavitt, 2002). While the im-
portance of promises is rarely questioned, several experimental results cast doubt
on the explanation based on group identification.11 Possibly most insightful in
this respect is the finding that communication on a relevant topic other than the
social dilemma proves to be insufficient for enhancing cooperation (Dawes et al.,
1977, Bouas and Komorita, 1996). If communication itself fosters group identifi-
cation which then increases cooperation, the contrary should be expected.12
10For a recent meta study on this topic see Balliet (2010).
11Already Kerr et al. (1997, p. 1301) notes that “[v]arious lines of evidence converge on the con-
clusion that such commitment-keeping underlies (or at least contributes to) the cooperation-
enhancing effect of group discussion” (parentheses in the original).
12For a more comprehensive discussion of evidence in favor of an explanation based on promises,
see Chapter 4 in Bicchieri (2006).
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It is the aim of this thesis to expand the knowledge of human behavior in
collective action problems. More specifically, we13 are interested in non-coercive
means to stimulate voluntary cooperative behavior. To this end, we investigate
two motivational solutions to the free-rider problem in a series of studies that are
organized in four self-contained chapters. Chapters 2 to 4 are dedicated to ad-
vance the current understanding of how communication affects behavior in social
dilemmas. The key innovation presented in Chapter 2 is the introduction of one-
way communication as a sparse mechanism that only allows for unidirectional
written messages by a single member of a group. One-way communication pre-
cludes the mutual exchange of promises but is shown to increases cooperation.
This results challenges the cherished view that mutual promises are necessary
for communication to be effective. The studies presented in Chapters 3 and 4 in-
vestigate the effects of one-way communication in various asymmetric decision
environments. The key observations are that one-way messages may stimulate
contributions to public goods in proportion to asymmetric endowments, and that
one-way communication enhances cooperation even if such behavior leads to in-
equality in earnings. In Chapter 5, we augment the knowledge on leading by
example in social dilemmas as we (i) generalize the paradigm to a scenario of in-
tergroup competition and (ii) categorize follower behavior based on conditional
responses with respect to leaders’ examples.
A common aspect to all studies presented in this thesis, is the application of
laboratory experimental methods. More specifically, we make consistent use of
the linear public goods game as an experimental paradigm that generates sharp
contrast between the individuals’ and the collective’s monetary interests. In the
public goods game neither communication nor leading by example can be ex-
pected to shape the behavior of (a homogenous population of) rational and self-
regarding actors. Consequently, we will draw on economic theory that models
other regarding motivations in order to generate hypotheses. In the following
section, we will briefly introduce the structure of the linear public goods game,
highlight important behavioral regularities, and discuss their consequences for
possible solutions to the free-rider problem.
13The first person plural will be used throughout this thesis. This approach serves consistency
purposes. It is also justified because many of the more general considerations in the introduc-
tion and the conclusion pertain to the single- and the co-authored studies alike.
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1.2 Conditional Cooperation and Coordination in
Public Goods Games
In its most common format, the linear public goods game was introduced by
Isaac et al. (1984). Its fully symmetric version depicts a situation in which N>2
members of a group, each endowed with E tokens, decide simultaneously and
independently about their contributions (each between 0 and E) to a common
project, i.e., the public good. Every token a decision maker keeps is worth 1 token
to him. Additionally, he earns β tokens for every token he or any other group
member contributes to the public good. Denoting individual i’s contribution by
ci, his payoff is given by
pii (c) = 25− ci + β ×
N∑
j=1
cj , (1.1)
where c = (c1, . . . , cN) and
∑N
j=1 cj represent the strategy profile and the sum of
contribution in i’s group, respectively. Usually, public goods games are parame-
terized such that 0 < β < 1 andN×β > 1. Due to the first inequality, contributing
a token is associated with a net loss of 1 − β > 0 tokens irrespective of the deci-
sions of the other group members. A rational and self-regarding decision maker
thus prefers to contribute nothing to the public good. However, due to the sec-
ond inequality, it is efficient to contribute the full endowment in the sense that it
maximizes the sum of material payoffs in a group.
By now, a large number of experiments has established various behavioral
regularities that are commonly observed in public goods games (for surveys, see
Ledyard, 1995, Chaudhuri, 2011). Particularly notable stylized facts are that (i)
participants on average contribute between 40% and 60% of their endowment in
one-shot encouters and that (ii) average contributions start out at 40% – 60% of
the endowment but decrease over time in finitely repeated interaction. Neither
observation is consistent with the assumption that all participants are rational
and seek to maximize their own monetary outcomes and that this is commonly
known.14
14For the first observation, this is obvious since full defection is the dominant solution in the
one-shot game. For the second observation, the statement follows from a classical backward
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A rather recent advancement is the understanding that a large fraction of par-
ticipants in public goods games are conditional cooperators who prefer to cooperate
if they know that other actors cooperate as well. The most clear-cut evidence on
conditional cooperation stems from experiments that elicited subjects’ willing-
ness to contribute conditional on the average contribution in their group. In a
one-shot linear public goods game, Fischbacher et al. (2001) find that 50% of all
participants are conditional cooperators, whereas only 30% are free riders who
contribute nothing irrespective of the decisions of other actors.15 Fischbacher and
Gächter (2010) replicate this result.16 For an extensive survey of experimental and
field evidence on conditional cooperation, see Gächter (2007). Conditionally co-
operative behavior is consistent with various theoretical approaches which use
psychological game theory (Geanakoplos et al., 1989) to model intention based
reciprocity. This has been shown by Rabin (1993) and Dufwenberg and Kirch-
steiger (2004) for the simultaneous and sequential prisoner’s dilemma game, re-
spectively. Theoretical models that incorporate a dislike for inequitable distribu-
tions of monetary outcomes such as in Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and
Ockenfels (2000) are also able to explain conditionally cooperative behavior (see
Fehr and Schmidt, 2006, p. 669).17 For the large part of this thesis, we refrain from
discussions which preferences underlie conditional cooperation. Instead, the con-
ditionally cooperative attitude of some part of the population is taken as a given
and serves as an assumption when solutions for social dilemmas are discussed.
The presence of conditional cooperators has fundamental consequences for
behavior in social dilemmas. For groups that consist of conditional cooperators
the game above – although a linear public goods game in monetary payoffs – may
even be a coordination game in utility payoffs. To see this, let us consider a sub-
ject that has a preference to match the average contribution of all group members
induction argument: since every last period is strategically equivalent to one-shot interaction,
zero contributions are the dominant choice. Rational decision makers should anticipate such
behavior. Consequently, the second to last period is, again, strategically equivalent to one-shot
interaction. By this argument, full defection unravels “from behind” until the first period.
15The third notable group displayes hump-shaped patterns, in that they conditionally cooperate for
low average group contributions and reverse this behavior for large average contributions.
16For experiments that compare the proportions of free riders and conditional cooperators in
different cultural areas, see Kocher et al. (2008) and Herrmann and Thöni (2009).
17According to Fischbacher et al. (2001, p. 397), “[c]onditional cooperation can be considered as
a motivation in its own [...].” For an argument that views conditional cooperation as a social
norm, see Fehr and Fischbacher (2004).
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excluding herself.18 This subject prefers, e.g., to contribute her entire endowment
if the other group members do the same. In a homogenous group of such sub-
jects every uniform contribution vector constitutes an equilibrium of the game
defined by the subjects’ utilities. Thus, a linear public goods game with full free
riding as the only equilibrium in monetary terms becomes a coordination game
with Pareto-ranked equilibria in utility terms. The idea that the actual prefer-
ences of the subjects may transform cooperation games into coordination games
is by no means a novelty of this thesis. It has been voiced, inter alia, by social
psychologists (see, e.g., Dawes et al., 1988), sociologists (see, e.g., Simpson, 2006),
economists (see, e.g., Sen, 1967, Fehr and Schmidt, 2006, Gächter, 2007), and legal
scholars (see, e.g., Kahan, 2005). It is also consistent with interdependence the-
ory in social psychology (Kelley and Thibaut, 1978, Kelley, 1979) which argues
that the (experimentally) “given” payoff matrix may diverge from the “effective”
matrix and that the latter is directly linked to behavior. Kollock (1998b) uses
this concept to show that a prisoner’s dilemma game in monetary payoffs can be
an assurance (or stag hunt) game in utility payoffs. The same transformation is
shown in Rabin (1993) who uses the concept of “fairness equilibrium.”
In repeated interaction, the presence of conditional cooperators may even cre-
ate incentives for rational and self-regarding decision makers to act cooperatively.
This is possible since conditional cooperative behavior increases the long-term ex-
pected payoff for cooperative choices by other actors. Given appropriate beliefs
with regard to the proportion of conditional cooperators in the group, a rational
and self-regarding actor may prefer to start by cooperating, in order to build up
a good reputation, and free ride later on (Kreps et al., 1982). Another implication
of the presence of conditional cooperators is that belief management may take on
an important role for how to approach the free-rider problem (Gächter, 2007). In
order to boost cooperation, leaders may, among others, attempt to manipulate the
beliefs which followers hold with respect to other actors’ contribution decisions.
The concept of leadership is the topic of the following section.
18In Fischbacher et al. (2001), such subjects are called “perfect conditionally cooperative.”
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1.3 A Leadership Perspective
Concepts of leadership have been discussed in many social sciences (for over-
views, see House and Baetz, 1979, Yukl, 2002). In economics, effective leadership
is especially important in organizational contexts where it serves as a means to
stimulate efforts from staff when employment contracts are incomplete (for ex-
ample for intellectual work).
The literature offers a plethora of definitions for leadership. House and Baetz
(1979), e.g., count 70 definitions, Yukl (2002) reports on 13. We subscribe to the
notion proposed by Max Weber (see Gerth and Mills, 1958, p. 148 – 150) who
argues that the essence of leadership is inducing others to follow voluntarily. In
our view, leadership is thus distinct from formal authority in that it does not rely
on coercive means to influence behavior.19 We assume that leaders have neither
sticks nor carrots at their disposal. In fact, we do not even require a hierarchy to be
in place for somebody to exert an influence on others. In essence, everybody can
be a leader. This notion of leadership has thus some resemblance to the literature
on peer effects (see, e.g., Falk and Ichino, 2006).20
In collective action problems, leadership can be a means to motivate coopera-
tive behavior (see, e.g., Potters et al., 2005). Experimental economists investigate
leadership predominantly in the context of linear public goods games in which
actors decide upon their contributions in the following order. The leader chooses
her contribution first. Her decision is communicated to multiple followers who
then choose their contributions simultaneously (see, e.g., Gächter and Renner,
19In fact, the power to dictate other actors’ behaviors is rarely absolute. Even in a military context,
one might argue that soldiers have some discretion on how to fulfill their duty. Thus, the
notion of leadership we discuss might also extend to situations in which some degree of formal
authority seems feasible.
20Research on leadership also figures prominently in social psychology. A distinguishing feature
of this literature is the role it assigns to the self-concepts of leaders and followers – aspects
that this thesis neglects (for a survey, see, van Knippenberg et al., 2004). De Cremer and van
Knippenberg (2002), e.g., show that charisma or fairness of treatment of leaders may affect a
follower’s self-concept by eliciting group identification. Another notable observation is that
prototypicality, i.e., a close correspondence of a leader’s and a group’s characteristics, is con-
ducive to effective leadership (see, e.g., Hogg, 2001). A marked difference between studies
on leadership in psychology and those presented in this thesis is that while, in the former,
leaders are mostly presented by verbal descriptions (see, e.g., De Cremer and Van Vugt, 2002,
De Cremer and van Knippenberg, 2002), in the latter, followers are asked to respond to actual
behavior.
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2004, Güth et al., 2007, Levati et al., 2007). This conceptualization is clearly in
accordance with the notion of leadership given above since its effectiveness in
alleviating the free-rider problem relies on leaders’ willingness to give good ex-
amples and followers’ voluntary responses. Leading by example can also be con-
sidered a motivational solution to collective action problems since, in a group of
rational and self-regarding actors, followers would not follow and, consequently,
leaders would not lead. In Chapter 5, we generalize leading by example to a
scenario of intergroup competition. Leading by example is, however, only one
possible form of leadership that relies on other-regarding motivations. In a se-
ries of studies which are presented in Chapters 2 to 4, we investigate “leading by
words.” The context is a linear public goods game with sparse cheap talk com-
munication, where only one member of a group is able to send a written message
to the other group members. The written messages allow for persuasion in favor
of the collective interest and, as our results show, can be used to foster coopera-
tion. As with leading by example, the effectiveness of leading by words relies on
followers’ voluntary responses to one group member’s attempt to stimulate co-
operation. The obvious difference is that the act which may motivate cooperation
is a committed costly action in one case and merely cheap talk in the other.
Economic theory largely neglects the notion of leadership. In one of the few
models, Rotemberg and Saloner (1993) examine the influence of leadership style
(participatory versus autocratic) on firm profitability assuming that leaders may
differ in empathy. Hermalin (1998) investigates leading by example or sacrifice
using the teams model formulated by Holmstrom (1982). He assumes uncertainty
over the value of the common project and asymmetric information in that the true
value is only known to leaders.21 A leader’s effort is thus informative for follow-
ers as it may signal the value of the common project.22 In two follow-up studies,
Hermalin (2007) and Komai et al. (2007) extend Hermalin’s model to a scenario
of repeated interaction and provide a rationale for why leaders should not sim-
ply disclose their superior information. Huck and Rey-Biel (2006) consider se-
quential contribution decisions in collective action problems with two actors and
complete information about the game. Their model provides an explanation why
21Andreoni (2006) develops a model of leadership giving in fund raising that also builds on in-
formation asymmetries – in this case about the quality of charities.
22Potters et al. (2007) provide an experimental investigation of Hermalin’s model.
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good examples may foster cooperation based on preferences for conformity in
contributions, or, in other words, preferences for conditional cooperation. In a
nutshell the model shows that reciprocal behavior of a conformist second mover
generates an incentive for first movers to give a good example.
The model by Huck and Rey-Biel (2006) cannot be directly applied to most
experimental studies on leading by example since it only considers two actors,
one leader and one follower. In this setting, followers no longer face any uncer-
tainty after being informed about the leader’s contribution. In cases with more
than one second mover, Huck and Rey-Biel’s line of thought has to be extended to
incorporate followers’ beliefs about other followers’ actions. Given the presence
of conditional cooperators, this is viable: a first mover’s contribution may affect
the expectations of second movers. Conditionally cooperative followers should
be sensitive to changes in beliefs, which is what may create an incentive for a
first mover to give a good example.23 This notion of leaders as “belief managers”
(Gächter, 2007, p. 36) is also applicable to leading by words since one-way com-
munication can be used to make a specific contribution decision a salient choice.
If followers are conditional cooperators and believe that some other conditional
cooperators are present, one-way messages may affect their expectations and,
consequently, their contribution decisions.
The following section sketches the motivation, the experimental design, and
the results of each of the studies presented in this thesis.
1.4 Overview
Chapter 2 is entitled “Leading by Words: A Voluntary Contribution Experiment
with One-Way Communication.” It is joint work with Anastasios Koukoumelis
from the Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, Germany and Vittoria Levati
from the Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, Germany and Verona Uni-
versity, Italy. In this chapter, we seek to advance the understanding why costless,
non-binding, and non-verifiable communication enhances voluntary cooperation
in experimental public goods games. At present, the leading explanation for this
effect is that communication allows for a mutual exchange of promises to cooper-
23For a similar argument on coordination games, see Foss (2001).
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ate and that these pledges are reinforced by the social norm of promise-keeping
(Bicchieri and Lev-On, 2007). This explanation is consistent with the view that
communication allows conditional cooperators to coordinate on specific contri-
bution decisions (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002, Mohlin and Johannesson, 2008).
Mutual promises are, however, only one possible coordination device. This raises
the question whether mutual promises are necessary for communication to en-
hance voluntary cooperation. Attempting to answer this question, we designed
an experiment which allows for communication but negates the opportunity to
exchange mutual promises. More specifically, we use a one-way communication
protocol that enables only one member of a group to send a written message
to her fellow players. After the message is received, all group members decide
privately and independently on their contributions to the public good. Our re-
sults show that one-way communication enhances cooperation with respect to
no-communication baseline treatments in repeated as well as one-shot interac-
tion. Moreover, in repeated interaction, we do not observe differences in behav-
ior between treatments that either allow for one-way communication before each
and every period or only before the first period. An analysis of the communi-
cation content reveals that most senders of messages give specific contribution
suggestions and that the majority of participants follows these suggestions. Our
results are thus consistent with the notion that communication allows for coordi-
nation in public goods games. Moreover, they clearly demonstrate that a mutual
exchange of promises is not necessary for communication to enhance voluntary
cooperation.
Chapter 3 is entitled “A Voluntary Contribution Experiment With One-Way
Communication and Endowment Asymmetry.” It is, again, joint work with Anas-
tasios Koukoumelis and Vittoria Levati. Herein, we extend the study presented in
Chapter 2 in order to allow for asymmetry in endowments. In laboratory exper-
iments, symmetric games are the standard case and often a good starting point.
Disregarding asymmetric decision situations may however result in an incom-
plete, probably even inaccurate understanding of human behavior (Güth et al.,
2004). In fact, outside the laboratory, asymmetry seems to be the rule rather than
the exception.24 In collective action problems, you can think of asymmetry for
24One may even argue that fully symmetric games are models of a class of decision situations
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example in the valuation of the common project, the information structure, or
even dimensions which are completely unrelated to the decision situation (An-
derson et al., 2008). We consider asymmetry in endowments as a proxy for “deep
or small pockets” regarding problems of public good provision or differences in
time constraints for work on joint projects. This particular form of asymmetry
has been shown to reduce voluntary cooperation in experiments with and with-
out (multi-way) communication (Isaac and Walker, 1988a, Cherry et al., 2005) and
may impair the effectiveness of one-way communication since, in such a setup,
the efficient provision of the public good requires unequal contributions. Our
results show that one-way communication is an effective mechanism to increase
and sustain voluntary cooperation even when endowments are asymmetric. A
particularly notable observation is that, while behavior is broadly consistent with
an equal contribution rule when communication opportunities are absent, it is
broadly consistent with an equal payoffs rule when one-way communication is
allowed.
Chapter 4 is a single-authored project entitled “Leading by Words in Privi-
leged Groups.” This study reports on a series of one-shot experiments which
are designed to investigate whether one-way communication is effective if mes-
sages cannot relate to the experimental game or if cooperation generates payoff
inequalities. The first question is intended to clarify whether one-way communi-
cation affects behavior simply by generating a more social decision environment.
To resolve this question, we compare contribution behavior in three treatments:
a no-communication baseline and two communication conditions, only one of
which allows for messages that are related to the experimental game. Since our
results show that only game-relevant one-way communication increases coop-
eration, we conclude that the mechanisms which underlie the effectiveness of
one-way messages have to reside within the communication content. The most
prominent observation concerning the communication content in Chapters 2 and
3 is that messages incorporate suggestions to contribute the entire endowment. A
common feature in these experiments is that efficient contributions by all group
members also yield equal monetary payoffs. This property might be critical for
the effectiveness of one-way communication, specifically if subjects dislike un-
which have no examples in everyday human interactions.
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equal distributions of payoffs. In order to assess whether (game-relevant) one-
way communication may also enhance cooperation if efficient contributions lead
to unequal earnings, we compare the effectiveness of one-way messages in nor-
mal, i.e., symmetric, vis-à-vis privileged groups (Olson, 1965). The latter differ
from the former only in that exactly one (high-benefit) group member gets an
additional remuneration for each unit of the public good that is provided. Conse-
quently, uniform contributions are associated with equal earnings in normal and
unequal earnings in privileged groups. Our results show that the presence of the
high-benefit member inhibits contributions by all other actors when communica-
tion opportunities are unavailable. One-way communication, however, enhances
overall cooperation as it boosts contributions particularly by those actors who do
not benefit disproportionally from the public good. This behavioral change oc-
curs despite the fact that messages originate from the high-benefit members and
are therefore suspected to serve egoistic purposes.
Chapter 5 is a single-authored project entitled “Leading by Example in Inter-
group Competition: An Experimental Approach.” In this study, we envisage to
augment the research on leading by example in two respects. First, we make use
of the strategy method when eliciting followers’ contribution decisions. This al-
lows us to categorize followers into types based on their conditional responses
to a leader’s contributions. Second, we generalize leading by example to a sce-
nario of intergroup competition. Bornstein et al. (1990), Bornstein and Ben-Yossef
(1994), and Halevy et al. (2008) show that intergroup competition has two dis-
tinct (positive) effects on intragroup cooperation – one that works via monetary
incentives and one that operates as it affects the willingness to act in the interest
of the own group. Our implementation of intergroup competition controls for the
former effect but allows for the latter. The experiment consists of two stages. In
the first stage, interaction is one-shot and followers’ choices are elicited via the
strategy method. In the second stage, groups interact for ten periods using the
play method. The results from the first stage suggest that the usually observed
undercutting of the leaders’ examples may be the result of type-specific behav-
ior. While many participants are conditional followers who behave in a reciprocal
way to a leader’s contributions, we also observe strict non-contributors, uncon-
ditional contributors, and hump-shaped followers. A small fraction of followers
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even punishes better examples by means of reverse conditional behavior. The
presence of intergroup competition has differentiated effects. Leaders’ decisions
remain unaffected. Followers, by contrast, react more cooperatively to a leader’s
contributions. The results from the second stage indicate that leading by example
is an effective means to foster intragroup cooperation in a scenario of intergroup
competition. In fact, at least in our data, leading by example does not enhance
cooperation in isolated groups but only in conjunction with intergroup competi-
tion.
Chapter 6 briefly summarizes the results of this thesis and provides conclud-
ing remarks.
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CHAPTER 2
LEADING BY WORDS: A VOLUNTARY
CONTRIBUTION EXPERIMENT WITH
ONE-WAY COMMUNICATION∗
∗This chapter is based on the article “Leading by words: A voluntary contribution experiment
with one-way communication” by Koukoumelis, Levati, and Weisser, 2012, Journal of Eco-
nomic Behavior & Organization 81 (2), 379–390. The working paper version can be found
in Koukoumelis et al., 2009, Jena Economic Research Papers 106. The authors thank the co-
editor of JEBO, Catherine Eckel, and three anonymous referees for helpful comments and sug-
gestions. We also thank seminar participants at the following universities and conferences:
Bolzano, Munich, Siena, Verona, ESA 2010 in Copenhagen, and IAREP/SABE/ICABEEP 2010
in Cologne. We benefited from discussions with Anna Conte, Christoph Engel, Simon Gächter,
Werner Güth, David Hugh-Jones, Oliver Kirchkamp, Martin Strobel, and Marie Claire Ville-
val. Matthias Uhl provided valuable assistance in the analysis of the messages’ content.
17
Chapter 2: Leading by Words in Public Goods Games
2.1 Introduction
One of the most consistent experimental findings in the social dilemma literature
is that costless, non-binding, and non-verifiable communication (i.e., cheap talk)
has a positive effect on cooperation.1 But what is it about communication that
boosts cooperation? Three aspects of communication have been suggested in the
literature as inductive to cooperation (see, e.g., Dawes et al., 1977): identification,
discussion, and commitment. Several experimental studies demonstrate that nei-
ther mere identification nor discussion is sine qua non for the communication ef-
fect to take place (see, e.g., Bouas and Komorita, 1996, Bohnet and Frey, 1999,
Brosig et al., 2003). Instead, the commitment to cooperate, in the form of a mu-
tual exchange of promises and pledges, is considered crucial for the cooperation-
enhancing effect of communication (see Kopelman et al., 2002 and Bicchieri and
Lev-On, 2007 for surveys of relevant work in the psychology and economics lit-
erature, respectively).2
Most of the evidence on the role of commitment comes from two kinds of
studies. First, experiments that draw a comparison between face-to-face and
other forms of active communication (e-mails, chat-rooms, audio-conferences,
numerical cheap talk; see, for instance, Frohlich and Oppenheimer, 1971, 1998,
Brosig et al., 2003, Bochet et al., 2006). Such experiments find that the strength
of the communication effect depends on the communication medium, with a
stronger effect of face-to-face discussion compared to any other alternative. The
crucial factor here is that face-to-face discussion facilitates the exchange of mu-
tual promises.3 Notice, however, that all these communication methods do allow
subjects to exchange non-binding promises.4 Second, experiments that draw a
comparison between face-to-face and passive communication (see, e.g., Brosig
1Sally (1995) offers a meta-analysis of 35 years of social dilemma experiments and shows that
enabling people to communicate increases cooperation rates significantly. Balliet (2010), in a
more recent meta-analysis, reports similar results.
2A notable exception is Bochet and Putterman (2009).
3According to Bicchieri and Lev-On (2007, p. 145), “using computer-mediated communication
instead of face-to-face communication can hamper the generation of normative settings in
which promises are perceived as reliable.”
4Although numerical cheap talk (Bochet et al., 2006) may be regarded as an exception, it is im-
possible to exclude that the announced contribution level is perceived as a signal for how
much one intends to contribute, and hence as a promise.
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et al., 2003).5 This approach prevents commitment at the cost of rendering the
source of the messages external to the group.
An unambiguous way of studying whether commitment is necessary for co-
operation, in the sense that the effect of communication vanishes in its absence,
calls for a setting where mutual pledges to cooperate are ruled out by design
while the in-group communication channels remain intact. In this study we pro-
vide a series of experimental studies based on such a setting.
We consider a linear public goods game with one-way communication. All
group members make their contribution decisions privately and simultaneously.
But prior to this, one of them, a group member that is randomly assigned the
role of “communicator,” can send a free-form text message to his fellow play-
ers. In this sense, the communicator is a leader who leads by words.6 More
importantly, such a unidirectional messaging precludes the mutual exchange of
promises. Hence, if the latter were necessary for the rise in cooperation rates,
we would not observe any difference in contribution levels in comparison to a
no-communication baseline treatment. If, on the other hand, giving someone the
chance to suggest and rationalize cooperative play suffices to alleviate the free-
rider problem, then the communicator’s presence should promote contribution
towards the public good.
We would like to stress that we are not questioning the importance of verbal
commitment.7 We are testing instead whether commitment is strictly necessary
for the cooperation-enhancing effect of communication. One other plausible ex-
planation for this effect is coordination (see, e.g., Charness, 2000, Mohlin and Jo-
hannesson, 2008). Public goods experiments are usually parameterized so that
5Passive communication means that subjects may attend but not intervene in the communica-
tion between outsiders (that is, people that do not belong to their own group). The exogenous
contribution assignments studied by, e.g., Seely et al. (2005) are akin to passive communica-
tion.
6With a few exceptions, experimental economists investigating the effects of leadership in social
dilemma games focused on leading by example (see, e.g., Güth et al., 2007, Levati et al., 2007).
Pogrebna et al. (2009) consider a public goods game where first the leader can promise to
contribute a certain amount and then all group members make binding contribution decisions.
The authors compare leading by pre-game communication with leading by example and find
no dependence of contributions on the leadership style.
7Gneezy (2005), Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), and Vanberg (2008), among others, show that
people have a preference for keeping their word. Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004) provide
experimental evidence that promises can mitigate the hold-up problem.
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the dominant strategy of a homogeneous population of monetary payoff maxi-
mizers is to free ride. The systematic finding of positive contributions has there-
fore led researchers to assume that people exhibit social preferences. Preferences
for conditional cooperation (in the sense that people prefer to cooperate as long
as all others cooperate), in particular, can transform social dilemmas into coor-
dination games.8 Whenever there are multiple equilibria, as it is the case with
coordination games, the communicator may affect the others’ play by drawing
their attention to a specific equilibrium (see, e.g., Cooper et al., 1992, Farrell and
Rabin, 1996, Crawford, 1998, Brandts and Cooper, 2007).
We investigate how effective the communicator is in fostering contributions
by means of a series of finitely repeated games where the number of communica-
tion opportunities acts as the primary treatment variable. The baseline treatment
involves no communication at all. The participants in the other treatments can
communicate either prior to each and every period (continuous communication)
or exclusively prior to the first period (pre-play communication). We compare
the results of these treatments to assess not only the effectiveness of one-way
communication but also its dependence on the frequency of messaging.
In a repeated context, incomplete information about the other players’ types
allows for reputation building. Given appropriate beliefs, a rational course of
action for a self-regarding forward-looking player would be to start by cooper-
ating, in order to build a good reputation, and free ride later on (Kreps et al.,
1982). Such strategic reasoning might interact with the communicator’s potential
to affect behavior. To assess the importance of reputation in the workings of one-
way communication, we run a series of one-shot games where people have no
strategic incentives to contribute.
Whether and to what extent one-way communication, in the form of leading
by words, affects cooperation levels in social dilemmas could be of interest to
group organizers and institution designers. As noted for example by Messick
and Brewer (1983), multi-way communication in real-world social dilemmas can
be very costly, or even unfeasible.9 Yet, if – as our results indicate – one-way
8This has been shown by, among others, Sen (1967), Levati and Neugebauer (2004), and Levati
(2006).
9Most social dilemmas are large group problems (e.g., global environmental problems) affording
participants little or no opportunity at all to either communicate or negotiate a solution.
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communication increases cooperation and pre-play communication is as effective
as communication on a repeated basis, then the required organizational cost may
be lower than presumed.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 lays out our experimental
design and details our research questions. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 provide analytical
results on the finitely repeated and one-shot treatments, respectively. Section 2.5
concludes.
2.2 The Experiment
2.2.1 The Basic Public Goods Game
The basic game is the voluntary contribution mechanism (see, e.g., Isaac et al.,
1984). Let I = {1, . . . , 4} stand for a group of four participants who interact for t =
1, . . . , T periods in a partners design (that is group composition does not change
throughout the experiment). At the beginning of every period, each individual
i ∈ I is endowed with 25 ECU (Experimental Currency Units) which he can either
consume privately or contribute to a public good. Denoting i’s contribution level
by ci,t, where 0 ≤ ci,t ≤ 25, his monetary payoff per period is given by:
pii,t(ct) = (25− ci,t) + 0.4
4∑
j=1
cj,t ∀ i, t, (2.1)
where ct = (c1,t, . . . , c4,t) and 0.4
∑4
j=1 cj,t represent the period t strategy profile
and income from the project, respectively.
Since the marginal per capita return is less than unity, the dominant strategy
for a self-regarding person (i.e., a monetary payoff maximizer) in a one-shot in-
teraction is to contribute nothing. If all group members free rided, then each one
of them would earn 25 ECU. On the other hand, the socially efficient outcome
(i.e., the outcome that is maximizing the sum of pii,t(ct) over i = 1, . . . , 4) is to
contribute everything. If all group members made the socially efficient choice,
then each one of them would earn 40 ECU. Assuming common knowledge of ra-
tionality and preferences to maximize monetary outcomes, the dominance of free
riding extends to the finitely repeated game.
21
Chapter 2: Leading by Words in Public Goods Games
2.2.2 Treatments and Research Questions
Using a between-subjects design, we study five treatments that build on the basic
game described above. The treatments differ with respect to the number of repe-
titions and, in the case of repeated games, the frequency of communication.
Finitely Repeated Games
In the first three treatments, participants interact for ten periods. The characteris-
tics of these treatments are as follows:
Baseline (B10): Group members cannot communicate with each other. In each
period, they decide simultaneously and privately on the number of ECU
that they want to contribute to the public good.
Continuous Communication (CC): At the beginning of the experiment, one mem-
ber of each group is randomly appointed communicator (a role which he
retains throughout the experiment). Prior to each period, the communi-
cator is given the opportunity to send a written message to his co-players
(details are given below). To ensure that the message is non-verifiable (and
thus cheap talk), the communicator’s contribution level is not identifiable.
Pre-play Communication (PC): The (randomly selected) communicator can send
just one written, non-verifiable message prior to the first period (i.e., in ad-
vance of any decision making). Afterward, group interaction follows B10.
These treatments are expressly designed to address the following questions:
Question 1. Does one-way communication affect contributions towards the public good?
Question 2. Is the number of communication periods relevant, i.e., does the effect of
one-way communication depend on whether written messages are sent repeatedly or just
once?
Question 3. What kind of arguments are invoked by the communicator and how do they
influence behavior?
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Table 2.1: Research Questions and Appropriate Answering Approaches
Research question Answering approach
(1) Is one-way communication effective? Compare CC with B10Compare PC with B10
(2) Does communication frequency matter? Compare CC with PC
(3) What kind of arguments are used? Study the messages’ content
(4) Does strategic play matter? Compare C with B1
Note: Questions 1 to 3 are addressed in the context of finitely repeated games, Question 4 in the
context of one-shot games.
The correspondence between these research questions and the methods used
to address them is displayed in the upper panel of Table 2.1.
With regard to Question 1, a number of papers have addressed the theoreti-
cal conditions under which augmenting the game with cheap talk assists in the
achievement of efficient outcomes (see Farrell and Rabin, 1996, Crawford, 1998
for surveys). Whenever individual and group interests conflict completely (as
in our case), cheap talk is not expected to alter the prediction of full free rid-
ing insofar as people care only about their own monetary payoff. However, this
prediction has been contradicted by decades of experimental research, with com-
mitment being regarded as the most likely explanation for the effect of commu-
nication.
We argue that there is more to the communication’s impact on cooperation
than the behavioral importance of promises to cooperate. More precisely, the
communicator may enhance cooperation by providing a mechanism that allows
for coordination on the socially efficient outcome. Previous experimental work
indicates that people are often motivated to contribute to the public good pro-
vided that others do the same (see, e.g., Keser and van Winden, 2000, Fischbacher
et al., 2001, Levati and Neugebauer, 2004, Croson, 2007, Gächter, 2007, Fischbacher
and Gächter, 2010). This kind of conditionally cooperative preferences can trans-
form the social dilemma game into a coordination game with multiple Pareto-
ranked equilibria.10 That the communicator’s cheap talk increases the amount of
10Sen (1967) shows that if players are conditional cooperators a prisoner’s dilemma in material
payoffs can turn into an assurance game in subjective payoffs. Distributional preferences à la
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efficient play in coordination games is consistent with theory and experimental
evidence (Farrell and Rabin, 1996, Cooper et al., 1992, Crawford, 1998, Charness,
2000, Blume and Ortmann, 2007). A message urging cooperation may positively
influence contributions also because it reduces the uncertainty about the num-
bers of conditional cooperators in the group.11 On the basis of these arguments
we conjecture a positive answer to Question 1.
As to Question 2, the existing research contrasting pre-play with continu-
ous communication in social dilemma experiments, albeit founded on multi-
directional communication, yields mixed results. While certain studies conclude
that pre-play communication has a lasting effect on cooperation (Brosig et al.,
2003, Balliet, 2010), others find that cooperation rates decline in response to lim-
itations in the opportunities to communicate (Ostrom et al., 1992, Frohlich and
Oppenheimer, 1998).
With one-way communication, two conjectures point to a negative answer to
Question 2: (i) the communicator is able to coordinate actions on the efficient
outcome at the outset of the game; and (ii) high first-period contributions are crit-
ical for future contribution levels. The first conjecture is plausible provided that,
as mentioned earlier, preferences for conditional cooperation can transform the
social dilemma into a coordination game. Blume and Ortmann (2007), among
others, claim that in games with multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria, communica-
tion reduces the first-period variance of play by concentrating action near the
unique efficient equilibrium. Empirical support for the second conjecture is pro-
vided by, e.g., Keser and van Winden (2000), who, having compared partners
with strangers conditions, document the importance of first-period play on the
whole game. Based on (i) and (ii), we expect the communicator to serve as an
enduring coordination device, in other words to have a lasting positive effect on
contributions.12
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) predict similar results.
11We thank an anonymous referee for bringing this to our attention.
12It might be claimed that additional communication opportunities are helpful, having restart
effects, if contributions start decreasing. Yet, anticipation of these effects may tempt individ-
uals into earlier free riding: since the communicator’s message can help revive cooperation,
reducing one’s own contributions in a period does not necessarily lead to a reaction from the
others in the next period. Such a behavioral pattern is observed, for instance, by Bochet et al.
(2006).
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Finally, we have no preconceptions about Question 3.13 However, we would
expect from a communicator interested in coordinating his co-players’ actions
to make an effort to persuade them of the advantages of the socially efficient
contribution.
One-Shot Games
Here, participants interact just once.
Baseline (B1): The group members cannot communicate with each other. They
make a one-shot contribution decision.
Communication (C): Before the one-shot interaction, one member of each group
is randomly appointed communicator and can send a message to his co-
players.
These two treatments are designed to address the following question (see as well
the lower panel of Table 2.1):
Question 4. What is the effect of one-way communication when subjects are denied the
opportunity to play strategically?
In finitely repeated games, if the information about types is incomplete, strate-
gic reputation building may by itself bring about more cooperation. For example,
suppose that a self-regarding player believes that some other players in his group
are conditional cooperators and that the communicator’s message could coordi-
nate them on a specific contribution. Then, it may be optimal for him to make
that same contribution early in the game (so as to induce these conditional co-
operators to contribute) but free ride later on (Kreps et al., 1982, Andreoni, 1988,
Sonnemans et al., 1999). With one-shot interaction there are no incentives for such
a forward-looking behavior. However, the coordination role of the communicator
is active in treatment C. Hence, by comparing contributions in B1 and C, we can
assess whether one-way communication is effective in the absence of strategic
reasoning.
13Previous studies analyzing the content of communication either involve multi-directional com-
munication or consider games where promises to cooperate play a crucial role (see, e.g., Char-
ness and Dufwenberg, 2006, Brandts and Cooper, 2007, Sutter and Strassmair, 2009).
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2.2.3 Procedures
The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and conducted
in the experimental laboratory of the Max Planck Institute of Economics (Jena,
Germany). The subjects were undergraduate students from the Friedrich Schiller
University Jena. They were recruited using the ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) software.
Upon entering the laboratory, the subjects were randomly assigned to visually
isolated computer terminals. The instructions were distributed and then read
aloud to establish common knowledge.14 All subjects’ questions were answered
individually at their seats. Before starting the experiment, subjects had to answer
a control questionnaire which tested their comprehension of the rules.
Whenever communication was allowed, the communicator could use a text
box to type in his message.15 He had a maximum of four minutes to compose
the message, but it was at his discretion to send it ahead of the deadline. In
principle, the form of the message was free, the only restrictions to its content
being that the communicator could neither identify himself, nor promise side-
payments, nor threaten the other group members with anything that could occur
after the experiment. To enforce compliance with these restrictions, all messages
were screened before being sent.16 Then, all of them were delivered simultane-
ously. It was common knowledge that (a) the messages were cheap talk (i.e., cost-
less and non-binding), (b) all group members received exactly the same message
from the group communicator, and (c) only after having read the communica-
tor’s message could the group members decide simultaneously on their individ-
ual contributions.
14All instructions can be found in Appendix A.2.
15We prefer free-form text messages to face-to-face communication so as to isolate the impact of
the message’s content from visual (i.e., body language, eye contact, facial expressions) and
verbal cues (tone of voice, phrasing, fluency, manner of expressing moral rhetoric). We pre-
fer free-form to pre-specified messages so as to allow subjects to express freely their thoughts
and views of the game. Lundquist et al. (2009) notice that “using pre-fabricated messages in
experiments will not capture the full effect of communication.” Similarly, Bochet and Putter-
man (2009) and Charness and Dufwenberg (2010) do not find any communication effect using
pre-fabricated messages incorporating promises.
16Improper messages were to be screened out and their sender was supposed to be given a warn-
ing for misconduct, but as a matter of fact such a thing never happened.
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Finitely Repeated Treatments
At the end of each period, participants got feedback on (a) the number of ECU
contributed by each group member (with the individual contributions being
sorted in descending order), (b) the income from the project, and (c) their cor-
responding payoff. Payoffs were quoted in ECU, where 10 ECU = 50 euro cents.
At the end of the last period participants were paid in private their accumulated
earnings. Average earnings per subject were 20.60 euro (inclusive of a 2.50 euro
show-up fee), ranging from 13.8 euro in treatment B10 to 23.6 euro in treatments
CC and PC.
One-Shot Treatments
One-shot treatments started with six training periods that involved neither inter-
action (the others’ decisions were selected randomly by the computer) nor com-
munication. The sole aim of these periods was to familiarize the participants with
the game and its incentives (no payments were associated with them).
Participants in these treatments received the same information as in the re-
peated treatments at the end of the experiment. The exchange rate was 10 ECU =
400 euro cents. Participants earned on average 15.12 euro, inclusive of a 2.50 euro
show-up fee.
2.3 Results on the Finitely Repeated Treatments
We ran three sessions per treatment (B10, CC, and PC). Each session involved 24
participants. With group size equal to 4, we have 18 independent observations
per treatment. The results are presented in two parts: first, the effects of one-way
communication on contribution levels; and second, the communication’s content
and its relation to contribution decisions.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics of Average Group Contributions
Across our Finitely Repeated Treatments
Treatment Mean Std. dev. Median MAD
B10 12.27 8.73 11.62 11.68
CC 22.15 5.94 25.00 0.00
PC 21.75 6.68 25.00 0.00
Note: 180 observations per treatment.
2.3.1 The Effects of One-Way Communication
Table 2.2 presents descriptive statistics of average group contributions.17 The
mean and median of the series in the CC and PC treatments are notably larger
than their respective values in the B10 treatment. In addition, the standard devia-
tion is smaller, which should not be surprising given that for CC and PC the me-
dian average group contribution is equal to the maximum contribution, namely
25.18 The disparity in dispersion between the baseline and the treatments allow-
ing communication becomes more pronounced once we consider the median ab-
solute deviation about the median (MAD) as a robust measures of scale.19
Figure 2.1 shows how the time series of measures of location of the average
group contributions respond to changes in our treatment variable. In panel A,
the baseline treatment replicates standard findings (see, e.g., Ledyard, 1995): the
mean of the average group contributions begins at 57.1% of the endowment and
declines with repetition (in the last period it stands at 18.8% of the endowment).
In contrast, in the treatments allowing communication the mean starts at very
high levels (89.6% and 90.0% of the endowment in CC and PC, respectively) and
remains fairly stable in all periods but the last (its period 9 value is 85.4% of the
endowment in CC and 83.3% of the endowment in PC). This stability is clearer if
we acknowledge that in the treatments allowing communication the distributions
17The CC and PC independent observation series contain outlying observations at the lower tail
of their distributions. Thus, in what follows, besides the conventional descriptive statistics
(mean and standard deviation) we also report measures of location and scale which are robust
to the presence of outliers.
18In fact, 73.33% (72.78%) of the average group contributions in the CC (PC) treatment equal the
subjects’ endowment. The corresponding percentage in the B10 treatment is 20.56%.
19If {x1, . . . , xn} is a set of numbers, MAD = b medi|xi −medjxj | (where med stands for median
and b is a correction factor for consistency) is the most frequently used robust estimate of scale.
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Figure 2.1: Mean and Median of Average Group Contributions Over Time
(Finitely Repeated Treatments; 18 Observations per Period)
of the average group contributions in each period are skewed to the left (i.e., they
have relatively few low values, see Figure 2.2), and opt for their median values
as better indicators of their central tendency. In periods 1 to 9, the medians of the
average group contributions in the CC and PC treatments equal 25 (see Figure
2.1 B). Furthermore, it is in period 9 that the difference between the median series
of the baseline and the treatments allowing communication reaches its maximum
value (that is 19.1 ECUs, or, alternatively, 76.5% of the endowment).
One-sided Wilcoxon rank sum tests with group contributions averaged over
all 10 periods as independent observation units confirm that the communicator’s
presence raises contribution levels significantly (p < 0.01 in both CC vs. B10 and
PC vs. B10 comparisons). The same holds if we compare average group con-
tributions in any particular period; all p-values are well below the conventional
significance levels (the largest of them, equal to 0.003, is associated with the sixth
period comparison between B10 and PC). On the other hand, the frequency of
communication opportunities does not appear to have any significant effect: it
is not possible to reject the null hypothesis that the CC and PC groups of inde-
29
Chapter 2: Leading by Words in Public Goods Games
pendent observations have identical distributions (p = 0.32; two-sided Wilcoxon
rank sum test). The same result holds for individual periods (the smallest p-value
is 0.30 in the third period).
Figure 2.2 draws for each individual treatment boxplots of the average group
contributions observed in each period, and illustrates the participants’ tendency
in the treatments allowing communication to contribute their entire endowment.20
More specifically, in the CC treatment, 10 out of 18 groups are socially optimizing
in periods 1 to 9 (one of them in periods 1 to 10). An equal number of groups are
socially optimizing in PC in periods 1 to 9 (five of them in periods 1 to 10). InB10,
in contrast, two thirds of the groups never choose the socially efficient amount.
The aforementioned behavioral stability is corroborated by the results of
Wilcoxon signed rank tests comparing the distributions of average group con-
tributions in the first and ninth periods of each treatment. These tests detect no
location shift different from zero in the case of CC and PC, but a significant pe-
riod effect in the case of B10 (p = 0.53 for CC; p = 0.36 for PC; p = 0.005 for
B10; the reported significance levels correspond to the two-sided version of the
test).
To conclude, the results of this section are consistent with our predictions and
can be summarized as follows:
Result 2.1. One-way communication significantly increases contributions to the public
good and renders them relatively stable in all periods but the last.
Result 2.2. Whether the communicator can send a message prior to the first period only
or prior to all periods bears no influence on contribution behavior.
2.3.2 The Communication Content
Our categorization scheme of the communicators’ arguments is described in Ta-
ble 2.3 (the methodological details are given in Appendix A.1). The relative fre-
quencies of observing the argument(s) implied by each category are reported in
Table 2.4. To facilitate between-treatment comparisons, relative frequencies for
CC are calculated separately for the first and then all subsequent periods.
20The boxplots corresponding to periods 2 to 9 (2 to 8) in CC (PC) collapse to a single value as all
five statistics that they typically depict (lower non-outlier value, first quartile, median, third
quartile, and higher non-outlier value) equal 25.
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Figure 2.2: Average Group Contribution in all Periods (Finitely Repeated Treat-
ments; the Observations are Represented by the Corresponding Group
Numbers)
All first-period messages can be classified into at least one of our categories,
which we interpret as a sign that the communicators took their task seriously. A
comparison between the third and fourth columns of Table 2.4 reveals that the
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Table 2.4: Relative Frequency of the Arguments’ Presence in PC and CC
Category Argument PC CC
t = 1 t = 1 t > 1
1 Suggestion 0.94 0.94 0.57
2 Efficient suggestion 0.83 0.78 0.51
3 Conformity 0.94 0.94 0.13
4 Payoff calculation 0.78 0.67 0.04
5 Group payoff maximization 0.50 0.78 0.01
6 Satisfaction 0.28 0.11 0.03
7 Fairness 0.22 0.17 0.02
8 Team spirit 0.44 0.28 0.09
9 Promise 0.00 0.11 0.03
10 Future repercussions of actions 0.06 0.17 0.01
11 Notification of low contributors - - 0.09
12 Praise - - 0.31
choice of first-period arguments is only marginally affected by the communica-
tion conditions. The vast majority of communicators propose a specific contribu-
tion (category 1), mainly the efficient one (category 2), and stress the importance
of conformity within the group (category 3). In line with our conjectures, sug-
gestion and conformity are always concurrent: the communicator seems to un-
derstand that if there are conditional cooperators in the group, contributing the
suggested amount favors cooperation.
In both treatments, first-period suggestions are often accompanied by calcu-
lations of the associated payoffs (category 4). Communicators also try to moti-
vate the others by drawing their attention to the payoffs that can be achieved un-
der full cooperation (category 5). Arguments that rationalize suggestions on the
grounds of either satisfaction (category 6) or fairness (category 7) are infrequent.
The same applies to arguments that draw peoples’ attention to the possible reper-
cussions of their actions (category 10), in particular the likely effects of free riding
on overall behavior.21 Notice that unilateral promises (category 9) occur just twice
in CC and never in PC.
In CC, the first-period messages in all ten groups that start with and retain (at
21Seely et al. (2005) show that “trigger” strategies, urging participants to reduce contributions
after they experience defection, are generally not credible.
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least till period 9) an average group contribution of 25 entail both the efficiency
and the conformity argument.22 These arguments do not appear in tandem in the
first-period messages sent within groups numbered 2, 3, and 8, but each one of
these groups achieves full contribution once its communicator has jointly invoked
them. Hence, in CC, the conjunction of efficiency and conformity arguments
seems to drive group contribution to the maximum.
In PC, the arguments of categories 2, 3, and 4 are mentioned in all groups
where average group contribution remains fixed at 25 for (at least) the first nine
periods.23 In groups that do not consistently cooperate fully (that is groups 8, 9,
15 and 17), the communicators do not make an efficient suggestion and/or do not
calculate the associated payoff.24 Thus, in PC, the efficiency argument needs to
be supplemented not only by conformity suggestions but also by payoff calcula-
tions in order that one-way communication has a strong impact on contribution
levels.
The analysis of messages in the remaining periods of CC aims to answer
two questions. The first is what communicators do in the face of initially high
contribution levels. Our data indicate that once the efficient outcome has been
achieved, the communicator sooner or later understands that group contribution
will remain maximum even with minimal correspondence effort from his part.
So most of the messages, if any, suggest to keep on with the same behavior (cat-
egory 1), and/or praise past behavior (category 12). It is worth mentioning that
the tenth-period messages in five out of the ten groups that socially optimize till
period 9 explicitly point out that the interaction is coming to an end.25 At least
one member of each of these five groups free rides in the last period, possibly ex-
plaining the higher cooperation breakdown that we observed in CC, compared
22These are the groups numbered 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 12, 14, 16, 17, and 18. The same holds for group 11
where average group contribution equals 25 for periods 1 to 8, and group 13 where deviations
from maximum average contribution are (with the exception of period 6) no larger than 0.25
ECU.
23These are groups 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 14, and 16. The same happens with groups 5 and 13,
where one group member deviates from maximum contribution in the first period.
24Here we provide a general description rather than exact rules. For example, even if the criteria
of categories 2 to 4 are satisfied, the members of group 18 contribute fully just in periods 2 to 6.
And the absence of payoff calculation does not prevent the members of group 3 to contribute
fully in periods 1 to 8.
25These are groups 5, 7, 12, 14, and 16.
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to PC.26 The additional communication opportunities are, in this sense, harmful
to cooperation.
The second question of interest is how communicators react to low contribu-
tors. In the three groups where first-period contributions are less than suggested,
this is communicated to the other group members in the second period (cate-
gory 11). In group 10, the communicator emphasizes the potential detrimental
consequences of low contributions (category 10) and his threats prevent free rid-
ing in all but the final period. In group 1, the communicator’s appeal to fairness
(category 7) fails to stabilize contributions. Finally, the communicator of group 15
undercuts (in the first period) his own suggestion. The group achieves full contri-
bution in the following three periods, but average contribution declines dramati-
cally following a second attempt by the communicator to free ride.
2.4 Results on the One-Shot Treatments
We ran one session per treatment (B1 and C). Each session involved 32 partici-
pants. Figure 2.3, panel A, draws histograms of the two data sets of individual
contributions. While the distribution of the B1 data is skewed to the right, that of
the C data is bimodal (with more than 50% of the data points falling into the two
extreme classes).
Figure 2.3, panel B, graphs empirical estimates of the cumulative distribution
functions for the distributions that generated the two treatments’ contribution
data.27 In the B1 treatment, the function rises steeply for ci ≤ 15 (over 90% of
the observations are less than or equal to 15) and levels off for the remaining val-
ues. In the C treatment, in contrast, less than 50% of the observations are lying
within the [0, 15] range. Following the introduction of one-way communication,
the mean (median) contribution rises from 6.9 (5.0) to 14.6 (17.5). Formal testing,
with group averages as independent observations,28 confirms that the two under-
lying probability distributions are stochastically different (the p-value of the two
26Recall that 5 groups in PC, but only 1 in CC, contribute 100% of their endowment in period 10.
27The empirical cumulative distribution function F (ci) gives the proportion of observations in a
sample which are less than or equal to ci.
28Since members of a given group share exposure to the same message, which – we know – affects
behavior, group contributions cannot be considered fully independent of each other.
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Figure 2.3: Histograms and Empirical Cumulative Distribution Functions of In-
dividual Contributions in the One-shot Treatments
sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is less than 0.02), implying that strategic play
can not be the driving engine of the effectiveness of one-way communication.29
Thus, the answer to the fourth question of Table 2.1 can be formulated as
follows:
Result 2.3. One-way communication stimulates contributions even when subjects are
denied the possibility to play strategically.
Finally, Table 2.5 reports the occurrence frequencies of the arguments that ap-
ply to one-shot communication.30 Among all groups with an average group con-
29We perform the following analysis in order to compare the power of communication in the first
period of the finitely repeated games and the one-shot games. We calculate the difference (∆)
between the average of the first period contributions in B10 and the average of the contribu-
tions in B1. ∆ is treated as a measure of the effect of strategic reasoning. We subtract it from
the first period average group contributions in CC and PC, and use the Wilcoxon rank sum
test to assess whether the distribution of the resulting sequences is identical to the distribu-
tion of the average group contributions in C. The obtained test statistics are not significant at
conventional levels (p = 0.26 for CC vs. C and p = 0.17 for PC vs. C; two-sided tests), which
we interpret as evidence of the independence of the communication effect from the type of
interaction (i.e., one-shot vs. repeated).
30All messages can be classified into at least one category, attesting once again the communica-
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Table 2.5: Relative Frequency of the Arguments’ Presence in C
Category Argument Relative frequency
1 Suggestion 1.00
2 Efficient suggestion 0.75
3 Conformity 0.88
4 Payoff calculation 1.00
5 Group payoff maximization 0.50
6 Satisfaction 0.00
7 Fairness 0.12
8 Team spirit 0.62
9 Promise 0.38
tribution at least equal to 65% of the endowment (the groups numbered 1, 2, 3, 4,
7 and 8), all but two communicators (in groups 3 and 7) mention the arguments
pertaining to categories 2, 3, and 4. The absence of the efficiency suggestion in
the messages sent within groups 5 and 6 is associated with lower average group
contributions. Unilateral promises are again infrequent: 3 out of the 8 communi-
cators promise to contribute a specific amount. These results parallel our findings
for the PC treatment, and confirm the importance of advancing the efficiency and
conformity arguments, as well as of exemplifying payoff computations, to contri-
bution levels.
2.5 Conclusions
Contrary to the widespread view that, in public goods games, the mutual ex-
change of promises is necessary for the cooperation-enhancing effect of commu-
nication, we find that one-way communication, in the form of leading by words,
increases contributions significantly. Our interpretation of this result is that the
communicator acts as an efficient coordination device, as preferences for condi-
tional cooperation can transform the original game into a coordination game with
multiple equilibria (see, e.g., Sen, 1967).
The rise in contributions does not depend on the frequency of communica-
tion and holds even if there are no prospects of future interactions. Our analysis
tors’ commitment to reasoned arguments.
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of the messages’ content reveals that unilateral promises are rather infrequent.
Most communicators successfully invoke the consequences of efficient behavior
and stress the importance of conformity within the group: in the presence of
conditional cooperators, the efficient outcome can be achieved only if all group
members follow the suggestion of the leader. Thus, while decades of experi-
mental research have shown that Hobbes was wrong in holding that “covenants
without swords are nothing but words” (as people keep their promises even in
the absence of sanctions), our experimental results suggest that, at least in the sce-
nario that we considered, no covenants are needed in order to establish mutually
beneficial cooperative relationships.
Understanding exactly how coordination contributes to the effectiveness of
one-way communication is beyond the scope of this study and may provide a
fruitful avenue for future research. Yet, the practical implications of our results
are worth pointing out: a low-cost communication medium, like the internet,
may be a suitable platform for addressing issues raised in social dilemma prob-
lems. Even with projects where many individuals interact via long distance, what
seems to do the trick is the presence of a collaborator who sends a timely message
to the others exhorting them to cooperate.
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CHAPTER 3
A VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTION
EXPERIMENT WITH ONE-WAY
COMMUNICATION AND
ENDOWMENT ASYMMETRY∗
∗This chapter is based on the article “A voluntary contribution experiment with one-way com-
munication and income heterogeneity” by Koukoumelis, Levati, and Weisser, forthcoming in
Applied Economics Letters. The working paper version can be found in Koukoumelis et al.,
2010, Jena Economic Research Papers 094. The authors thank Christoph Göring for his help in
programming and conducting the experiments.
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3.1 Introduction
According to standard economic theory, markets underprovide public goods ow-
ing to the free-rider problem. Experimental and field evidence may suggest other-
wise, but the observed outcome is typically suboptimal (see, e.g., Ledyard, 1995).
Since the provision of public goods influences the functioning and well-being of
our societies, social scientists and policy makers aim at finding mechanisms that
could propel individuals towards the social optimum.
In the context of any particular public goods production technology, the play-
ers’ behavior depends on the choice of values for the various environmental and
design variables. In Chapter 2, we show that one-way communication, or more
specifically a free-form text message sent by one group member to his co-players
before contribution decisions are made, enhances efficiency in linear voluntary
contribution mechanisms (VCMs). In this chapter, we investigate the robustness
of this communication method as a mechanism for the alleviation of the free-rider
problem.
The experimental research on one-way communication has so far involved
players that receive equal laboratory endowments. It could be that the efficiency-
enhancing properties of one-way communication hinge upon the symmetry in
endowments.
In fact, the experimental literature on VCMs provides evidence that asymme-
try deters cooperation both when communication is not allowed (see, e.g., Cherry
et al., 2005, Buckley and Croson, 2006) and when group members can communi-
cate face-to-face (Isaac and Walker, 1988a).
In what follows we examine whether one-way communication is effective in
fostering contributions in the presence of asymmetrically endowed players. Con-
ditionally cooperative preferences (for a survey see Gächter, 2007) can transform
the social dilemma game into a coordination game with multiple Pareto-ranked
equilibria (see, e.g., Sen, 1967). Insofar as the communicator is able to draw the
others’ attention to an equal payoffs (rather than an equal contributions) rule,
the above form of asymmetry should not be relevant to the effects of one-way
communication.1
1That the communicator’s cheap talk increases the amount of efficient play in coordination
games is consistent with both theory and experimental evidence (Cooper et al., 1992, Farrell
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3.2 Experimental Design
In order to facilitate comparison, the experimental design resembles that of the
study presented in Chapter 2. Groups of size four interact for 10 periods in a
partners design. At the beginning of every period t, each player i is endowed
with ei,t ECU (Experimental Currency Units), which he can either consume pri-
vately or contribute to a public good. Individual endowments are asymmetric:
there are two “rich” members endowed with 30 ECU and two “poor” members
endowed with 20 ECU (the overall endowment is therefore 100 ECU per period,
as in Chapter 2). The individual endowments remain constant throughout the
game and are commonly known.
Let ci,t denote individual i’s contribution to the public good in period t (with
0 ≤ ci,t ≤ ei,t) and Ct =
∑4
j=1 cj,t be the provided public good. The period t
monetary payoff of each i is given by
pii,t(ci,t, Ct) = (ei,t − ci,t) + 0.4 Ct.
Since the marginal per capita return is less than unity, the dominant strategy for
a monetary payoff maximizer is to contribute nothing. On the other hand, what
is socially efficient is to contribute everything.
We study two treatments that build on the basic game described above. In the
baseline treatment (B10,A), group members cannot communicate with each other:
in each period of a session, they decide simultaneously and privately on the num-
ber of ECU that they wish to contribute to the public good. In the communica-
tion treatment (CCA), the game begins with one member of each group being
randomly appointed communicator, a role that he retains throughout the experi-
ment. Prior to each period’s decision making, the communicator has a maximum
of four minutes to compose a free-form message and send it to his co-players.
The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and conducted
in the experimental laboratory of the Max Planck Institute of Economics (Jena,
Germany). The subjects were undergraduate students from the Friedrich Schil-
ler University Jena. Upon entering the laboratory, they were randomly assigned
to visually isolated computer terminals. The instructions were distributed and
and Rabin, 1996, Crawford, 1998).
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics of Average Group Contributions
Mean Standard deviation Median Median absolute deviation
B10,A 10.66 5.47 10.75 6.67
CCA 19.73 7.47 25.00 0.00
Note: 160 observations per treatment.
then read aloud to establish public knowledge.2 Before starting the experiment,
subjects had to answer a control questionnaire testing their comprehension of the
rules. In both treatments, all players received at the end of each period feedback
on the number of ECU contributed by each group member, the income from the
project (that is 0.4Ct), and their corresponding payoff. We implemented an ex-
change rate of 10 ECU = 0.50 euro. The average earnings per subject were 19.62
euro (inclusive of a 2.50 euro show-up fee).
We ran two sessions per treatment. Each session involved 32 participants.
With group size equal to four, we have 16 independent observations per treat-
ment.
3.3 Experimental Results
Table 3.1 documents summary statistics for the average group contributions. The
reported measures of location increase in response to the introduction of one-way
communication. The variation, in contrast, decreases, provided that we acknowl-
edge the presence of outliers and consider a robust measure of spread (like the
median absolute deviation).
Figure 3.1 depicts the time paths of the means of the average group con-
tributions. For the reader’s convenience, we present as well the outcome of
the symmetric-endowment treatments: B10,S (CCS) corresponds to B10 (CC) in
Chapter 2.3 Treatment B10,A replicates standard findings: the mean of average
group contributions starts above the series’ overall mean and follows a down-
ward trend. In contrast, the CCA treatment mean of average group contributions
2All instructions can be found in Appendix B.2.
3The additional index S is meant to emphasize the symmetric parametrization of these treat-
ments.
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Figure 3.1: Mean of Average Group Contributions Over Time
starts at a notably higher level and remains fairly stable in all periods but the
last. A one-sided Wilcoxon rank sum test (W ) with mean group contributions
averaged over all 10 periods as independent observations confirms that contri-
butions in CCA are significantly higher than contributions in B10,A (p = 0.00). In
CCA, the average group contributions of the groups that are led by rich commu-
nicators are not significantly different from those of the groups that are led by
poor communicators (p = 0.25, two-sided W ). These results are consistent with
our main hypothesis on the efficacy of one-way communication. Additionally,
contributions are higher in CCS than in CCA, and in B10,S than in B10,A, but the
differences are not significant (p = 0.36 and p = 0.76, respectively; two-sided
W ).
Figure 3.2 graphs the average relative contribution (that is contribution di-
vided by endowment) of poor and rich subjects in all periods. In line with the
results of previous experiments, in B10,A poor subjects contribute a larger share
of their endowment than rich subjects do. Conversely, in CCA the relative con-
tributions of poor and rich are similar. Evidence to this is provided in Table 3.2
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Figure 3.2: Average Relative Contributions of Poor and Rich Subjects Over Time
where we model the temporal pattern of ci,t/ei,t: the coefficient of the endowment
dummy is significant in the B10,A regression but insignificant in the CCA regres-
sion.4 The communicator directs the players’ attention away from an equal (in
absolute terms) contributions rule, and successfully evokes a coordination rule
prescribing contributions that equalize final payoffs.5 In particular, 10 out of the
16 communicators suggest in their first period messages that all group members
should contribute their whole endowment. Rich as well as poor subjects adhere
to these suggestions in 80% of the cases.
3.4 Conclusions
Past studies dealt with one-way communication as a mechanism that fosters con-
tributions in symmetric VCMs. This study examines a more realistic scenario. It
demonstrates that the coordination role of the communicator is robust to situa-
4Table 3.2 presents parsimonious models that optimize the Bayesian information criterion. Yet,
the results remain valid for alternative regression specifications (see Appendix B.1).
5In B10,A the median contribution of both poor and rich subjects equals 10, whereas in CCA it
equals 20 for the poor and 30 for the rich. See Van Dijk and Wilke (1995) and Van Dijk et al.
(1999) for studies showing that participants in resource dilemmas prefer an equal payoffs rule.
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Table 3.2: Random-Effects Tobit Regression Results for Rela-
tive Contributions to the Public Good
B10,A CCA
constant 0.352 (0.000) −0.461 (0.105)
t −0.035 (0.000) 0.322 (0.000)
t2 −0.032 (0.000)
dendowment −0.168 (0.001) −0.111 (0.501)∑4
j=1 cj,t−1/ej,t−1
4
0.807 (0.000) 1.790 (0.000)
Wald test 199.89 (0.000) 99.94 (0.000)
BIC 552.7 614.7
Note: The dependent variable is ci,t/ei,t (576 observations grouped by
subject). t stands for trend; dendowment equals 0 for the poor and 1 for the
rich. Significance levels are reported in parentheses. The B10,A (CCA)
regression involves 91 (53) left censored and 74 (401) right censored ob-
servations. BIC stands for Bayesian information criterion.
tions where individuals are asymmetrically endowed. Our interpretation of this
finding is that the communicator turns the people’s attention away from an equal
contributions rule. He promotes instead an equal payoffs rule, in particular the
rule that is leading to the highest jointly attainable payoff.
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LEADING BY WORDS IN PRIVILEGED
GROUPS∗
∗This chapter is based on the single-authored article “Leading by word in privileged groups,”
Jena Economic Research Papers 2011-066. This study benefited greatly from discussions with
Oliver Kirchkamp, Werner Güth, Christoph Engel, Gary Bornstein, Vittoria Levati, Sebastian
Krügel, Matthias Uhl, and all participants of the ESI and IMPRS seminars in Jena. Nadine Mar-
mai, Jochen Bick, Tina Hilbig, and Evgenia Grishina provided valuable support in conducting
the experiments.
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4.1 Introduction
In public good provision, the dictate of monetary payoff maximization predicts
inefficient outcomes for the collective (Olson, 1965). While decades of experi-
mental research demonstrate the prevalence of social preferences (see, e.g., Fehr
and Schmidt, 2006), a general willingness to withstand selfish acts is not suffi-
cient to resolve the inefficient provision of public goods. Since individual actors’
decisions are typically highly interdependent (see, e.g., Fischbacher et al., 2001,
Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010), successful collective action also requires a high
level of coordination.
In Chapters 2 and 3, we have shown that one-way communication, i.e., a free-
form text message sent from one group member to his co-players before contri-
bution decisions are made, can provide the means for successful coordination.
The main facts that have emerged from these experiments are (i) that most mes-
sages entail specific suggestions for efficient contributions and (ii) that partici-
pants generally follow these suggestions. Such one-way communication is a use-
ful simplification of real world situations in which communication is uni- rather
than multidirectional. Speeches as a tool to encourage cooperation when formal
authority is lacking are one example. It is therefore important to identify the cir-
cumstances which are conducive to the cooperation-enhancing effect of one-way
communication as well as its underlying mechanisms.
This study reports on a one-shot experiment with asymmetric benefits from
the public good. More specifically, we consider a situation in which the commu-
nicator, i.e., the sender of a message, is also the main beneficiary of cooperation.
Apart from its intuitive appeal, this scenario might challenge the effectiveness of
one-way communication if those who send messages rely on efficient contribu-
tion suggestions as witnessed in previous experiments. Arguably, such prompts
are even more likely if communicators benefit disproportionally from coopera-
tion. Compliance with such suggestions, however, might suffer for at least two
reasons. One such reason is the inequality in payoffs associated with an efficient
provision of the public good. Since compliance with any suggestion is volun-
tary, it is likely to depend on the desirability of the projected outcome. Inequality
averse subjects (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) might thus
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be less likely to follow prompts to cooperate when the benefits from cooperation
are asymmetric. Another reason is that compliance with contribution suggestions
might depend on the recipients’ perception of the sender’s intent. Parallel to
findings on direct reciprocity, i.e., responses to actions (see, e.g., Falk et al., 2008),
intentional ambiguity might diminish cooperative responses to written prompts.
While any message which encourages cooperation in a social dilemma might be
perceived as selfish, this is arguably more likely if the sender also benefits dispro-
portionally from the public good.
In his topology of groups, Olson (1965) identified the particular asymmetry in
benefits from cooperation, which we described before, in what he called “privi-
leged groups.” Such collectives consist of two types of actors: high-benefit group
members for whom the benefits from the public good outweigh the costs for pro-
viding it and low-benefit members, for whom the opposite is the case.1 Olson’s
labeling already signifies the argument that, given actors care only about their
own monetary outcome, privileged groups should enjoy higher quantities of the
public good than normal, non-privileged groups since the latter uniquely con-
sist of low-benefit members.2 The only two experiments that explicitly examined
privileged groups are not univocal with respect to this conjecture.3 Glöckner et al.
(2011) report that the presence of a high-benefit member inhibits the coopera-
tion of low-benefit members, although the former makes efficient contributions.
As a consequence, privileged and normal groups enjoy similar quantities of the
public good. Reuben and Riedl (2009), in contrast, confirm Olson’s conjecture
as correct when punishment opportunities are unavailable. When sanctioning
of (mis)behavior is allowed, however, privileged groups lose their status com-
pletely as low-benefit members largely refuse to react to punishment by high-
benefit members. Reuben and Riedl (2009) thus demonstrate that the term “priv-
1Examples for privileged groups include the international efforts to fight terrorism, where pri-
mary targets such as the U.S. and the U.K. would still have an incentive to provide the funds
needed even if all other country would refuse to assist. Scientific projects may share similar
characteristics. Imagine, e.g., a graduate student who needs a co-authored study to be com-
pleted for his Ph.D.
2This argument is consistent with experimental evidence confirming that the marginal per capita
return for providing the public good is a strong predictor of behavior (see, e.g., Marwell and
Ames, 1979, Isaac and Walker, 1988b, Ledyard, 1995, Fisher et al., 1995).
3Palfrey and Prisbrey (1996, 1997) and Brandts and Schram (2001) allow for the “accidental” for-
mation of privileged groups. Due to the information structure in these experiments, however,
participants were not aware what kind of group was formed in a given period.
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ileged” can be misleading when it comes to the effectiveness of measures against
free riding.
This study reports on the first experiment comparing the effectiveness of one-
way communication in normal vis-à-vis privileged groups.4 The addition of
baseline conditions without any opportunities to communicate also allows for
insights with respect to the conjecture that privileged groups enjoy higher quan-
tities of the public good. The results indicate no such advantage. On the contrary,
low-benefit members contribute even less when matched with a high-benefit
member, which reveals considerable inequality aversion. The effectiveness of
one-way communication, however, is not affected by group composition. Even
messages from senders who benefit disproportionally from cooperation elicit sub-
stantial increases in contributions from low-benefit members. This is also surpris-
ing because the post experimental questionnaire reveals that high-benefit mem-
bers’ messages are suspected of serving egoistic purposes.
What makes one-way communication effective? In Chapters 2 and 3, we em-
phasized the coordinative role of specific contribution suggestions. In this study,
we test an alternative explanation which focuses on the basic fact that communi-
cation enables social interaction ex ante any binding decisions. This aspect is es-
sential to some social psychological explanation attempts as to why (multi-way)
communication enhances cooperation. Based on social identity theory (Tajfel
and Turner, 1986), it is argued that communication may create affinity for the
group and hence more cooperation (see, e.g., Orbell et al., 1988). Accordingly,
well structured argumentation might not even be necessary for communication
to strengthen contributions, and “giving someone a voice” might be sufficient.
We test this conjecture for one-way communication. Specifically, we contrast a
baseline with two communication conditions, only one of which allows for mes-
sages related to the experimental game. Our results show that only game-relevant
messages may increase cooperation beyond the baseline condition. This finding
is in accordance with results from previous studies (Dawes et al., 1977, Bouas
and Komorita, 1996) which compared unrestricted multi-way communication to
conditions that enabled discussion about predefined topics but not the dilemma
4In fact, we are not aware of any public goods experiment that simultaneously allows for com-
munication and asymmetric benefits from cooperation.
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situation itself.
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the
experimental design and procedures. Qualitative hypotheses are discussed in
Section 4.3. Section 4.4 reports on the experimental results regarding contribution
decisions, the communication content, and the post experimental questionnaire.
Section 4.5 summarizes the findings and concludes.
4.2 Experimental Design
4.2.1 The Basic Public Goods Game
In all treatments, participants interact for a single period in a linear voluntary
contribution mechanism (see, e.g., Isaac et al., 1984). Every group consists of
three members, i = {1, 2, 3}, each of whom is endowed with E=25 ECU (Exper-
imental Currency Units). All group members simultaneously decide about their
individual contributions, ci ∈ [0, 25], to the public good. Every ECU a decision
maker keeps is worth 1 ECU to him. Additionally, he earns βi ECU for every
ECU he or any other group member contributes to the public good. We refer to
βi as individual i’s marginal per capita return (MPCR) or marginal benefit (from
cooperation). Individual i’s payoff can be summarized by
pii (c) = 25− ci + βi ×
3∑
j=1
cj , (4.1)
where c = (c1, c2, c3) and
∑3
j=1 cj represent the strategy profile and the sum of
contribution in i’s group, respectively.
Usually, public goods games are parameterized such that they satisfy
0 < βi < 1,∀i and
∑3
i=1 βi > 1. The first inequality implies that a monetary payoff
maximizing decision maker has a dominant solution to contribute nothing since
he incurs a net loss of 1 − βi ECU for every ECU he contributes. However, due
to the second inequality it is efficient to contribute the entire endowment in the
sense that it maximizes the sum of payoffs in a group.
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4.2.2 Experimental Treatments
The experiment follows a 2×3 between subjects design. For the first dimension
we vary the composition of the groups by introducing two types of players. A
normal group consists of three low-benefit members, whose individual marginal ben-
efit from cooperation are equal to βL = 0.6. Privileged groups, in contrast, comprise
two low-benefit and one high-benefit member.5 The latter’s MPCR is set to βH = 1.6.
Classification into player types takes place at random. Note that this implemen-
tation of privileged groups mirrors that in Reuben and Riedl (2009) and is consis-
tent with the definition in the sense of Olson (1965).6
For the second dimension we vary the available communication technology.
The baseline (or B) treatment offers no opportunity to communicate. In two fur-
ther conditions, we allow for one-way communication. We give one randomly
chosen group member, i.e., the communicator, the opportunity to send a writ-
ten message to his co-players prior to the contribution decisions.7 In privileged
groups, the communicator is also the high-benefit member. To ensure that mes-
sages are non-verifiable (and thus cheap talk), the communicators’ contribution
levels could not be identified. The two conditions allowing communication differ
only with respect to the permissible communication content. While relevant one-
way communication allows for messages that relate to the decision situation, ir-
relevant one-way communication does not.8 The two treatments are abbreviated
to RC and IC, respectively. Table 4.1 summarizes the experimental treatments.
4.2.3 Procedures
The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and conducted
in June and July 2011 in the experimental laboratory of the Max Planck Insti-
5In the experiment, high- and low-benefit members were labeled A- and B-types, respectively.
6The only difference compared to Reuben and Riedl (2009) is that in their setup, the types’
MPCRs are set to βL = 0.5 and βH = 1.5. This discrepancy is deliberate as we want to preserve
the social dilemma character of the decision situation also for the subsets of two low-benefit
members.
7In the following, we use the term “follower” to denote those group members who cannot com-
municate in treatments which allow for one-way communication.
8The labels game-relevant and game-irrelevant would be more appropriate as we do not mean to
prejudge any treatment effects. The simplification is intended to serve readability and is in
accordance with previous studies (Dawes et al., 1977, Bouas and Komorita, 1996).
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Table 4.1: Experimental Treatments
Treatment Normal groups Privileged groups
(3 low-benefit members) (1 high-, 2 low-benefit members)
B no communication no communication
RC relevant communication,low-benefit communicator
relevant communication,
high-benefit communicator
IC irrelevant communication,low-benefit communicator
irrelevant communication,
high-benefit communicator
tute of Economics in Jena, Germany. The participants were undergraduate stu-
dents from the Friedrich Schiller University Jena.9 They were recruited using the
ORSEE system (Greiner, 2004). Upon arrival, participants were seated at visually
separated computer terminals. The instructions were distributed and then read
aloud to establish common knowledge.10 The comprehension of the experimen-
tal rules was tested by means of a control questionnaire. Any questions were
answered privately at the participants’ seats.
In both treatments allowing communication, the communicator had up to
four minutes to compose his message but was also able to finish ahead of time.
The implementation of relevant and irrelevant communication differed only with
respect to the set of restrictions to the otherwise free-form messages. In both
cases, the communicator was neither allowed to violate anonymity, nor to promise
side payments, nor to threaten the other group members with anything that
might occur after the experiment. As for irrelevant communication, the mes-
sages were additionally restricted to statements not relating to the experiment.11
9None of the subjects had previously participated in a public goods game experiment with com-
munication opportunities.
10All instructions can be found in Appendix C.3.
11Implementing irrelevant communication in this way has the shortcoming that communicators
may try to circumvent the restriction, e.g., by using clever wording or metaphors. An alter-
native would be to record the communicators’ messages before distributing the instructions.
While the latter method precludes any reference to the specifics of the public goods game, it
does not entirely prevent the communicator from relating his message to the experiment. More
specifically, subjects experienced in experimental paradigms such as the trust game might
expect cooperation to be an important element of the experiment. As communicators, they
might then attempt to promote “full cooperation” even without knowledge of the game and
its parametrization.
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All messages were collected, screened by an experimenter, and delivered simul-
taneously. If any restrictions were violated, the message was blocked and the
communicator was notified about his misconduct. Such an incident happened
only once in a normal group in treatment IC. It was common knowledge that
(a) the messages were cheap talk (i.e., costless, non-binding, and non-verifiable),
(b) all group members received exactly the same message from the group’s com-
municator, and (c) only after having read the communicator’s message could the
group members decide simultaneously on their individual contributions.
The experimental procedure included four practice periods in which partici-
pants were matched with computerized agents programmed to choose contribu-
tions randomly. In treatments RC and IC, the practice periods did not include the
communication stage. After the experiment, all participants received information
about the other group members’ individual contributions. Before the feedback
was delivered, we distributed an unincentivized questionnaire to elicit the sub-
jects’ identification with their group, first order action beliefs, and the followers’
perception regarding the intention underlying the communicator’s message.12,13
The questionnaire items’ exact wording can be found in Appendix C.1.
Sessions lasted 60 minutes on average. Payoffs were quoted in ECU, where 1
ECU = 20 euro cents. High- and low-benefit group members earned on average
16.60 and 10.10 euro, respectively, including a 2.50 euro show-up fee.
4.3 Hypotheses
4.3.1 No Communication – Baseline
Given preferences to maximize own monetary payoffs, group composition should
not affect behavior since both types of players have dominant strategies. A high-
benefit member should contribute his whole endowment since he earns a net
benefit of 1.6 − 1 = 0.6 ECU for every ECU he contributes. A low-benefit mem-
ber, in contrast, is expected to contribute nothing to the public good. Decades
12Since our main focus was on contribution decisions, we followed the advice in Gächter and
Renner (2010) and elicited beliefs without payment.
13Delivering feedback after the questionnaire precluded the possibility that the participants’ an-
swers were affected by statements about payoffs.
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of experimental research, however, have rejected the latter prediction (see, e.g.,
Chaudhuri, 2011) and it is thus reasonable to expect some positive contributions
also from low-benefit members.
If we relax our assumptions and allow for preferences for equitable mone-
tary outcomes, the behavioral predictions change. Outcome-based models (see,
e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) take into account that
the privileged member benefits disproportionally from cooperation within the
group. In fact, the only uniform contribution decision by all group members
which leads to strict equality in payoffs is when overall contributions equal zero.
Strictly positive contributions from low-benefit types increase the inequality in
payoffs between the decision maker and the high-benefit member by exactly the
same amount since βH − βL = 1. Notice that by the same argument, it is ex-
clusively the low-benefit group members’ contributions which generate payoff
discrepancies across player types. A low-benefit group member who is sensitive
to the inequality in payoffs is thus predicted to contribute less in privileged than
in normal groups.
In both, normal and privileged groups, a contribution always benefits the
group more than it costs the contributor. The aggregate effect on overall pay-
offs, however, differs according to group composition. While a contribution of 1
ECU generates a total payoff of 3 × 0.6 = 1.8 ECU in normal groups, this figure
amounts to 2× 0.6 + 1.6 = 2.8 ECU in privileged groups. This discrepancy might
lead to differences in behavior if participants’ choices are guided by concerns for
overall efficiency (see, e.g., Engelmann and Strobel, 2004). While a preference for
overall efficiency coincides with monetary payoff maximization for high-benefit
types, it counteracts the incentive to free ride for low-benefit members.
In summary, it can be said that high-benefit members are expected to con-
tribute their whole endowment under monetary payoff maximization. Neither
inequality aversion nor a preference for efficiency contradict this prediction. We
propose our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4.1. High-benefit group members contribute their entire endowment.
Both, maximization of the own monetary payoff and preferences for equality in
payoffs, predict lower contributions from low- than from high-benefit types, lead-
ing to Hypothesis 4.2:
54
Chapter 4: Leading by Words in Privileged Groups
Hypothesis 4.2. High-benefit group members contribute more than low-benefit mem-
bers.
It is not straight-forward how the composition of groups will affect low-benefit
types. Preferences for efficiency suggest higher contributions, while preferences
for equality suggest lower contributions in privileged than in normal groups.
While, strictly speaking, we are not in a position to propose a precise behav-
ioral hypothesis ex ante, the observed behavior will help us to make an inference
about the relative strength of the opposing effects ex post.
4.3.2 One-Way Communication
In social dilemma experiments, participants seize communication opportunities
usually in an attempt to mitigate the free-rider problem. In our setup, however,
high-benefit members are essentially unproblematic since they themselves have
an incentive to provide the public good. As a consequence, neither relevant nor
irrelevant one-way communication are expected to change the behavior of high-
benefit members and thus we state:
Hypothesis 4.3. High-benefit group members contribute their entire endowment irre-
spective of any communication opportunities.
Since high-benefit members should remain unaffected, we exclusively con-
centrate on the low-benefit types when discussing the potential effects of one-way
communication.
Relevant Communication
If we assume common knowledge of rationality and preferences to maximize
monetary outcomes, then costless, non-binding, and non-verifiable messages are,
of course, pure cheap talk. Consequently, they should not affect the behavior
of low-benefit members. However, previous studies on (relevant) one-way com-
munication in normal groups have rejected this prediction. Even for the case
in which subjects interact for a single period, relevant one-way messages have
a strong and positive effect on overall cooperation (see Chapter 2). Since our
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setup is different from theirs only with respect to the parametrization of the pub-
lic goods game, we expect to replicate the effect for normal groups. We formulate
Hypothesis 4.4.
Hypothesis 4.4. In normal groups, contributions are higher with relevant one-way com-
munication than with no communication.
In Chapters 2 and 3, we observe that the majority of messages contain spe-
cific contribution suggestions, which mostly point to full cooperation, and that
these suggestions are followed by the majority of participants. We conjectured
that messages function as a coordination device, which is plausible as, e.g., pref-
erences for conditional cooperation can transform the social dilemma into a co-
ordination game with multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria (see, e.g., Sen, 1967, Fehr
and Fischbacher, 2002).14 It is also consistent with a stream of literature in social
psychology (Kelley and Thibaut, 1978, Kelley, 1979) which argues that the (ex-
perimentally) “given” payoff matrix might diverge from the “effective” matrix
and that the latter is directly linked to behavior. Or, as the sociologist Peter Kol-
lock (1998a, p. 193) put it: “There is, after all, no guarantee that subjects play an
experimental game as intended by the researcher [...] .”
There is little reason to expect that high-benefit communicators will be less
likely than low-benefit communicators to try and promote high cooperation. Af-
ter all, they have an even greater interest to do so, as they benefit disproportion-
ally from the public good. Whether they are similarly successful will depend on
the desirability of high cooperation for low-benefit types in privileged groups.
Assume, for instance, that a communicator suggests full cooperation. Unani-
mous compliance with such a suggestion would lead to higher overall payoffs in
privileged than in normal groups. The distribution of payoffs, however, would
be equal in normal and maximally unequal in privileged groups since the total
surplus is solely earned by the high-benefit communicator. Thus, if low-benefit
types strive for efficiency, their compliance with high contribution suggestions
might be high also in privileged groups. Compliance and thus the cooperation-
enhancing effect of one-way communication might seriously suffer, though, if
low-benefit types dislike payoff inequalities.
14According to Fischbacher et al. (2001) conditional cooperation can either be viewed as a conse-
quence of, e.g., fairness motives or as a preference in itself.
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Contribution suggestions by communicators are not only cheap talk but may
also exhibit some self-serving character. If a communicator believes (with pos-
itive probability) that high contribution suggestions will, on average, lead to
higher contributions, he will always want to promote cooperation. While this
is true for both types of groups, the self-serving character of contribution sugges-
tions seems intuitively more salient in the case of asymmetric marginal benefits,
where communicators are also the main beneficiaries of cooperative play. We
know, e.g., from research on trust games, that intentions are crucial for recipro-
cal action (see, e.g., McCabe et al., 2003, Falk et al., 2008). We are not aware of
a similar result which connects the effectiveness of communication to the per-
ceived intention underlying the communication content. If such a relationship
exists, however, a higher saliency of selfish intentions is likely to lead to lower
compliance with suggestions to cooperate.
Depending on the desirability of efficiency or payoff equality and the sensitiv-
ity to perceived intentions, one-way communication, or, more precisely, specific
contribution suggestions might be more or less effective in privileged vis-à-vis
normal groups. We suspect that the net effect will be correlated with how be-
havior of low-benefit members compares across both types of groups. Lower co-
operation in the presence of the high-benefit member, for instance, would signal
inequality aversion, which should weaken the effectiveness of one-way commu-
nication.
Irrelevant Communication
It has been a long-standing conjecture in social psychology that communication
affects cooperation in social dilemmas by manipulating the social environment
(see, e.g., Orbell et al., 1988). The same may be true for one-way communica-
tion. By sending their message, communicators might create an environment in
which participants perceive their group no longer as anonymous and randomly
assembled but rather as a social entity bound together by fate.15 Research in soci-
ology and social psychology suggests that even arbitrary categorization can lead
15In a similar vein, Greiner et al. (forthcoming) show that one-way video messages by receivers
affect behavior in a dictator game. This result demonstrates that communication may have an
impact in the absence of strategic effects. It is not directly applicable to our setup, however,
since, in their experiment, messages could relate to the experimental game.
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to higher cooperation in social dilemmas (see, e.g., Simpson, 2006, Yamagishi and
Mifune, 2008). Thus, communicators’ messages might not have to relate to the ex-
perimental game for one-way communication to be efficiency-enhancing. “Giv-
ing one group member a voice” might be sufficient to elicit identification with
the group and enhance cooperation. This line of reasoning is equally applicable
to normal as well as privileged groups and suggests the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4.5. Irrelevant one-way communication, i.e., messages unrelated to the ex-
perimental game, leads to higher cooperation than no communication.
Previous empirical findings cast doubt on the validity of this hypothesis. In
two separate experiments, Dawes et al. (1977) as well as Bouas and Komorita
(1996) find that even irrelevant multi-way communication (i.e., communication
among all group members on a topic other than the experiment) does not lead to
higher cooperation rates than no communication at all.16 If “giving everyone in a
group a voice” does not suffice to promote cooperation, it is doubtful that giving
only one person a voice will.
4.4 Results
We conducted one session per treatment with 30 participants each. The data anal-
ysis is based on 10 group averages per treatment since communication allows
for correlated decisions within groups.17 Consequently, data is also averaged by
group for analysis on a more disaggregate level, i.e., for low-benefit members
or followers. Unless stated otherwise, we will use two-sided Wilcoxon rank sum
tests for comparisons across treatments and two-sided Wilcoxon signed rank tests
to compare matched pairs within treatments.18 We first investigate contribution
decisions. Afterward, we advance to the analysis of the communication content
and the data from the post experimental questionnaire.
16For experimental evidence on game-irrelevant communication in an ultimatum bargaining
game, see Roth (1995).
17In case of irrelevant communication, we exclude the group for which the message was blocked
from our entire analysis. All results are robust to its inclusion.
18The null hypothesis of a Wilcoxon rank sum test states that both independent samples are
drawn from the same population. A Wilcoxon signed rank test requires for any observation
in one sample a unique counterpart in the paired sample. It tests the null hypothesis that the
difference in medians between the samples is equal to zero.
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4.4.1 Contribution Decisions
Figure 4.1, panel a, depicts the average group contributions in normal groups for
all three conditions. It shows that average contribution increase steeply when
relevant one-way communication is allowed both with respect to the baseline
and with respect to treatment IC. Irrelevant one-way messages, in contrast, are
associated with lower overall cooperation than no communication at all. Non-
parametric tests confirm this impression. While relevant messages lead to sig-
nificantly higher contributions both with respect to the baseline (p = 0.01) and
irrelevant messages (p = 0.004), the latter two conditions show no significant
differences (p = 0.44). Moreover, the same result holds if we exclude the com-
municators’ decisions (p = 0.02, B vs. RC; p = 0.65, B vs. IC; p = 0.02, RC vs.
IC).
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Figure 4.1: Average Group Contributions and 95% Confidence Intervals
The general picture for privileged groups, which is depicted in panel b of
Figure 4.1, is qualitatively similar to that of normal groups. It is again relevant
communication which elicits the highest average contributions. The absolute and
relative advantage of one-way messages with respect to the baseline and treat-
ment IC, however, seems smaller in privileged than in normal groups The null
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hypothesis of equality in distributions is rejected on the 10% significance level
only for the comparison between relevant communication and the baseline con-
dition (p = 0.053). No other pairwise comparison reveals a significant difference
(p = 0.16, RC vs. IC; p = 0.82, B vs. IC). We summarize with our first result.
Result 4.1. We confirm that relevant one-way communication elicits higher average co-
operation than no communication in a public goods game with normal groups. The effect
also proves to be robust in privileged groups. The cooperation-enhancing effect of one-way
communication is, however, confined to (game-)relevant messages. Merely “giving one
group member a voice” does not suffice for one-way communication to increase coopera-
tion. We do (do not) find that relevant messages lead to significantly higher contributions
than irrelevant messages in normal (privileged) groups.
In order to assess the alleged advantage of privileged over normal groups,
we compare the contributions across the two panels of Figure 4.1. While average
contributions are virtually identical in the two baseline conditions, contributions
are higher in normal than in privileged groups when relevant communication is
allowed. This relation is reversed when we consider irrelevant communication.
Pairwise comparisons, however, fail to reject the null hypothesis of equality in
distributions for all three conditions (p = 0.97 for B; p = 0.18 for RC; p = 0.22 for
IC). We summarize with our second result.
Result 4.2. Irrespective of whether we allow for no communication, relevant, or irrele-
vant one-way communication, we do not find support for the claim that contributions are
higher in privileged than in normal groups.
Both previous results have to be treated cautiously, as average group contri-
butions may mask considerable heterogeneity in behavior across different player
types. Figure 4.2 depicts type-specific contributions, where those of low-benefit
members represent group averages.19 Let us consider privileged groups. Hy-
pothesis 4.3 holds that high-benefit members contribute their entire endowment
irrespective of any communication opportunities. Low-benefit types are expected
to contribute significantly less (see Hypothesis 4.2) but might be affected by one-
way communication. Our data lend support to these conjectures. High-benefit
19The bars for normal groups are identical to those in panel a of Figure 4.1 since normal groups
exclusively consist of low-benefit members.
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Figure 4.2: Type-Specific Contributions and 95% Confidence Intervals
members contribute, on average, between 88% and 98% of their endowment. In
fact, 24 out of 30 individual observations are exactly equal to the entire endow-
ment. Two-sided t-tests do not detect a location shift away from 25 ECU in any
of the conditions (p = 0.12 for B; p = 0.26 for RC; p = 0.34 for IC). Further-
more, pairwise comparisons fail to reject the null hypothesis of equal distribu-
tions across conditions with and without communication opportunities (small-
est p-value: p = 0.28 for RC). While high-benefit group members’ contributions
are very close to full efficiency, the contributions from low-benefit members fall
short of that mark. On average, they contribute 29%, 56.8%, and 32.6% of their
endowment in treatments B, RC, and IC, respectively. Comparing contributions
between the different player types, the null hypothesis is rejected on the 1% sig-
nificance level for both treatments B and IC (both p = 0.005) and on the 10% level
for treatment RC (p = 0.08). Unlike high-benefit members’ decisions, those of
low-benefit members are sensitive to the availability of communication opportu-
nities. This is already visible on the group level and becomes even more evident
on the individual level, where the efficient contribution is observed only once in
each treatment B and IC but nine times in treatment RC. Pairwise comparisons
of low-benefit types’ contributions reveal that relevant one-way messages lead to
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higher cooperation than the baseline treatment, though irrelevant messages do
not (p = 0.04, B vs. RC; p = 0.97, B vs. IC). As for relevant communication, con-
tributions are marginally significantly higher than for irrelevant communication
(p = 0.095). Figure 4.2 also suggests that relevant messages lead to similar (ab-
solute) increases in low-benefit members’ contributions in both types of groups.
These findings qualify Result 4.1 and show that relevant one-way communication
is effective in privileged groups, specifically as it leads to higher contributions by
low-benefit members. We summarize with our third result.
Result 4.3. In privileged groups, behavior is type-specific. High-benefit group members
contribute almost their entire endowment irrespective of any communication opportuni-
ties. Low-benefit members contribute significantly less than high-benefit members, unless
relevant one-way messages are possible. Relevant one-way communication affects low-
but not high-benefit members’ decisions. Irrelevant messages are never effective.
Result 4.2 does not support the presupposed advantage for privileged groups
but, according to Result 4.3, this is not due to the lack of contributions from high-
benefit members. It is thus of interest to compare the behavior of low-benefit
members across the different types of groups. Figure 4.2 shows that low-benefit
members’ contributions are lower in privileged groups for all three treatments.
The discrepancy between privileged and normal groups is more pronounced in
treatments B (4.7 ECU) and RC (5.0 ECU) than in treatment IC (1.5 ECU). Pairwise
comparisons reveal that the difference is significant in the baseline treatment (p =
0.03), weakly significant with relevant messages (p = 0.09), and far from being
significant with irrelevant messages (p = 0.57). We summarize with our fourth
result.
Result 4.4. Low-benefit members’ contribution decisions are sensitive to the presence of
the high-benefit member as contributions tend to be lower in privileged than in normal
groups when communication opportunities are either absent or if relevant messages are
allowed.
This result deserves some discussion. First, note that Reuben and Riedl (2009)
do not find that low-benefit members’ decisions are sensitive to group composi-
tion. This discrepancy might be explained by their choice of a repeated partners
62
Chapter 4: Leading by Words in Privileged Groups
design which allows for reputation building. The opportunity to act strategi-
cally might induce low-benefit members to cooperate even if they dislike pay-
off inequalities. Glöckner et al. (2011) report that the presence of a high-benefit
member deters cooperation of low-benefit members but only after a restart fol-
lowing ten initial periods. Our result is complementary as it shows that this
effect does not rely on long sequences of repetitions. Result 4.4 is also infor-
mative with respect to the effectiveness of relevant one-way communication in
privileged groups. It demonstrates that low-benefit types’ contribution decisions
are sensitive to payoff inequalities. We argue in Section 4.3 that such sensitiv-
ity could weaken the cooperation-enhancing effect of one-way communication
in privileged groups. Results 4.1 and 4.3, however, show that relevant one-way
messages are similarly effective in both types of groups. One possible explana-
tion is that efficiency concerns, when voiced by the communicator, become in-
creasingly important in the decision process. We discuss this in more detail in
Section 4.4.2.
Results 4.1 through 4.3 show that relevant one-way communication yields an
increase in contributions to the public good irrespective of group composition.
But who benefits from this increase in cooperation? In order to answer this ques-
tion, we investigate participants’ payoffs, which are summarized in Table 4.2.
In normal groups, group-averaged payoffs are significantly higher in treat-
ment RC than in the baseline and in treatment IC (both p = 0.01). The additional
earnings benefit followers and, to a minor extent, also communicators. While fol-
lowers in RC earn significantly more than both followers in IC and participants
in the baseline treatment (both p < 0.02), the respective comparisons are only
weakly significant (p = 0.07) and insignificant (p = 0.18) for communicators.
In privileged groups, the increase in average earnings associated with rele-
vant one-way communication is less pronounced. In particular, average payoffs
are only weakly significantly higher in treatment RC than in B and not signifi-
cantly different for all other pairwise comparisons (p = 0.054, B vs. RC; p = 0.82,
B vs. IC; p = 0.16, RC vs. IC). Since high-benefit members benefit disproportion-
ally from the public good, it is not surprising that they earn significantly more
than low-benefit members in all three treatments (all p < 0.01). A comparison be-
tween treatments, however, also reveals that high-benefit members are the only
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Table 4.2: Payoffs by Treatment and Player Type
Treatment Average Communicator / Follower /high-benefit low-benefit
B 9.46 – 9.46
Normal groups RC 10.66 10.64 10.67
IC 9.08 9.67 8.79
B 12.09 14.99 10.64
Privileged groups RC 13.61 19.27 10.78
IC 12.42 15.67 10.79
Note: Payoffs are denoted in euro and include the 2.50 euro show-up fee.
beneficiaries of the opportunity to send (game-)relevant messages in privileged
groups. While low-benefit members earn virtually the same in all three treat-
ments (all p > 0.12), high-benefit members earn significantly more in treatment
RC than in the baseline (p = 0.04).20 In fact, while the average earnings differen-
tial between player types amounts to 4.35 and 4.88 euro in B and IC, respectively,
it roughly doubles to 8.49 euro in treatment RC.21
4.4.2 Communication Content
We categorize the messages in treatment RC according to the scheme described
in Table 4.3. All methodological details can be found in Appendix C.2. Table 4.4
reports the categories’ relative frequencies of appearance in the messages’ argu-
mentation.
On average, a message entails arguments according to 4.8 and 4.2 categories
in normal and privileged groups, respectively. We treat this as a sign that most
communicators took their task seriously, trying to make an impact with their mes-
sages. In many respects, the messages are very similar in both types of groups.
In normal as well as privileged groups, the majority of messages incorporates
suggestions for specific (category 1) and efficient (category 2) contributions cou-
20No other pairwise comparison for high-benefit members reveals significant differences (p =
0.93, B vs. IC; p = 0.11, RC vs. IC).
21The earnings differential between high- and low-benefit members is significantly larger in RC
than in B (p = 0.04), weakly significantly so in RC than in IC (p = 0.096), and not different for
B and IC (p = 0.97).
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pled with an emphasis on the importance of conformity within the group (cate-
gory 3).22 Statements pointing to fairness (category 7) or team spirit (category 8),
which are most likely meant as auxiliary arguments to substantiate the contribu-
tion suggestions, are less frequent but present for both types of groups.23 Half
of all communicators signal their contribution intentions (category 9).24 Most of
them specifically promise to contribute their entire endowment. Note that such
a promise is credible in privileged groups, as communicators are high-benefit
members, but not in normal groups.
Apart from these similarities, there are some noticeable differences in the mes-
sages’ content between the different types of groups. In fact, comparing the dis-
tributions of arguments between types of groups, a one-sided Fisher exact test
gives some indication that the distribution of category appearance depends on
group composition (p = 0.07). Most strikingly, we observe payoff calculations
for seven out of ten normal groups but only for one privileged group. This dif-
ference is significant according to a two-sided Fisher exact test (p = 0.02). One
rationalization for this observation might be that payoff calculations facilitate the
demonstration of possible gains from cooperation but, at the same time, may also
highlight the salience of payoff inequalities. High-benefit communicators might
thus avoid computations altogether if they expect low-benefit types to be inequal-
ity averse. Instead, they might try to point out the possibility of efficiency gains
in different ways, which is what we observe. Six high-benefit communicators
mention group payoff maximization (category 5) – twice as many as in normal
groups. This difference is, however, not significant (p = 0.37, two-sided Fisher
exact test).
We have not categorized messages in treatment IC since they tend to be very
heterogenous in their content. Many of them include only one “argument,” if
any. Three messages, for instance, merely incorporate the wish that the other
group members may enjoy the experiment. Other messages just consist of nurs-
22While this is in accordance with the results for treatment C in Chapter 2, note that the relative
frequency of suggestions is somewhat lower in the present study.
23Statements which relate to satisfaction (category 6) are absent in normal as well as privileged
groups. We incorporate this category in order to facilitate comparison with the results in
previous chapters.
24Note that the 40% promises in normal groups mirror the relative frequency of pledges in treat-
ment C in Chapter 2.
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Table 4.4: Relative Frequency of the Arguments’ Presence with
Relevant Communication
Category Argument Relative frequency
Normal Privileged
groups groups
1 Suggestion 0.8 0.7
2 Efficient suggestion 0.7 0.6
3 Conformity 0.9 0.6
4 Payoff calculation 0.7 0.1
5 Group payoff maximization 0.3 0.6
6 Satisfaction 0 0
7 Fairness 0.3 0.1
8 Team spirit 0.3 0.4
9 Promise 0.4 0.6
Note: The relative frequencies are based on 10 observations for each
type of group.
ery rhymes. Four messages are seemingly intended to entertain the receivers as
they contain a joke or humorous summary of the daily news. The only message
that was blocked referred to the upcoming contribution decision and the possible
payoffs.25 Perhaps most rich in content, six messages relate to general fairness
ideas (“love your neighbor as yourself,” “harm set, harm get”) or invoke solidar-
ity principles (three senders mention the slogan of Dumas’ musketeers “one for
all, all for one”).
4.4.3 Post Experimental Questionnaire
Group Identification
Some studies in social psychology argue that the effects of communication are
driven by enhanced group identification. If this was the case (and given our re-
sults in Section 4.4.1), we should expect group members to identify more with
their group in treatment RC than in the baseline. The ineffectiveness of irrele-
25We observe only one obvious attempt to circumvent the restrictions and still hint to to some
desired contribution level. The sender of this message fabricates a story and mentions the
number 25 wherever possible, but he never relates to the experiment. The average contribu-
tion from low-benefit members in that particular privileged group is 7.5 ECU.
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vant one-way communication, in turn, might be explained by the lack of such an
increase in identification. The data from the post experimental questionnaire per-
mit us to investigate these conjectures. We calculate a participant’s mean identifi-
cation score as his average response to all four items. Comparing group averages
across treatments, we find for normal groups that identification is indeed weakly
significantly higher in RC than in B (p = 0.06) and not significantly different oth-
erwise (p = 0.97, B vs. IC; p = 0.12, RC vs. IC).26 The data from normal groups
are thus not inconsistent with previous conjectures.
The picture changes when we consider privileged groups. While, on the
group level, mean identification scores are weakly significantly higher in RC than
in the baseline (p = 0.06), this is not the case for low-benefit members (p = 0.21).
Since it is precisely the low-benefit members who react to relevant communica-
tion in privileged groups, the latter observation is inconsistent with the claim
that communication works via enhancing group identification. A further puz-
zling observation is that irrelevant one-way messages lead to significantly higher
identification than the baseline for group averages as well as for averages of low-
benefit members (p = 0.02 and p = 0.03, respectively).27 If communication was
to affect cooperation via group identification, we should observe higher contri-
butions in IC than in the baseline for privileged groups. The fact that we do not
casts doubt on the conjectured link between (higher) identification and enhanced
cooperation. It is thus also possible that the increased identification in treatment
RC for normal groups is a by-product rather the driving force behind the effec-
tiveness of relevant one-way messages.
Message Perception
In treatment RC, the majority of communicators makes specific contribution sug-
gestions. Although these may always be interpreted as serving the communica-
tor’s monetary interest, we conjectured in Section 4.3 that such an interpretation
was more likely in privileged groups, where the incentive structure highlights the
communicator’s interest in the public good. We also surmised that the perception
26This result proves robust if we focus on group averages of non-communicators (p = 0.096, B
vs. RC; p = 0.73, B vs. IC; p = 0.32, RC vs. IC).
27In privileged groups, identification is not different for treatments RC and IC, neither for group
averages nor for averages of low-benefit members.
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that a suggestion serves a egoistic purpose might reduce the rate of compliance.
Result 4.3 shows, however, that relevant messages increase the cooperation of
low-benefit members also in privileged groups. The question arises whether this
is due to the fact that followers are unaware of the messages’ potentially egoistic
character or that this property is unimportant for their decisions.
The questionnaire data (cf. item 9, Appendix C.1) might help to shed light on
this question. Followers had to rate their degree of consent to a statement portray-
ing the message they received as intended to maximize the communicator’s own
payoff. The data show that followers (averaged by group) have a significantly
higher tendency to agree with this statement in privileged than in normal groups
(p = 0.001).28 Since it is not the lack of awareness, followers’ choices must be in-
sensitive with respect to perceived selfish purpose of messages. And indeed, the
correlation between average follower contributions and their average responses
to this questionnaire item turns out to be virtually zero (ρ = 0.02, p = 0.97). This
insight is somewhat surprising as we know that perceived intentions are a crucial
determinant of reciprocity (Falk et al., 2008). Despite the obvious discrepancy that
the latter result deals with reactions to actions and not written statements, both
situations share a seemingly crucial aspect. The sum and distribution of payoffs
always depend on some agents’ willingness to react to another agent’s attempt to
stimulate cooperation.
Expected Contributions
In Section 4.3 and in previous chapters, we have argued that relevant one-way
messages, and, more specifically, contribution suggestions may serve as a co-
ordination device. This concept assigns a critical role to expectations as sug-
gestions supposedly affect prior beliefs about what to expect from other group
members. Conditional cooperators should be sensitive to such changes in expec-
tations. The questionnaire data reported in Table 4.5 provide some support for
these conjectures.29 On the group level, average expectations proof to be signifi-
cantly higher in treatment RC than in the baseline for both types of groups (both
p = 0.01). Irrelevant messages, on the other hand, do not significantly affect av-
28This is not the case for irrelevant messages (p = 0.73).
29Cf. items 5 to 8 in Appendix C.1.
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Table 4.5: Expected Contributions by Treatment and Player Type
Treatment Average Communicator / Follower /high-benefit low-benefit
about:
high-benefit low-benefit
B 12.4 – – 12.4
Normal
groups RC 18.1 16.2 – 19.1
IC 11 8.2 – 12.4
B 12.1 9.5 19.3 7.5
Privileged
groups RC 15.4 11.4 23.6 11.1
IC 13.4 11.2 21.4 7.6
Note: In order to obtain one (average) measure per privileged group, we first calculate a low-
benefit member’s average expectation as the mean of what he expects from both his co-players.
Then, we average the expectations of all three group members.
erage expectations compared to the baseline treatment (p > 0.41, for both types
of groups).30 Interestingly, we do not find significant differences between ex-
pectations of communicators in treatment RC and those of average participants
in the baseline treatment (p = 0.59) for normal groups. The same holds for high-
benefit members’ expectations in treatments RC and B (p = 0.29).31 This result
is remarkable as it indicates that communicators in treatment RC did not believe
that their messages would enhance cooperation. Instead, it is followers who trust
in the effectiveness of relevant one-way messages. In normal groups, they report
significantly higher expectations in treatment RC than the average member in the
baseline and followers in treatment IC (both p < 0.01). In privileged groups, this
tendency is less marked as low-benefit members’ expectations about the other
low-benefit member’s action are only weakly significantly higher in treatment
RC than in the baseline and not significantly different otherwise (p = 0.095, B vs.
RC; p = 0.88, B vs. IC; p = 0.12, RC vs. IC). Surprisingly, however, low-benefit
members’ expectations about high-benefit contributions are affected by relevant
30Relevant messages elicit significantly higher average expectations than irrelevant ones only in
normal but not in privileged groups (p = 0.01 and p = 0.16, respectively).
31Communicators of normal groups report significantly lower expectations in treatment IC than
communicators in RC or the average member in the baseline (p = 0.02 and p = 0.048, respec-
tively). There are no significant differences in expectations for high-benefit members for any
combination of treatments (p > 0.29, for all cases).
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messages (p = 0.01).32 This indicates that enhanced cooperation of low-benefit
members in treatment RC might partially be due to a conditionally cooperative
reaction to a falsely assumed (cf. Result 4.3) increase in contributions from high-
benefit members. In summary, the belief data suggest that relevant but not ir-
relevant one-way communication generates more optimistic expectations about
others’ contributions. Most astonishingly, this effect is exclusively visible for fol-
lowers.
4.5 Conclusions
In this study, we use a one-shot public goods game to investigate contribution
behavior in privileged vis-à-vis normal groups with and without one-way com-
munication. The contribution to the literature is three-fold.
First, we provide evidence that contribution behavior can be inversely related
to other group members’ marginal benefits from the public good when interac-
tion is one-shot. While efficiency concerns would predict the opposite, the re-
sult is in accordance with fairness theories (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, Bolton and
Ockenfels, 2000) which account for payoff inequalities resulting from asymmet-
ric marginal benefits. The lack of personal sacrifice in contributions from high-
benefit members constitutes an alternative explanation (Glöckner et al., 2011). If
personal sacrifice is defined dichotomously, a future experiment might succeed
in distinguishing these two explanations by comparing normal and privileged
groups to intermediate groups, in which marginal benefits are asymmetric but
the dominance of free riding is preserved. Our results have implications for the
alleged advantage of privileged groups (Olson, 1965). They show that the under-
provision of the public good in privileged compared to normal groups depends
on two opposing effects. The first effect is that high-benefit members contribute
higher amounts than low-benefit members in normal groups. The other is that the
presence of a high-benefit member inhibits cooperation by low-benefit members.
Which of these effects dominates might depend on group composition. When
they have many low- and few high-benefit members, privileged groups might
32Separate t-tests reject the null hypothesis that followers expected high-benefit members to con-
tribute the entire endowment for all three treatments (p < 0.02, for all cases).
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even enjoy lower quantities of the public good than normal groups.
Second, we confirm that one-way communication yields enhanced coopera-
tion even if a sender of the message benefits disproportionally from the public
good. Followers comply with communicators’ persuasion attempts (i) despite
their awareness that these might be based on self-serving intentions rather than a
desire to benefit the group and (ii) despite the fact that such behavior inevitably
yields unfavorable payoff inequality for themselves. The first aspect suggests
that, in contrast to reciprocity with respect to actions, compliance with contri-
bution suggestions does not depend on perceived intentions. The second as-
pect indicates that followers accept payoff inequalities more readily when one-
way communication is available. One possible explanation for this observation
is that communicators’ arguments increase the weight of efficiency considera-
tions in the decision making process. Overall, our experimental evidence makes
a compelling case for the robustness of the effectiveness of one-way communi-
cation. This property should not be taken for granted. Reuben and Riedl (2009)
have already shown that even the power of punishment opportunities tumbles in
privileged groups.
Third, we test and reject the conjecture that one-way communication affects
cooperation merely by “giving someone a voice.” Messages which are restricted
to topics other than the experiment do not affect contribution decisions irrespec-
tive of group composition. This result suggests that the mechanism underlying
the effectiveness of one-way messages resides within the communication con-
tent.
72
CHAPTER 5
LEADING BY EXAMPLE IN
INTERGROUP COMPETITION: AN
EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH∗
∗This chapter is based on the single-authored article “Leading by example in in-
tergroup competition: An experimental approach,” Jena Economic Research
Papers 2011-067. This study benefited greatly from discussions with Oliver
Kirchkamp, Werner Güth, Christoph Engel, Vittoria Levati, Ro’i Zultan, Mat-
teo Ploner, Sebastian Krügel, Matthias Uhl, and all participants of the ESI and
IMPRS seminars in Jena. Adrian Liebtrau provided valuable assistance in programming and
conducting the experiments.
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5.1 Introduction
Effective leadership is an important element in modern organizations. It serves
as a means to motivate effort from personnel in circumstances of incomplete con-
tracts or where formal authority is lacking. Leading by example is, perhaps, the
most basic form of leadership. It comes in many forms: the CEO working for
a symbolic salary of 1$ when his company demands pay cuts from its employ-
ees, the foreman being the first on the site and the last to leave, or union leaders
joining the street protests. Historical examples outside for-profit organizations
include Martin Luther King’s participation in the freedom marches or Joseph
Stalin’s decision to stay in Moscow during World War II (Hermalin, 1998).
This study reports on an experiment in which we extend the research on lead-
ing by example to a situation relevant to many organizations: a scenario of in-
tergroup conflict within the firm. Intergroup conflict occurs when the interests of
two or more groups are in opposition. This readily translates to the organizational
context as groups, like departments or work teams, compete over scarce resources
imposed by limitations in space, budget, or labor supply. The notion of group
conflict is often exclusively associated with detrimental consequences which may
arise as rivals have the incentive to waste resources for conflict-related activities.
It may, however, also be used to the benefit of the organization (de Dreu and van
de Vliert, 1997).1 Examples include Oppenheimer’s use of competing groups in
the Manhattan Project (Gosling, 1999) and within-firm R&D competitions, e.g., at
Samsung (Chen and Li, 2007).
The experimental literature examines leading by example in the environment
of linear public goods games – an experimental paradigm, which is often used
to study team work. Leading by example is implemented via a semi-sequential
decision protocol. The leader acts as the first mover. His decision is revealed to
the remaining group members who then decide simultaneously on their contribu-
tions. The experimental literature on leading by example includes, among others,
Moxnes and van der Heijden (2003), Güth et al. (2007), and Levati et al. (2007).
These studies generally show that leaders are willing to give good examples. Fol-
1The term intergroup competition seems to capture this notion more convincingly than inter-
group conflict. The literature, however, treats these terms as interchangeable and it does not
seem possible to act upon this issue in the present study.
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lowers, however, react only partially and undercut the leaders’ contributions. As
a result, leading by example only weakly increases overall contributions to the
public good. The basic paradigm of leading by example has been extended to
incorporate different forms of heterogeneity (Levati et al., 2007, Glöckner et al.,
2011), endogenous leader selection (Güth et al., 2007, Rivas and Sutter, 2008), or
voluntary leadership (Haigner and Wakolbinger, 2010, Rivas and Sutter, 2011).
None of the previous studies, however, dealt with a situation involving more
than one group.2
Intergroup competition has received attention in a number of disciplines. For
an excellent review on the experimental research in social psychology, see Born-
stein (2003). A recent laboratory study in evolutionary biology is Puurtinen and
Mappes (2008). Experimental studies in economics include, among others, Nal-
bantian and Schotter (1997), Gunnthorsdottir and Rapoport (2006), Tan and Bolle
(2007), and Abbink et al. (2010). The evidence from all disciplines shows that in-
tergroup competition can lead to an increase in intragroup cooperation in a large
set of circumstances. The underlying mechanisms root in both strategic as well as
motivational sources. They relate to in-group favoritism and social preferences
– concepts closely linked to reciprocity which most likely is crucial to leading by
example. This will be discussed in greater detail in Section 5.2.
We complement the existing literature in three ways. First, we generalize the
paradigm of leading by example to a scenario of intergroup competition. We ex-
amine both one-shot and repeated interaction. The former abstracts from strate-
gic considerations and allows us to investigate leader and follower behavior in
a clean environment. The latter accounts for the fact that real life intergroup
conflict mostly entails multiple encounters. Second, we use the strategy method
when eliciting followers’ decisions. This enables us to fully characterize follow-
ers’ types and to examine the change in conditional follower responses when in-
tergroup conflict is introduced.3 Third, we elicit group identification and analyze
its relation to the effect of intergroup competition.
2For theoretical and experimental work on leading by example with information asymmetries
between leaders and followers, see Hermalin (1998) and Potters et al. (2007).
3Gächter et al. (2010) also elicits followers’ choices via the strategy method, but in a two-person
game. In such a setup, a follower’s choice does no longer entail any behavioral uncertainty,
which is present in our design. Their measurement is thus more closely related to the elicita-
tion of conditional cooperative attitudes (see, e.g., Fischbacher et al., 2001).
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Our results for the one-shot interactions show that intergroup competition
has differential effects on leader and follower behavior. While leaders are largely
insensitive to the presence of intergroup conflict, followers display an increased
willingness to cooperate. This increase does not depend on the leaders’ actions.
When groups interact repeatedly, we do not find that leading be example is able to
foster cooperation by itself. It only significantly improves contributions when it is
accompanied by intergroup competition. Our data do not support the conjecture
that intergroup competition leads to higher group identification.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 5.2 illustrates our hypotheses. Sec-
tion 5.3 describes the experimental design, Section 5.4 presents the results, and
Section 5.5 concludes.
5.2 Theoretical Considerations and Hypotheses
Embedding a social dilemma in an intergroup conflict affects individuals’ de-
cisions in two important ways. First, it changes incentives. If groups enter a
competition for an exogenously given price as in winner-takes-all or rent-seeking
(or Tullock) contests, cooperation becomes more profitable because it increases
the chances for winning the prize (see, e.g., Bornstein et al., 1990, Abbink et al.,
2010).
Intergroup conflict has a second and purely motivational effect on intragroup
cooperation and we are exclusively interested in the latter.4 Its existence has been
a long-standing conjecture in social psychology (see, e.g., Messick and Brewer,
1983, Brown, 1988). Yet, Bornstein and Ben-Yossef (1994) were the first to provide
a clean experimental test. They designed an experiment to compare behavior in
a single group prisoner’s dilemma (PD) and in an intergroup prisoner’s dilemma
game (IPD). Both games were identical with respect to their intragroup social
dilemma structure. The IPD, however, models two competing groups, where co-
operation in any one of them inflicts a negative external effect on the respective
opponent. Bornstein and Ben-Yossef (1994) report twice as much cooperation
in the IPD than in the PD. Since both games were identical with respect to ma-
4In fact, our experiment is expressly designed to control from the afore mentioned incentive
effect.
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terial incentives of individuals and groups, the authors attributed the effect to
purely motivational reasons. More specifically, they state that the difference in
behavior “[...] cannot be explained by assuming that subjects were motivated by
self-interest, group-interest, or some fixed combination of both.” (p. 64). Since,
in the IPD, a cooperative act benefits the own group and hurts the out-group at
the same time, a greater concern for the in-group’s outcome or spite toward the
out-group remained possible explanations. Halevy et al. (2008) presents evidence
on this distinction. In their experiment participants have the choice whether their
cooperative act shall decrease the out-group’s outcome in addition to increasing
the in-group’s. The results show that the vast majority of participants chooses
not to hurt the out-group. In conjunction with the results in Bornstein and Ben-
Yossef (1994) this evidence strongly suggests that intergroup competition leads to
enhanced concerns for the in-group’s overall outcome.
We implement intergroup competition in the same way as Bornstein and Ben-
Yossef (1994) who examine pure one-shot interaction. It is therefore reasonable
to expect similar results in our one-shot encounters. It is more difficult to foresee
behavior in the repeated interaction setup as empirical results are mixed. Born-
stein et al. (1996), e.g., find that the motivational effect of intergroup competition
diminishes with repetition. We state our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5.1. When interaction is one-shot, intergroup competition leads to an in-
crease in intragroup cooperation.
The motivational effect associated with intergroup competition might impact
leading by example. First, we expect that leaders contribute more to the pub-
lic good if they assign greater weight to the outcome of their group. Since we
know from previous experiments that followers’ contribution decisions are pos-
itively correlated with those of leaders, such a behavioral change would yield
higher overall cooperation. Followers, in turn, might be willing to reciprocate
a leader’s contribution more forcefully given that the group’s outcome figures
more prominent for their decisions. Such a behavioral shift would counteract the
followers’ general tendency to undercut leaders’ contributions, which previous
studies identified as the most serious obstacle for leading by example to effec-
tively increase cooperation.
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An increased willingness to reciprocate leaders’ examples is conceivable in
different forms. One possibility is that the enhanced cooperation in intergroup
competition is associated with a greater concern for the in-group’s success which
is not conditional on the decisions of other group members. In this case, we
would expect that followers increase their contributions to every possible leader
decision by some fixed amount. An alternative would be that intergroup com-
petition leads to an increased willingness to cooperate that is conditional on the
other group members’ readiness to forego their individual monetary interest as
well. In other words, intergroup competition might lead to a stonger tendency for
conditional cooperation. In this case, we would expect that followers’ marginal
responses to increases in leaders’ contributions are strengthened in a scenario
of intergroup competition.5 Our use of the strategy method when eliciting fol-
lowers’ choices will help to shed light on this issue. In summary, we state the
following hypotheses with respect to role-specific behavior:
Hypothesis 5.2. Leaders contribute more in a social dilemma when it is embedded in-
tergroup competition than when it is not.
Hypothesis 5.3. Followers react more cooperatively to the leader’s example when the
social dilemma is embedded in intergroup competition.
According to Bornstein and Ben-Yossef (1994), the motivational effect of inter-
group conflict might be mediated by group identification. Social identity theory
(or SIT), as introduced by Tajfel and Turner (1986), promotes the idea that ac-
tions are influenced by the social category of the decision maker. Key to SIT are
the assumptions that people strive for a positive self-concept, that their group-
membership can provide them with a value which contributes positively or neg-
atively to their self-concept, and that these evaluations come from favorable or
unfavorable comparisons with other groups (see Tajfel and Turner, 1986, p. 16).
Not every possible comparison matters, however. Only if the decision maker
identifies with a group, he will care about the outcome of a comparison. Inter-
group competition has the potential to affect personal attachment to a group as
5Huck and Rey-Biel (2006) explain the effect of leading by example by way of assuming con-
formist follower types. In their model, an increased tendency for conditional cooperation
would translate to a higher degree of conformism.
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it is said to serve “[...] as a unit-forming factor, that enhances group identifica-
tion [...]” (Bornstein and Ben-Yossef, 1994, p. 64). Research on social identity has
also picked up in economics. A recent experiment by Chen and Li (2009) inves-
tigates the mechanism underlying the effect of group identification. The results
connect to the findings in Halevy et al. (2008). They demonstrate that social pref-
erences may be affected by group identification in that the likelihood for positive
reciprocal and social welfare maximizing actions increases. The original result in
Bornstein and Ben-Yossef (1994) was replicated several times (Probst et al., 1999,
Baron, 2001, Tan and Bolle, 2007). None of these studies directly tested whether
the motivational effect of competition works through increased group identifi-
cation. By measuring identification, our results will shed light on this possible
mechanism.
5.3 Experimental Design
5.3.1 The Basic Game
The basic game follows the taxonomy of a standard linear voluntary contribu-
tion mechanism (Isaac et al., 1984). Participants interact in groups of N = 3 for
t = 1, . . . , T periods. At the beginning of every period, each participant is given
an endowment of E = 10 ECU (Experimental Currency Units) which she can
consume privately or contribute to a group project. Every ECU that is consumed
privately benefits the individual decision maker 1 ECU. Every ECU contributed
to the group project benefits every member of the group β = 0.5 ECU. Thus, the
payoff for individual i in period t is given by
pii,t = 25− ci,t + 0.5×
∑
j∈Gi
cj,t , (5.1)
where ci,t is individual i’s contribution to the public project in period t, Gi is the
set of members in individual i’s group, and
∑
j∈Gi cj,t are the total (i.e., the sum
of) contributions to the public good in individual i’s group in that period. Since
β < 1, a pure money maximizer’s dominant choice is to contribute nothing to the
group project. This result holds for one-shot interactions and can be generalized
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to finitely repeated interactions by means of backward induction if we assume
rational monetary payoff maximizers and common knowledge. Socially optimal
behavior, on the other hand, would prescribe full contribution to the public good,
since N × β > 1.
5.3.2 Implementing Leading by Example and Intergroup
Competition
In the basic game, interaction takes place simultaneously. Leading by example
is implemented by means of a semi-sequential decision protocol: one member of
the group is randomly appointed to be the “leader” who decides about his contri-
bution to the group project before the other group members do. The leader’s de-
cision is communicated to the two other group members, or the “followers,” who
then decide simultaneously about their contributions.6 Since, in a last period,
contributing nothing is still the dominant choice for followers, the first mover is
also always better off contributing zero. I.e., assuming monetary payoff maxi-
mizers, the semi-sequential move structure does not alter the behavioral predic-
tions.
Our implementation of intergroup competition follows Bornstein and Ben-
Yossef (1994). It involves real payoff consequences but is designed to preserve
the intragroup incentive structure of the public goods game.7 Pairs of groups
are formed and after participants decided on their contributions, the groups’ to-
tal contributions are compared in every pair. This comparison takes place after
each period. The group with the higher total contributions wins the comparison
and receives a transfer from the loosing group. The transfer equals 0.3 times the
absolute difference in total contributions between the opposing groups. Its ben-
efits and costs are shared equally by the respective groups’ members. In order
to account for the fact that an individual’s marginal per capita return (MPCR) of
contributing 1 ECU is increased by α = 0.1 due to the transfer, we reduce the re-
turn from the group project to βc = β−α = 0.4. In the treatments with intergroup
6The instructions used neutral wording: leaders were described as “first movers.”
7The most significant deviation from the setup in Bornstein and Ben-Yossef (1994) is that the
contribution decisions are no longer dichotomous.
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competition, individual i’s payoff in period t can be summarized by
pii,t = 25− ci,t + 0.4×
∑
j∈Gi
cj,t + 0.1×
( ∑
j∈Gi
cj,t −
∑
j∈G−i
cj,t
)
, (5.2)
where G−i is the set of members in the group which opposes individual i’s. If we
assume common knowledge of payoff maximizer preferences and rationality, full
free riding remains the theoretical prediction also with intergroup competition,
since the MPCR is still below unity.8 Moreover, we control for the overall MPCR
(β = βc + α = 0.5) such that the marginal incentives to contribute are identical in
all conditions. This is necessary since a higher MPCR empirically yields higher
contributions (Ledyard, 1995) and would thus constitute a possible confounding
effect.9 Since the transfer constitutes a zero-sum transaction, the overall efficiency
for pairs of groups is reduced in treatments with intergroup competition. Pref-
erences for efficiency (see, e.g., Engelmann and Strobel, 2004) would therefore
predict contributions to be lower than in the case of isolated groups. This effect
runs counter our hypothesis that intergroup conflict promotes intragroup coop-
eration. Note that, unlike in Bornstein and Ben-Yossef (1994), socially optimal
behavior would still prescribe full contributions as βc × 3 > 1. This corresponds
to our view that competition can be efficiency-enhancing in an organizational
context.
5.3.3 The Experiment’s Structure
One-Shot Interaction - Stage 1
The experiment is divided into two stages. The first stage addresses sequential
decisions with and without intergroup competition. The two treatments are la-
beled S1-SeqC and S1-SeqNC, respectively, and are played between-subjects. In-
teraction in this stage is one-shot (i.e., T = 1) in order to abstract from potential
reputation effects (Kreps et al., 1982). In this one period, leaders move first but
followers are not informed about their choices. Instead, we employ the strat-
8Other ways of implementing competition include awarding fixed exogenous prices (see, e.g.,
Nalbantian and Schotter, 1997) or Tullock-like contests (see, e.g., Abbink et al., 2010). These
approaches do, however, yield Nash equilibria with non-negative contributions.
9A control for the overall MPCR is missing, e.g., in Puurtinen and Mappes (2008).
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egy method (Selten, 1967) to elicit the followers’ conditional responses to each
possible contribution by the leader.10 After collecting contribution choices, we
additionally elicit the participants’ identification with their group and their per-
ception about the competitiveness of the situation.11 Participants were informed
about the decisions in the first stage only after the end of the second stage to pre-
vent behavioral spill-overs across the two stages and in order to keep the group
identification elicitation clean.
Repeated Interaction - Stage 2
The second stage contains a 2×2 between-subjects design with simultaneous vs.
sequential decisions as the first dimension and intergroup competition vs. no in-
tergroup competition as the second. The treatments are labeled S2-SimNC and S2-
SimC for the simultaneous move conditions without and with intergroup compe-
tition and, accordingly, S2-SeqNC and S2-SeqC for the sequential move conditions.
In all second stage treatments participants interact in a (T =) 10 periods repeated
partners design with feedback after every period. The feedback contains infor-
mation about individual contributions in a participant’s own group and, in case
of competition, the total contributions of the opposing group. We also elicit first
order action beliefs about the average contribution in the own group (excluding
the leader) and the average contribution in the competing group, where appli-
cable. These beliefs are incentivised following the procedure in Fischbacher and
Gächter (2010): if the expectation differs by 0 (1) ECU from the rounded average
contribution, the participant receives 3 (2) ECU. In all other cases the participant
receives nothing.12
10It has been argued that employing the strategy method facilitates (cold) decisions based on
reason rather than (hot) decisions based on emotions. The empirical evidence on this issue is,
however, inconclusive (see, e.g., Brandts and Charness, 2011). If follower behavior is based on
emotions and if competition influences those emotions, our use of the strategy method might
results in smaller behavioral differences associated with intergroup competition.
11See the procedures for the exact wording of the items.
12Gächter and Renner (2010) report that this form of belief elicitation can affect contribution de-
cisions. We are, however, mainly interested in treatment differences and it is not obvious why
the belief elicitation should affect behavior differentially in different treatments.
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Table 5.1: Experimental Treatments
Stage 1 Stage 2
Treatment S1-SeqNC
S1-
SeqC
S2-
SimNC
S2-
SeqNC
S2-
SimC
S2-
SeqC
Sequential
decisions X X – X – X
Intergroup
competition
– X – – X X
Strategy method
for second mover
X X – – – –
One-shot X X – – – –
10 periods – – X X X X
Belief elicitation – – X X X X
# sessions 4 7 2 2 3 4
# groups 25 52 13 12 24 28
# subjects 75 156 39 36 72 84
Note: A checkmark (dash) means that a design feature is (not) present in the respective treat-
ment. The matching across stages is such that participants of treatment S1-SeqNC continue
either with treatment S2-SimNC or S2-SeqNC and that those who participated in S1-SeqC con-
tinue either with treatment S2-SimC or S2-SeqC.
Matching and Payment
Every subject participates in both stages of the experiment. We keep group com-
position and the matching into pairs of groups constant across stages.13 All groups
that participate in treatment S1-SeqNC are divided equally to continue either in
treatment S2-SimNC or in S2-SeqNC. All pairs of groups that participate in treat-
ment S1-SeqC are divided equally to continue either in treatment S2-SimC or in
S2-SeqC. This procedure insures that participants experience either the compe-
tition or the no competition environment but not both. Whenever decisions are
recorded sequentially in the second stage, the group’s leader was also the leader
in the first stage of the experiment. This was known to the participants. Table 5.1
summarizes the structure of the experiment.
Participants were paid according to their decisions in only one of the two
13Participants learn this not until the beginning of the second stage.
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stages. This method prevents the possibility of hedging behavior across stages.
Payment for the first stage equals the earnings according to the contribution de-
cisions. Payment for the second stage equals the sum of the earnings from the
contribution decision and those for the accuracy of beliefs in one randomly se-
lected period.14
5.3.4 Procedures
The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and conducted
in the experimental laboratory of the Max Planck Institute of Economics in Jena,
Germany. The participants were undergraduate students from the Friedrich Schil-
ler University Jena. They were recruited using the ORSEE system (Greiner, 2004).
Upon arrival, participants were seated at visually separated computer terminals.
The instructions were divided into two sets according to the separate stages and
distributed before the start of each stage.15 All instructions were read aloud. The
first set announced the experiment’s division into two stages but did not spec-
ify further information about the second stage. It was common knowledge that
only one stage would randomly be selected for payment. Before the start of the
first stage, the subjects’ understanding was tested by means of a set of control
questions. Participants’ questions were answered privately at the their seats.
The payoff relevant stage was determined via a coin toss at the end of the
experiment. If the second stage was selected, the payoff relevant period was
determined by drawing a ball from an urn which contained 10 balls numbered
from 1 to 10. Both random draws were performed by one subject and applied to
all participants in a session. The subject was chosen based on an experimenter’s
draw from a second urn. To be as credible as possible, all draws were performed
publicly.
As a measure of perceived competitiveness and identification participants
were asked to rate their agreement to specific statements on 7 point Likert scales
(1=“not at all” to 7=“very much”). Perceived competitiveness was measured us-
14Paying only one randomly chosen period theoretically controls for wealth effects on risk atti-
tudes (Lee, 2008). Paying both the contribution decision and the belief statement in principle
allows for hedging risks between these two activities. Blanco et al. (2010) investigate this issue
in a sequential prisoner’s dilemma game and find no evidence for such hedging behavior.
15All sets of instructions can be found in Appendices D.2 and D.3.
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ing the statement “I perceived the situation among groups to be very competi-
tive.” The items measuring identification were taken from Leach et al. (2008) and
read “I feel committed to [In-group],” “I am glad to be [In-group],” “I feel solidar-
ity with [In-group],” and “It is pleasant to be [In-group].” Groups were identified
with an individual color.
All sessions were conducted between September and December 2010. The
number of sessions, groups, and subjects per treatment are summarized in Table
5.1. Overall, 231 subjects participated in the experiment. Sessions lasted between
one and a half and two hours. Given the exchange rate of 0.80 euro cents per
ECU, subjects earned on average 12.70 euro, ranging from 6.50 euro to 21.80 euro
(inclusive of a 2.50 euro show-up fee).
5.4 Results
Results are going to be presented as follows. First we provide a manipulation
check. Next, we report on differences in leader and follower behavior with and
without intergroup competition using first stage data. Afterward, we focus on
the results for the repeated interactions in the second stage.
5.4.1 Manipulation Check
We implemented intergroup competition via a transfer between groups. In order
to check whether the manipulation was successful, we compare the perceived
competitiveness across conditions in stage 1. Since the first stage does not in-
clude any feedback, every participant’s response can be treated as an indepen-
dent observation. With 75 and 156 observations and average measures of 2.8 and
4.2 for S1-SeqNC and S1-SeqC, respectively, the difference is highly significant
(p < 0.01, Wilcoxon rank sum test, two-sided). We are thus confident that we suc-
cessfully manipulated the perception about the environment. Next, we test the
conjecture that competition yields higher identification with the in-group. We
calculate each individual’s mean identity score as the average response to all four
items. Comparing conditions S1-SeqNC and S1-SeqC, the mean identity scores
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are virtually identical at 3.65 (p = 0.82, Wilcoxon rank sum test, two-sided).16
This provides an indication that intergroup competition might affect behavior in
other ways than by inducing in-group identification. On the individual level the
measures of identification and competitiveness are correlated in S1-SeqC (Spear-
man’s ρ = 0.35, p < 0.01) but not in S1-SeqNC (ρ = 0.12, p = 0.29). Over the full
sample, the Spearman correlation coefficient is ρ = 0.26. While this correlation is
significant (p < 0.01), its magnitude points to a rather weak interdependence of
perceived competitiveness and group identification.
5.4.2 One-Shot Interaction
Overall contributions. We begin the analysis examining average group behavior.
The first stage involves a pure one-shot interaction. However, since followers’
decisions are conditional on those of leaders, each group constitutes the basis for
one independent observation. This leaves us with 25 and 52 independent obser-
vations for S1-SeqNC and S1-SeqC, respectively. A group’s average contribution
is calculated as the mean of the leader’s contribution and the two followers’ actual
contributions. The latter are those conditional choices of followers which corre-
spond to the leader’s actual decision. Following our first hypothesis, we expect
higher contributions with intergroup competition. The mean contributions are
depicted in the first two bars in Figure 5.1, panel a. They amount to 3.84 ECU
in S1-SeqNC and 4.53 ECU in S1-SeqC. The difference is significant (p = 0.049,
Wilcoxon rank sum test, one-sided), which confirms our expectation. This yields
our first result:
Result 5.1. Three person groups consisting of one leader (first mover) and two followers
(second movers) contribute more to a public good when the social dilemma is nested in an
intergroup conflict.
Leader and follower behavior. To what extend can this effect be attributed to differ-
ences in leader and follower behavior with and without intergroup competition?
Bars three to six in panel a of Figure 5.1 depict the role-specific contributions
for both experimental conditions. Hypothesis 5.2 postulates higher contributions
from leaders in the presence of intergroup competition. The figure, however,
16There are no significant differences for responses to any of the single items.
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Figure 5.1: Average Contributions in Stage 1
suggest that leaders’ choices remain unaffected by competition This impression is
corroborated by a one-sided Wilcoxon rank sum test (p = 0.35). How do followers
react? Visual inspection suggests that followers’ actual contributions are higher in
S1-SeqC than in S1-SeqNC. We use a Wilcoxon rank sum test for statistical analy-
sis. Since, in each group, both followers’ actual contributions depend on the same
leader decision, we calculate their average as one independent observation. Us-
ing the resulting 25 and 52 observations for S1-SeqNC and S1-SeqC, respectively,
the test confirms that intergroup competition leads to higher follower contribu-
tions (p = 0.023, Wilcoxon rank sum test, one-sided). In connection with the ob-
servation that leaders’ contributions are seemingly insensitive to intergroup con-
flict, this finding supports Hypothesis 5.3: a leader’s example is followed more
closely if the social dilemma is embedded in intergroup competition.
Followers’ conditional responses. The differences in followers’ actual contributions
could be driven by heterogeneity in leaders’ choices which is not captured by
their average. The followers’ full conditional choice vectors control for this is-
sue. Figure 5.1, panel b, displays the average vectors by experimental condi-
tion.17 The monotonically upward sloping lines clearly show that followers on
average react positively to an increase in the leader’s contribution. Nonetheless,
the most critical result from previous studies on leading by example proves to be
robust: followers tend to undercut the leaders’ contributions. This can be seen
17The average conditional choice vectors are obtained by calculating the followers’ mean re-
sponse for each possible leader contribution.
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when comparing the average vectors to that of a hypothetical, perfect conditional
follower depicted by the dotted line. It is only for small (<3 ECU) leader contri-
butions that followers contribute the same as or more than leaders. The figure
suggests furthermore that followers sustain systematically higher contributions
under intergroup competition. We first investigate this issue by calculating every
follower’s average conditional response. The averages of this measure amount to
3.17 ECU in S1-SeqNC and 3.75 ECU in S1-SeqC, where the figures are based on
50 and 104 independent observations, respectively (one for each follower). The
difference is small but statistically significant (p = 0.039, Wilcoxon rank sum test,
one-sided). This finding indicates that followers’ average responses are higher
under intergroup competition. Next, we perform an individual regression on
each follower’s vector of conditional choices and compare the resulting slopes
across conditions. This measure can be used to investigate the followers’ average
marginal responsiveness as higher values indicate that the followers react more
strongly to changes in the leaders’ decisions. The mean slopes amount to 0.34
and 0.35 in S1-SeqNC and S1-SeqC, which confirms that followers on average
react positively but far from perfectly to a change in the leader’s contribution.
A Wilcoxon rank sum test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the mean slopes
come from the same underlying distribution (p = 0.78, two-sided). The difference
in followers’ average contributions is thus not reflected by steeper reaction func-
tions with respect to the leader’s examples. On average, followers rather seems
to increment their contribution by an amount which is not conditional on what
the leader does. Evidence in support of this conjecture comes from a Wilcoxon
rank sum test that compares the followers’ predicted responses for the average
contribution of a leader (i.e., 5 ECU). We use this measure as a proxy for the con-
stant part of the followers’ response functions. The test rejects the null hypothesis
at the 10% significance level (p = 0.08, two-sided). The evidence on role-specific
behavior is summarized by:
Result 5.2. The presence of intergroup competition does not affect the contribution be-
havior of leaders but the conditional responses of followers. The change in follower behav-
ior is best described as an increase in the willingness to contribute which is not conditional
on the leader’s decision.
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There is considerable heterogeneity in how followers react to leaders’ contri-
butions. As this study is the first to use the strategy method on followers’ choices,
we are able to provide a more complete picture of these patterns. We categorize
followers into five distinct groups according to the pattern of their conditional
responses. The first group are strict non-contributors (SNC) who contribute ex-
actly zero ECU for every possible leader decision.18 Unconditional contributors
(UC) do also not condition on the leader’s decision but contribute strictly positive
amounts. Conditional followers (CF) are characterized by upward sloping condi-
tional response vectors. Their vectors of conditional choices either increase mono-
tonically with the leader’s contribution or exhibit a positive and highly significant
Spearman correlation coefficient.19 The fourth group are hump-shaped followers
(HSF) who react positively to better examples only up to some specific leader con-
tribution. Beyond this threshold, they react negatively.20 The last group are reverse
conditional followers (RCF) who contribute less the more the leader contributes.21
Such a pattern might reflect a motivation to supply some fixed amount of the pub-
lic good as a group. A higher leader contribution would lower the burden to con-
tribute for the follower, which implies a downward sloping pattern. The group
no category (NC) subsumes all remaining followers. Table 5.2 depicts the observed
relative frequencies for each follower category. It is evident that conditional fol-
lowers constitute the largest group. Strict non-contributors, reverse conditional
followers, and hump-shaped followers mark the second, third, and forth most
frequently observed categories. Unconditional contributors are rarely observed.
Note that about one fourth of all followers does not fall into any category. This
is partly due to our strict requirement on the significance of the Spearman cor-
relation coefficient.22 Comparing the distributions of types across treatments, we
18We prefer this term to free riders as the latter is already established and describes an actor who
contributes nothing independently of the decisions of everyone else in the group (see, e.g.
Fischbacher et al., 2001).
19These criteria mirror those used in Fischbacher et al. (2001) and Fischbacher and Gächter (2010)
for a public goods game with simultaneous decisions.
20The decisive criterion is a highly significant positive Spearman correlation coefficient for
choices smaller or equal to the threshold and a negative and highly significant coefficient for
choice above the threshold.
21The conditional responses either monotonically decrease with higher leader contributions or
exhibit a negative and highly significant Spearman rank correlation coefficient.
22A relaxation of this requirement yields more observations for conditional followers, reverse
conditional followers, and hump-shaped followers.
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Table 5.2: Relative Frequencies of Follower Categories
Treatment SNC UC CF RCF HSF NC # obs
Isolated groups (S1-SeqNC) 10.0 6.0 46.0 8.0 6.0 24.0 50
Competition (S1-SeqC) 10.6 2.9 40.4 8.7 6.7 30.7 104
Total 10.4 3.9 42.2 8.5 6.5 28.5 154
Note: Abbreviations: SNC = strict non-contributors; UC = unconditional contributors;
CF = conditional followers; HSF = hump-shaped followers; RCF = reverse conditional follow-
ers; NC = no category.
find them to be very similar in both conditions. A one-sided Fisher exact test does
not reveal a significant difference in the distribution of types (p = 0.89). Pairwise
comparisons for each individual category also do not indicate any differences
in the relative frequencies (the smallest p-value is equal to 0.25 for no category,
one-sided). Intergroup competition thus does not seem to have an influence on
the distribution follower types. Figure 5.2 displays the average contribution vec-
tors by follower category for both experimental conditions. It clearly shows the
distinct type-specific patterns of conditional responses. The figure indicates fur-
thermore that the increase in followers’ average conditional responses which is
associated with intergroup competition (see Result 5.2) is mainly due to uncon-
ditional contributors, reverse conditional contributors, and those who cannot be
categorized.23 In contrast, conditional followers display almost identical average
conditional response vectors in both experimental conditions. We summarize as
follows:
Result 5.3. Followers can be classified into several types according to their conditional
responses to leaders’ examples. While almost half are conditional followers, we also ob-
serve strict non-contributors, unconditional contributors, reverse conditional followers,
and hump-shaped followers who each account for a minor percentage of the observations.
The distribution of types does not depend on the presence of intergroup competition.
23Wilcoxon rank sum tests that compare followers’ average conditional responses between
S1-SeqNC and S1-SeqC, however, do not reveal statistically significant differences for any sin-
gle follower type.
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Figure 5.2: Followers’ Average Conditional Responses by Follower Category
5.4.3 Repeated Interaction
Investigating one-shot interactions allows for valuable insights as it abstracts
from strategic behavior. Real life social dilemmas such as team work situations,
however, are often marked by repeated interaction which allows for reputation
building or reciprocity concerns. In this section, we extend our analysis to re-
peated play using data from the second stage of the experiment. Most of the
analysis in this section is based on independent observations. Due to the feed-
back between periods, the unit of an independent observation are group averages
in case of isolated groups and averages of pairs of groups in case of intergroup
competition.
Treatment effects. Figure 5.3 graphs the time series of average contributions for
each treatment. Treatment S2-SimNC replicates standard findings closely as con-
tributions start at around 50% of the endowment and decline steadily to 20%
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Figure 5.3: Average Contributions Over Time in Stage 2
of the endowment in the last period. Contributions in S2-SimC are higher than
without competition in every period but show the same decline over time. Both
treatments with sequential decisions show higher cooperation rates than the re-
spective simultaneous move conditions. While this improvement is only visible
for periods 4 to 10 when comparing S2-SeqNC to S2-SimNC, it is sustained over
all ten periods for the treatments with intergroup competition.
In order to assess how the treatments affect overall cooperation, we aver-
age contribution over all ten periods. Table 5.3 provides the relevant descrip-
tive statistics, based on independent observations. Mean and median contribu-
tions indicate what Figure 5.3 already suggested: intergroup competition seems
to foster intragroup cooperation. Pairwise two-sided Wilcoxon rank sum tests,
however, fail to reject the null hypothesis that contributions come from the same
underlying distribution both for simultaneous (p = 0.18) and for sequential deci-
sions (p = 0.14). Thus, while intergroup competition leads to higher contributions
in our (sequential move) one-shot interactions, this does not prove to be robust
in repeated play.24 In order to assess whether we find the effect of intergroup
competition in our overall data set, we pool the data for the simultaneous and
24This result is in accordance with previous findings. While Bornstein and Ben-Yossef (1994) and
Baron (2001) show that cooperation is higher in the IPD than in the PD for one-shot interac-
tions, this relation is not confirmed in Bornstein et al. (1996) who allow for repetition.
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Table 5.3: Descriptive Statistics: Time-Averaged Contributions
Based on Independent Observations
Treatment Mean Median St. Dev. # Indep. obs.
S2-SimNC 3.6 3.4 1.96 13
S2-SeqNC 4.4 5.1 2.83 12
S2-SimC 4.6 4.5 1.71 12
S2-SeqC 6.1 6.5 1.59 14
sequential treatments. A comparison based on independent observations shows
that the difference is statistically significant (p = 0.036, Wilcoxon rank sum test,
two-sided).
Next, we consider leading by example. Figure 5.3 and Table 5.3 indicate that
sequential decisions tend to elicit higher average contributions both with and
without intergroup competition. We test this formally using two-sided Wilcoxon
rank sum tests. While the test widely fails to reject the null hypothesis that contri-
butions stem from the same underlying distribution when there is no intergroup
competition (p = 0.39), the null hypothesis is rejected for the condition with in-
tergroup competition (p = 0.045). Thus, according to our data, leading by ex-
ample only has a consistent positive effect on contributions when it is combined
with intergroup competition. This also drives the significant effect of sequential
vs. simultaneous decisions when the data is pooled over conditions (p = 0.037,
Wilcoxon rank sum test, two-sided). The non-significance of the effect of leading
by example without intergroup competition runs counter to results in previous
studies. It is, however, not possible to attribute this discrepancy to a specific
element of the experimental design since neither of the previous studies on lead-
ing by example used three person groups, payed only one period in an repeated
partners design, or elicited beliefs. The relative increase in contributions of 22%
is, moreover, in the same order of magnitude as the ones found in previous stud-
ies.25 We summarize as follows:
Result 5.4. Both, leading by example and intergroup competition, significantly increase
contributions to the public good. The effect of leading by example is only significant in
the condition with intergroup competition.
25Güth et al. (2007), for instance, find a weakly significant increase of 33%.
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Figure 5.4: Box-Whisker Plots of Time-Averaged Contributions Based on Inde-
pendent Observation. The Boxes Depict the 25 Percentile, the Median,
and the 75 Percentile. The Whiskers Mark the Upper and Lower Ad-
jacent Values.
A noteworthy feature of the data is that the variation in cooperation between
matching-groups depends on the treatment. Figure 5.4 provides a graphical il-
lustration. The Box-Whisker plots indicate that the variation between matching-
groups is largest in S2-SeqNC and smallest in S2-SeqC. In fact, S2-SeqNC shows
the highest maximum and the lowest minimum average contributions among all
treatments. Comparing the standard deviations of time-average contributions
based on independent observations between S2-SeqNC and S2-SeqC, this differ-
ence is significant (p = 0.026, robust Levene’s-test).26 It thus seems that inter-
group competition does not only induce significantly higher average contribu-
tions when decisions are sequential but also a reduction in variance. The large
variance in S2-SeqNC also explains why leading by example does not seem to
have an effect without competition. It is only with intergroup competition that
sequential decisions lead to consistently higher contributions. This result comple-
ments the finding in Sausgruber (2009) who shows that intergroup comparison
reduces between-group variance in cooperation.
26None of the other pairwise comparisons reveals significant differences for the respective stan-
dard deviations.
94
Chapter 5: Leading by Example in Intergroup Competition
Interaction of leading by example and intergroup competition. The presence of the
leader yields a relative increase in contributions which amounts to 22% without
competition and to 39% with competition. The absolute increase, although be-
ing of a small order of magnitude, roughly doubles. This suggests that leading
by example and intergroup competition may interact in their effects on overall
contributions. In order to formally test for such an interaction effect, we turn to
regression analysis. Table 5.4 presents results from two panel Tobit models, with
subject-specific random intercepts.27 The first model regresses individual con-
tributions on the two dummy variables Competition and Sequential representing
the experimental conditions, a linear trend, Period, as well as on Age and Gen-
der (male=1). The results partly mirror those obtained from the non-parametric
tests since both main effects turn out to be positive and significant. In addition,
we obtain the expected negative trend over periods and a positive effect of age.
The second model augments the first as it adds the interaction of both experi-
mental conditions labeled as Comp*Sequential. As expected, its point estimate is
positive which indicates that the effect of leading by example tends to be larger
with intergroup competition. However, the interaction is not significantly differ-
ent from zero. The inclusion of the interaction also does not improve the model
fit (p = 0.19, LR-test). It is thus not possible to conclude that leading by exam-
ple and intergroup competition interact in a meaningful way in their effects on
overall cooperation.
Our estimations do not allow contribution decisions to be interdependent
within the same group and period. This, however, is likely to be the case as
subjects condition their behavior on the history of choices and because of the
semi-sequential decision protocol in the treatments with leading by example. In
order to control for this issue, we estimate two Tobit models with group-specific
random intercepts and two linear mixed effects models with nested random in-
tercepts for groups and individuals.28 All previous results are shown to be robust
(see Tables D.1 and D.2 in Appendix D.1).29 We summarize as follows:
27We report on Tobit models since the dependent variable (individual contributions) exhibits a
large number of corner solution outcomes. In fact, 32% of all observations are either 0 ECU or
10 ECU.
28Due to a lack of implementation in Stata 11, we are not able to estimate Tobit models with
nested random intercepts for groups and individuals.
29The only difference is that the coefficient for Competition turns out to be significant in the linear
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Table 5.4: Panel Tobit Regressions: Main and Interaction Effects
Dep. variable: individual contributions
Random intercept: individual
(1) (2)
Coefficient 95% CI (BCa) Coefficient 95% CI (BCa)
Competition 1.896∗∗ [0.32; 3.22] 1.213 [-0.50; 2.94]
Sequential 1.629∗∗∗ [0.44; 2.76] 0.703 [-1.91; 2.99]
Comp*Sequential – – 1.356 [-1.17; 4.64]
Period -0.212∗∗∗ [-0.34; -0.11] -0.212∗∗∗ [-0.34; -0.11]
Age -0.231∗∗∗ [-0.41; -0.09] -0.224∗∗∗ [-0.39; -0.09]
Gender -0.340 [-1.16; 0.28] -0.268 [-1.10; 0.46]
Constant 9.044∗∗∗ [5.33; 12.51] 9.307∗∗∗ [5.90; 13.26]
St. dev. random intercept 3.470∗∗∗ [2.90; 3.98] 3.458∗∗∗ [2.90; 3.99]
St. dev. residual 3.044∗∗∗ [2.73; 3.65] 3.044∗∗∗ [2.74; 3.65]
Log likelihood -4838.2 -4837.3
Note: The regressions are based on 2310 observations, 231 individuals, and 77 groups. 448 (293)
observations are left (right) censored. The bias corrected and accelerated (BCa) confidence
intervals are based on non-parametric bootstraps with 500 replications. Sampling respects
group composition. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at levels 1%, 5%, and 10%, based on the BCa
confidence intervals.
Result 5.5. The interaction effect of leading by example and intergroup competition is
positive but not statistically significant.
Leader and follower behavior. Figure 5.5 depicts the time series of leader and fol-
lower contribution decisions for isolated groups (panel a) and intergroup com-
petition (panel b). Both graphs show clearly that second movers tend to fol-
low the leaders’ examples over time. The Spearman correlation coefficients be-
tween leader and average follower contributions are ρ = 0.77 and ρ = 0.68 (both
p < 0.01) for treatments S2-SeqNC and S2-SeqC, respectively.30 At the same time,
it is obvious that leaders consistently contribute more than followers. This is
corroborated by two-sided Wilcoxon signed rank tests comparing leader and av-
erage follower contributions, averaged over periods (p = 0.007 in S2-SeqNC and
p < 0.01 in S2-SeqC). As a consequence, leaders’ expected earnings based on con-
tribution decisions are lower than those of followers (p < 0.01 in S2-SeqNC and
mixed effects model that includes the interaction effect Comp*Sequential.
30We average the contributions of the two followers in one group in order to obtain one number
which can be compared to the leader’s example.
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Figure 5.5: Leaders’ and Followers’ Contributions Over Time for the Conditions
Without (Panel a) and With Intergroup Competition (Panel b)
p < 0.01 in S2-SeqC, two-sided Wilcoxon signed rank test).31 These results are in
accordance with those from previous studies (see, e.g., Levati et al., 2007).
5.5 Conclusions
In this study we experimentally investigate leading by example in a linear pub-
lic goods game in environments with and without intergroup competition. The
advancement with respect to the previous literature is two-fold.
First, we use the strategy method to characterize followers according to their
conditional responses to a leader’s contributions. Our results suggest that the
usually observed undercutting of the leaders’ examples may be the result of type-
specific behavior. While the largest group of participants are conditional follow-
ers who reciprocate a leader’s example, other types like strict non-contributors or
hump-shaped followers on average undercut the leader’s contribution. A non-
negligible fraction of followers even punishes better examples by means of re-
31Note that payment for the second part was based on one randomly chosen period and incor-
porated payment for belief statements. The tests compare expected earnings for leaders and
followers (averaged per group) based on contributions, i.e., excluding those from belief state-
ments.
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verse conditional behavior.
Second, we generalize the cooperation enhancing effect of leading by example
to a scenario of intergroup competition. Moreover we show that intergroup com-
petition has differentiated effects on leading by example. While leader behavior
remains largely unaffected, followers behave more cooperatively in the presences
of intergroup competition. Their change behavior is best described as an increase
in the willingness to cooperate that is not conditional on the leader’s contribu-
tion. Thus, while exemplary effort should always be encouraged, it seems even
more beneficial when groups are in competition. The latter statement, however,
hinges on our specific parametrization in that a cooperative act benefits the in-
group more than it hurts the out-group. The effects of leading by example in
destructive intergroup conflict remain to be explored.
In this study, we control for the incentive effects of intergroup competition in
order to examine its purely motivational aspects. In real life, however, both these
effects are present simultaneously. A possibly fruitful avenue of research is thus
to investigate the interplay between leading by example and the structural ef-
fects of intergroup conflict. A leader’s example might, e.g., constitute a powerful
tool for equilibrium selection in contests that are associated with an exogenously
given price (see, e.g., Erev et al., 1993, Abbink et al., 2010) or all-can-win compe-
titions (Reuben and Tyran, 2010).
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING
REMARKS
This thesis addresses the question how to promote voluntary cooperation in so-
cial dilemmas. In what follows, we summarize the main findings of the four
studies presented in this thesis and provide some concluding remarks.
Chapter 2 starts out from the current state of the literature which holds that
mutual promises are crucial for the cooperation-enhancing effect of (multi-way)
communication (see, e.g., Balliet, 2010). The predominance of mutual promises
is also consistent with a broader view that builds on coordination among con-
ditional cooperators to account for the effects of communication (see, e.g., Fehr
and Fischbacher, 2002). Since promises are only one of many conceivable coor-
dination devices, their necessity is questionable. We investigate this issue in a
series of public goods experiments that only allow for one-way communication,
i.e., a free-form written message by a single member of a group prior to the si-
multaneous contribution decisions. Since all other group members are unable to
respond, this mechanism precludes the mutual exchange of promises. Our exper-
imental data show that one-way communication increases cooperation compared
to no-communication baseline treatments in pure one-shot as well as in finitely
repeated interaction. In the latter, one-way communication is equally effective if
a message can be sent only prior to the first or before every period. The commu-
nication content analysis indicates that suggestions to contribute efficiently (i.e.,
the entire endowment) are ubiquitous while unilateral promises to cooperate are
infrequent. Overall, the effectiveness of one-way messages demonstrates that
mutual promises are not necessary for communication to increase cooperation.
The prevalence of contribution suggestions, however, is consistent with the con-
jecture that communication is used as an opportunity to coordinate behavior.
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In Chapter 3, we examine one-way communication in a public goods game
with asymmetric experimental endowments. This form of asymmetry has been
shown to reduce cooperation (Cherry et al., 2005) and induces behavior consis-
tent with an equal contribution rule (Buckley and Croson, 2006). Such behavior
may restrict the potential effect of one-way communication, since the efficient
provision requires unequal contributions to the public good when endowments
are asymmetric. Our results confirm that “poor” and “rich” subjects contribute
similar amounts if communication opportunities are unavailable. One-way com-
munication, however, not only enhances cooperation but also induces behavior
consistent with an equal payoffs rule that prescribes efficient contributions.
In Chapter 4, we show that (i) one-way messages which are not related to
the experimental game do not significantly affect behavior and that (ii) one-way
communication increases contributions to the public good even if cooperation
leads to unequal earnings. The first observation indicates that the effectiveness
of one-way communication does not merely originate from the socializing func-
tion of the messages but rather from their (game-relevant) content. The second
observation stems from an experiment in which we compare behavior in groups
with symmetric and asymmetric marginal benefits from cooperation. In two no-
communication baseline conditions, we show that this form of asymmetry may
be hurtful to cooperation since contribution behavior is inversely related to the
marginal benefits of other actors. One-way messages counteract this tendency
as they increase contributions particularly by those individuals who benefit the
least from cooperation. This observation is particularly striking since the mes-
sages originate from the main beneficiaries of cooperation and are thus suspected
to serve egoistic purposes.
Previous research shows that leading by example, i.e., the exemplary effort
of a first mover, promotes voluntary cooperation in public goods games. Its ef-
fect on behavior, however, is fragile since followers tend to undercut the leaders’
efforts, thereby causing cooperation to dwindle over time. The study presented
in Chapter 5 provides a more detailed picture of this phenomenon as it shows
that follower behavior is type-specific. While almost half of all second movers
are conditional followers who reciprocate a leader’s contribution, other types are
insensitive to leading by example or even punish exemplary efforts by means of
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reverse conditional behavior. This observation might be interesting to group or-
ganizers as it indicates that group composition is important for the workings of
leadership. A finding that connects this study further to an organizational con-
text is that leading by example affects intragroup cooperation also when groups
are in competition. In fact, intergroup competition may even enhance the impact
of good examples since it promotes cooperative behavior by followers in partic-
ular.
In the studies presented in this thesis, the implementation of one-way com-
munication was predominantly motivated by its usefulness to investigate the
mechanisms that underly effective communication. But one-way communication
is more than a purposeful experimental manipulation. It is also an experimen-
tal adaption of real-world situation in which communication technologies are
uni- rather than multidirectional. Recommended contributions in fundraising
for charities (Croson and Marks, 2001) or in political campaigning in the U.S. are
such instances. In an organizational context, one-way communication can be ob-
served in the form of announcements or speeches by executives. At large events
such as demonstrations or pre-election parties, leading activists or politicians also
address all participants simultaneously and unilaterally.1 One-way communica-
tion may even occur among actors who meet at eye level in most other situations.
Imagine, for instance, a department leader who is a co-worker in one context but
the superior in another.
Our implementation of one-way communication is, of course, a lousy simu-
lation of the situations portrayed above and by no means directly applicable. It
fails to capture potentially important aspects, only some of which might be ac-
counted for in future laboratory experiments. For instance, while the possibility
to adjust for group size is limited, formal authority may be implemented in the
form of exclusion power (see, e.g., Güth et al., 2007). Whether such competen-
cies are conducive to the effectiveness of one-way communication or even have
crowding out effects is a topic for future research.
The predominance of mutual promises in communication experiments has
led to discussions about which communication technologies are more suitable to
1The traditional New Year’s speech of the German Prime Minister (or Chancellor) is an extreme
example of one-way communication.
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promote cooperation. Reviewing the literature, Bicchieri and Lev-On (2007) ar-
gue that “thin” communication channels like chat or audio conferences are less
practical since they impede the efficient exchange and the credibility of promises.
The fragility of the communication effect based on promises may cause scepti-
cism with regard to its applicability to situations outside the laboratory. To rely
on the effectiveness of promises is especially problematic when its complex re-
quirements may cause high organizational costs (see, e.g., Messick and Brewer,
1983). Consequently, one-way communication may be favorable, where its sim-
plicity is advantageous. Large groups may be such an instance since the number
of required links among group members grows more rapidly for multi-way than
for one-way communication as group size increases.2 Noisy communication en-
vironments may also favor one-way communication since the informational re-
quirements for effective one-way messages seem less demanding than those for
credible mutual promises. By now, no research has been conducted on the rela-
tive advantages of one-way and multi-way communication in social dilemmas.
Such an endeavor seems promising, however, especially as it may allow for in-
sights with regard to the efficient application of communication outside the labo-
ratory.
Any efficient application of one-way communication necessitates an accurate
understanding of the underlying mechanisms. While the experimental results
presented in this thesis give some indications, they are not conclusive. The in-
effectiveness of irrelevant one-way communication indicates that messages have
to relate to the decision situation. The communication content analysis signifies
the predominance of suggestions to contribute the entire endowment in conjunc-
tion with different supplementary arguments. The behavioral data show that
contribution decisions are largely congruent with such suggestions even if exper-
imental endowments or evaluations for the group project are asymmetric. This
correspondence of behavior and communication content, however, does not im-
ply that suggestions to contribute efficiently are sufficient or necessary for the
effect of one-way communication. In fact, the literature entails some indication
that mere suggestions do not suffice to enhance cooperation. In step-level public
2This conjecture may also explain why communication among all the members of a group is
often encouraged in small groups but very rarely observed in large groups.
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goods games, for instance, suggestions to contribute according to the symmet-
ric Nash equilibrium do not affect behavior (Croson and Marks, 2001). In linear
public goods games, numerical (multi-way) communication remains ineffective –
no matter whether it is framed as contribution announcements (Wilson and Sell,
1997, Bochet et al., 2006) or as promises (Bochet and Putterman, 2009). An un-
published pilot study of our own also indicates that mere (one-way) suggestions
may not be sufficient to enhance cooperation.3 In order to assess the role of sug-
gestions and their interplay with seemingly auxiliary statements, more data is
needed. A standardization of the communication protocol might be one way to
generate correlated systematic variation in the communication content and the
decision behavior. Such an investigation could be arranged based on the com-
munication content analysis of previous experiments and may yield important
insights with respect to the underlying mechanism of effective one-way commu-
nication.
All four studies presented in this thesis demonstrate the effectiveness of lead-
ership as a tool to alleviate the free-rider problem in social dilemmas. They show
that leadership – in the form of, either, leading by words or leading by exam-
ple – promotes voluntary cooperation in situations as diverse as one-shot and
repeated interaction, in isolated groups and intergroup competition, and in sit-
uations when efficiency necessitates unequal individual efforts or when cooper-
ation leads to inequality in earnings. Leadership is important in situations that
require civil courage, in charitable giving, in the sphere of politics, and in most
organizations. This being said, the scarcity of theoretical and empirical economic
research on leadership in collective action problems seems unsatisfactory. This
thesis provides a small contribution to fill this gap but, in light of the significance
of leadership and that of collective action problems, it seems a small contribution
to an important topic.
3More specifically, we contrasted treatment NC (see Chapter 2) with a treatment that allowed
for messages of the following form prior to every period: “I suggest to contribute X ECU to
the project.” Communicators were allowed to enter their contribution suggestion for X (or
to send no message at all). The development of average group contributions over time was
almost identical in both treatments.
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A.1 Categorization Methodology
Our categorization methodology follows Cooper and Kagel (2005) and Sutter and
Strassmair (2009). Initially, two researchers examined independently a sample of
the messages and established their own distinct sets of preliminary categories.1
Each category represents one or more arguments that the communicator is likely
to invoke, and each message may belong to more than one category. After con-
sultations, the two researchers agreed upon the final set of categories shown in
Table 2.3.
Then three undergraduate research assistants coded (once again separately)
the total of the messages one by one: if one message contained the argument(s)
specified by some category, then that category was assigned the value of 1 (other-
wise, it was assigned the value of 0). The average correlation coefficient between
the assistants’ codings ranged from 0.70 to 0.80 (0.81 to 0.89) for the first-period
messages sent in CC (PC), and from 0.75 to 0.79 for the messages sent in periods
2–10 in CC.2 We can not compute such correlations coefficients in the case of C,
as the assistants often coded with the same value all the available messages. As
an alternative we report that the number of times all coders agreed on 1 relative
to the number of times that at least one of them decided on 1 equals 0.85.3
Finally, the coders gathered, discussed their individual assessments and ar-
rived at a common coding (the results are reported in Tables 2.4 and 2.5 for the
repeated and one-shot treatments, respectively).
1Since the experiment was conducted in German, the categorization was undertaken by Jo-
hannes Weisser and Matthias Uhl, a German native speaker familiar with all details of the
experiment.
2The correlation coefficient values reported by Cooper and Kagel (2005) and Sutter and Strass-
mair (2009) are somewhat smaller, implying that our categorization procedure was more clear-
cut.
3The corresponding ratios for the PC, CC (period 1), and CC (periods 2–10) treatments are 0.79,
0.83, and 0.61, respectively.
105
Appendix to Chapter 2
A.2 Instructions for Repeated Interaction
Treatments
This appendix reports the instructions (originally in German) for treatments B10,
PC, and CC. Those for treatmentB10 are displayed below in full length. They con-
tain all parts which are common to all three treatments. The instructions for the
other treatments can be obtained by inserting and replacing the appropriate para-
graphs. The place holder [for <treatment name>, replace the following paragraph]
indicates which paragraphs have to be replaced, where the replacement always
has the same heading. The place holder [for <treatment name>, insert paragraph
<paragraph name> here] prescribes where new paragraphs have to be inserted.
A.2.1 Instructions for Treatment B10
INSTRUCTIONS
Welcome and thank you for participating in this experiment. Please remain silent
and switch off your mobile!
You will receive 2.50 euro for showing up on time. Beyond this you can earn
more money. In order to do this, please read these instructions carefully. The 2.50
euro show-up fee and any additional amounts of money you may earn will be
paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. Payments are carried out pri-
vately, i.e., without the other participants knowing the extent of your earnings.
During the experiment, we shall not speak of euros but of ECUs (Experimental
Currency Units). ECUs are converted to euros at the following exchange rate: 1
ECU = 0.05 euro.
It is strictly forbidden to speak to other participants. If you have any questions
during the experiment please raise your hand.
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Detailed information on the experiment
Group formation
You will be placed in a group of four players. Group composition does not change
during the experiment, i.e., you will be always interacting with the same partici-
pants. You will never learn the identity of the other members of your group.
Decisions
The experiment consists of 10 periods. At the beginning of each period, you (as
well as the other members of your group) receive an endowment of 25 ECUs. You
have to decide how many of these 25 ECUs you want to contribute to a project.
The ECUs contributed to the project yield income for you as well as for the other
members of your group (you will learn more about the “income from the project”
below). You can keep the ECUs that you do not contribute for yourself (they yield
income just for you).
Period-earnings
More specifically, in every period your earnings consist of two parts:
a) “Income from the project” = 0.4 × sum of all group members’ contributions
(in words, the income from the project is determined by multiplying the
sum of the contributions of all group members by 0.4);
b) “ECUs you keep” = 25 − your contribution to the project.
Thus, your period-earnings summarized in a formula are
Your period-earnings = Income from the project + ECU you keep
(0.4× sum of group’s contributions) + (25− your contribution)
Example:
Suppose that all four group members contribute 5 ECUs. Then both you and your
group members receive an “income from the project” of 8 (= 0.4 × 20) ECUs. The
“ECUs you keep” are 20 (= 25 − 5). Hence, your period-earnings are 8 + 20 = 28
ECUs.
[for treatments PC and CC, replace the following paragraph]
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Interaction with your group members in each period
In each period, you as well as the other three members of your group decide
simultaneously and privately about the amount of ECUs you want to contribute
to the project.
[for treatments PC and CC, insert paragraph Communication here]
The information you receive at the end of each period
At the end of each period, you will receive information about 1) the number of
ECU contributed by each of your group members, with the individual contribu-
tions being sorted in descending order, 2) the income from the project, and 3)
your corresponding period-earnings.
Your final earnings
Your final earnings will be calculated by adding up your period-earnings in each
of the 10 periods. The resulting sum will be converted to euros and paid out to
you in cash, together with the show-up fee of 2.50 euros.
Before the experiment starts, you will have to answer some control questions
to verify your understanding of the rules of the experiment.
Please remain quietly seated until the experiment starts. If you have any questions,
please raise your hand now.
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A.2.2 Additional Instructions for Treatment PC
Interaction with your group members in each period
In each period, you as well as the other three members of your group decide
simultaneously and privately about the amount of ECUs you want to contribute
to the project.
Before making the 10 contribution decisions, one group member is given the
opportunity to communicate with his/her fellow members (how communication
is carried out is described below). In the following, we shall refer to the group
member who can communicate with the others as the “communicator”.
At the beginning of the experiment, one member of each group is randomly
selected to be the “communicator”. Every participant will be informed whether
he or she is going to act as the “communicator” in an “Information Window”.
Communication
During the communication stage (i.e., before period 1), the communicator can use
his/her keyboard to type one message to the others.
The communicator is free to send the message (s)he likes, including what (s)he
thinks is the best approach to the experiment, what (s)he plans to do, or what
(s)he would like the others to do.
However, there are two restrictions on the kind of messages that the communicator
can send:
1. First, the communicator is not allowed to identify him/herself to the oth-
ers. Thus, (s)he cannot reveal his/her real name, nicknames, or any other
identifying feature such as gender, hair, or seat number.
2. Second, there must be neither threats nor promises pertaining to anything
that is to occur after the experiment.
To enforce compliance with the above restrictions, all messages, before being
sent, are checked by a monitor (a member of the experiment team). Improper
messages are not be delivered. Instead, the sender receives a warning informing
him/her of his/her misconduct.
The communicator has 4 minutes to write his/her message, but (s)he is free
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to send it ahead of time. A clock will inform the communicator of the remaining
time.
The screen-shots that you will see in period 1 if you are the communicator in
your group are shown below.
Please, remember to remain quiet during the whole experiment or the session
will be terminated and all payments canceled.
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A.2.3 Additional Instructions for Treatment CC
Interaction with your group members in each period
Each period consists of the following two stages:
1. One group member is given the opportunity to communicate with his/her
fellow members (how communication is carried out is described below). In
the following, we shall refer to the group member who can communicate
with the others as the “communicator”.
2. When the communication stage ends, the four group members decide si-
multaneously and privately on their own contributions.
At the beginning of the experiment, one member of each group is randomly
selected to be the “communicator” for all 10 periods. Every participant will be
informed whether he or she is going to act as the “communicator” in an “Infor-
mation Window”.
Communication
During the communication stage, the communicator can use his/her keyboard to
type one message to the others.
The communicator is free to send the message (s)he likes, including what (s)he
thinks is the best approach to the experiment, what (s)he plans to do, or what
(s)he would like the others to do.
However, there are two restrictions on the kind of messages that the communicator
can send:
1. First, the communicator is not allowed to identify him/herself to the oth-
ers. Thus, (s)he cannot reveal his/her real name, nicknames, or any other
identifying feature such as gender, hair, or seat number.
2. Second, there must be neither threats nor promises pertaining to anything
that is to occur after the experiment.
To enforce compliance with the above restrictions, all messages, before being
sent, are checked by a monitor (a member of the experiment team). Improper
messages are not be delivered. Instead, the sender receives a warning informing
him/her of his/her misconduct.
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The communicator has 4 minutes to write his/her message, but (s)he is free
to send it ahead of time. A clock will inform the communicator of the remaining
time.
The screen-shots that you will see in period 1 if you are the communicator in
your group are shown below.
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In periods 2–10, if you are the communicator, you will see the following screen.
Please, remain quiet during the whole experiment or the session will be ter-
minated and all payments canceled.
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A.3 Instructions for One-Shot Interaction
Treatments
This appendix reports the instructions (originally in German) for treatments B1
and C. Those for treatment B1 are displayed below in full length. They contain
all parts which are common to both treatments. The instructions for treatment C
can be obtained by inserting and replacing the appropriate paragraphs. The place
holder [for treatment C, replace the following paragraph] indicates which paragraphs
have to be replaced, where the replacement always has the same heading. The
place holder [for treatment C, insert paragraph <paragraph name> here] prescribes
where new paragraphs have to be inserted. Minor discrepancies between treat-
ments are indicated in italics.
A.3.1 Instructions for Treatment B1
Welcome! You are about to participate in an experiment funded by the Max
Planck Institute of Economics. Please remain silent and switch off your mobile.
You will receive 2.50 euro for showing up on time. Beyond this you can earn
more money. In order to do this, please read these instructions carefully. The 2.50
euro show-up fee and any additional amounts of money you may earn will be
paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. Payments are carried out pri-
vately, i.e., without the other participants knowing the extent of your earnings.
During the experiment, we shall not speak of euros but of ECUs (Experimental
Currency Units). ECUs are converted to euros at the following exchange rate: 1
ECU = 0.40 euro.
It is strictly forbidden to speak to other participants. If you have any questions
during the experiment please raise your hand.
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Detailed information on the experiment
Group formation
You will be placed in a group of four players. You will never learn the identity of
the other members of your group.
Decisions
The experiment consists of one period only. In this period you (as well as the
other members of your group) receive an endowment of 25 ECUs. You have to
decide how many of these 25 ECUs you want to contribute to a project. The
ECUs contributed to the project yield income for you as well as for the other
members of your group (you will learn more about the “income from the project”
below). You can keep the ECUs that you do not contribute for yourself (they yield
income just for you).
Period-earnings
More specifically, your period-earnings consist of two parts:
a) “Income from the project” = 0.4 × sum of all group members’ contributions
(in words, the income from the project is determined by multiplying the
sum of the contributions of all group members by 0.4);
b) “ECUs you keep” = 25 − your contribution to the project.
Thus, your period-earnings summarized in a formula are
Your period-earnings = Income from the project + ECU you keep
(0.4× sum of group’s contributions) + (25− your contribution)
Example:
Suppose that all four group members contribute 5 ECUs. Then both you and your
group members receive an “income from the project” of 8 (= 0.4 × 20) ECUs. The
“ECUs you keep” are 20 (= 25 − 5). Hence, your period-earnings are 8 + 20 = 28
ECUs.
[for treatment C, replace the following paragraph]
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Interaction with your group members
You as well as the other three members of your group decide simultaneously and
privately about the amount of ECUs you want to contribute to the project.
[for treatment C, insert paragraph Communication here]
The information you receive at the end of the experiment
You will receive information about 1) the number of ECU contributed by each
of your group members, with the individual contributions being sorted in de-
scending order, 2) the income from the project, and 3) your corresponding period-
earnings.
Your final payoff
At the end of the experiment, your period-earnings will be converted into euros
and paid out to you in cash, together with the show-up fee of 2.50 euros.
Before the experiment starts, you will have to answer some control questions
to verify your understanding of the rules of the experiment. Once everybody
has answered all questions correctly, six practice periods will be played [(only in
treatment C:) which will only include the decision situation, but not the communication
stage]. During these six periods, you will not be matched with other persons in
this room, but with a computer that will determine randomly the others’ deci-
sions. You will get no payment for these practice periods.
Please remain quietly seated until the experiment starts. If you have any questions,
please raise your hand now.
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A.3.2 Additional Instructions for Treatment C
Interaction with your group members
You as well as the other three members of your group decide simultaneously and
privately about the amount of ECUs you want to contribute to the project.
Before making your contribution decision, one group member is given the
opportunity to communicate with his/her fellow members (how communication
is carried out is described below). In the following, we shall refer to the group
member who can communicate with the others as the “communicator”.
At the beginning of the experiment, one member of each group is randomly
selected to be the “communicator”. Every participant will be informed whether
he or she is going to act as the “communicator” in an “Information Window”.
Communication
During the communication stage the communicator can use his/her keyboard to
type one message to the others.
The communicator is free to send the message (s)he likes, including what (s)he
thinks is the best approach to the experiment, what (s)he plans to do, or what
(s)he would like the others to do.
However, there are two restrictions on the kind of messages that the communicator
can send:
1. First, the communicator is not allowed to identify him/herself to the oth-
ers. Thus, (s)he cannot reveal his/her real name, nicknames, or any other
identifying feature such as gender, hair, or seat number.
2. Second, there must be neither threats nor promises pertaining to anything
that is to occur after the experiment.
To enforce compliance with the above restrictions, all messages, before being
sent, are checked by a monitor (a member of the experiment team). Improper
messages are not be delivered. Instead, the sender receives a warning informing
him/her of his/her misconduct.
The communicator has 4 minutes to write his/her message, but (s)he is free
to send it ahead of time. A clock will inform the communicator of the remaining
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time.
The screen-shots that you will see if you are the communicator in your group
are shown below.
Please, remember to remain quiet during the whole experiment or the session
will be terminated and all payments canceled.
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B.1 Robustness Checks
Table 3.2 in Chapter 3.3 reports on two random-effects Tobit regressions that
model the individuals’ relative contributions to the public good. The main result
is that rich subjects tend to contribute significantly lower proportions of their en-
dowments than poor subjects in treatment B10,A but not in treatment CCA. Here
we show that this result is robust to alternative specifications.
Tables B.1 and B.2 report on two specifications for each treatment, both of
which involve a constant, the linear trend t, the endowment dummy dendowment,
and the average of the relative contributions of the group in the previous period.
The second specification additionally involves the time trend squared. The re-
sults show that the endowment dummy is significant for treatment B10,A but not
for treatment CCA, irrespective of the specification.1 The Bayesian information
criterion favors specification (1) over specification (2) for treatment B10,A but ad-
vices the reverse ordering for treatment CCA. Hence, our choice for Table 3.2.
Table B.3 provides a further robustness check. It reports the results from boot-
strapped random-effects Tobit models with the same set of variables as the spec-
ifications in Table 3.2. All results remain robust.
1This result is robust to a specification that includes a dummy variable for the end game effect
instead of the time trend squared. The result is also robust when we drop the average of the
relative contributions of the group in the previous period. Likelihood ratio tests, however,
advice its inclusion.
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Table B.1: Treatment B10,A: Random-Effects Tobit Regression
– Robustness Check
(1) (2)
constant 0.352 (0.000) 0.299 (0.001)
t −0.035 (0.000) −0.007 (0.779)
t2 −0.002 (0.286)
dendowment −0.168 (0.001) −0.168 (0.001)∑4
j=1 cj,t−1/ej,t−1
4
0.807 (0.000) 0.780 (0.000)
St. dev.
Random intercept 0.175 (0.000) 0.178 (0.000)
Residual 0.289 (0.000) 0.288 (0.000)
Wald test 199.89 (0.000) 199.38 (0.000)
BIC 552.7 557.9
Note: The dependent variable is ci,t/ei,t (576 observations grouped by
subject). The regression involves 91 left censored and 74 right censored
observations. t stands for trend; dendowment equals 0 for the poor and 1
for the rich. Significance levels are reported in parentheses. BIC stands
for Bayesian information criterion.
Table B.2: Treatment CCA: Random-Effects Tobit Regression
– Robustness Check
(1) (2)
constant 0.308 (0.170) −0.461 (0.105)
t −0.060 (0.000) 0.322 (0.000)
t2 −0.032 (0.000)
dendowment −0.111 (0.455) −0.111 (0.501)∑4
j=1 cj,t−1/ej,t−1
4
1.959 (0.000) 1.790 (0.000)
St. dev.
Random intercept 0.465 (0.000) 0.536 (0.000)
Residual 0.643 (0.000) 0.604 (0.000)
Wald test 98.45 (0.000) 99.94 (0.000)
BIC 631.8 614.7
Note: The dependent variable is ci,t/ei,t (576 observations grouped by
subject). The regression involves 53 left censored and 401 right censored
observations. t stands for trend; dendowment equals 0 for the poor and 1
for the rich. Significance levels are reported in parentheses. BIC stands
for Bayesian information criterion.
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Table B.3: Random-Effects Tobit Regression Results for Relative Contributions
to the Public Good - BCa Bootstraps
Dep. variable: ci/ei
Random intercepts: individual
B10,A CCA
Coefficient 95% CI (BCa) Coefficient 95% CI (BCa)
t -0.035*** [-0.05; -0.02] 0.322** [0.09; 0.66]
t2 -0.032*** [-0.06; -0.01]
dendowment -0.168*** [-0.25; -0.09] -0.111 [-0.36; 0.08]∑4
j=1 cj,t−1/ej,t−1
4
0.807*** [0.70; 1.01] 1.790*** [1.16; 3.79]
Constant 0.352*** [0.23; 0.46] -0.461 [-2.25; 0.35]
St. dev.
Random intercept 0.175*** [0.12; 0.22] 0.536*** [0.28; 0.79]
Residual 0.289*** [0.26; 0.34] 0.604*** [0.46; 0.85]
Log likelihood -257.3 -285.1
BIC 552.7 614.7
Note: The regressions are based on 576 observations, 64 subjects, and 16 groups. The B10,A
(CCA) regression involves 91 (53) left-censored and 74 (401) right-censored observations. t
stands for trend; dendowment equals 0 for the poor and 1 for the rich. The bias corrected and
accelerated (BCa) confidence intervals are based on non-parametric bootstraps with 500 repli-
cations. Sampling respects group composition. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at levels 1%, 5%,
and 10%, based on the BCa confidence intervals. BIC stands for Baysian information criterion.
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B.2 Instructions
This appendix reports the instructions (originally in German) for both treatments
treatments B10,A and CCA.2 Those for treatment B10,A are displayed below in
full length. They contain all parts which are common to both treatments. The
instructions for treatment CCA can be obtained by inserting and replacing the
appropriate paragraphs. The place holder [for treatment CCA, replace the following
paragraph] indicates which paragraphs have to be replaced, where the replace-
ment always has the same heading. The place holder [for treatment CCA, insert
paragraph <paragraph name> here] prescribes where new paragraphs have to be
inserted.
B.2.1 Instructions for Treatment B10,A
INSTRUCTIONS
Welcome! You are about to participate in an experiment funded by the Max
Planck Institute of Economics. Please remain silent and switch off your mobile.
You will receive 2.50 euros for showing up on time. If you read these instruc-
tions carefully, you can make profitable decisions and earn more. The show-up
fee and any additional amounts of money you may earn will be paid to you in
cash at the end of the experiment. Payments are carried out privately, i.e., without
the other participants knowing the extent of your earnings.
During the experiment, we shall not speak of euros but of ECUs (Experimental
Currency Units). ECUs are converted to euros at the following exchange rate: 1
ECU = 0.05 euro.
It is strictly forbidden to speak to other participants. If you have any questions
during the experiment please raise your hand.
2Since treatments B10,S and CCS correspond to treatments B10 and CC in Chapter 2, respec-
tively, the instructions for these treatments can be found in Appendix A.2.
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Detailed information on the experiment
Group formation
You will be placed in a group of four players. Group composition does not change
during the experiment, i.e., you will be always interacting with the same partici-
pants. You will never learn the identity of the other members of your group.
Decisions
The experiment consists of 10 periods. Before the experiment starts, you will be
randomly assigned to either of two types: type A or type B. Type A members
receive an endowment of 30 ECUs at the beginning of each period. Type B mem-
bers receive an endowment of 20 ECUs per period. Each group has two members
of type A and two members of type B.
You have to decide how much of your endowment you want to contribute
to a project. The ECUs contributed to the project yield income for you as well
as for the other members of your group (you will learn more about the “income
from the project” below). You can keep for yourself the ECUs that you do not
contribute (they yield income just for you).
Period-earnings
More specifically, in every period your earnings consist of two parts:
a) “income from the project” = 0.4 × sum of all group members’ contributions
(in words, the income from the project is determined by multiplying the
sum of the contributions of all group members by 0.4);
b) “ECUs you keep” = your endowment − your contribution to the project.
Thus, your period-earnings summarized in a formula are
Your period-earnings = Income from the project + ECU you keep
(0.4× sum of group’s contributions) + (your endowment
− your contribution)
Example:
Suppose that all four group members contribute 5 ECUs. Then both you and your
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group members receive an “income from the project” of 8 (= 0.4 × 20) ECUs. The
“ECUs you keep” are 25 (= 30 − 5) if you are of type A and 15 (= 20 − 5) if you
are of type B. Hence, your period-earnings are 8 + 25 = 33 ECUs if you are of type
A and 8 + 15 = 23 ECUs if you are of type B.
[for treatment CCA, replace the following paragraph]
Interaction with your group members in each period
In each period, you as well as the other three members of your group decide
simultaneously and privately about the amount of ECUs you want to contribute
to the project.
[for treatment CCA, insert paragraph Communication here]
The information you receive at the end of each period
At the end of each period, you will receive information 1) about the number of
ECU contributed by each of your group members, sorted in descending order
with the respective endowments indicated next to the contributions, 2) about the
income from the project, and 3) about your corresponding period-earnings.
Your final earnings
Your final earnings will be calculated by adding up your period-earnings in each
of the 10 periods. The resulting sum will be converted to euros and paid out to
you in cash, together with the show-up fee of 2.50 euros.
Before the experiment starts, you will have to answer some control questions
to verify your understanding of the rules of the experiment.
Please remain quietly seated until the experiment starts. If you have any questions,
please raise your hand now.
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B.2.2 Additional Instructions for Treatment CCA
Interaction with your group members in each period
Each period consists of the following two stages:
1. One group member is given the opportunity to communicate with his/her
fellow members (how communication is carried out is described below). In
the following, we shall refer to the group member who can communicate
with the others as the “communicator”.
2. When the communication stage ends, the four group members decide si-
multaneously and privately on their own contributions.
At the beginning of the experiment, one member of each group is randomly
selected to be the “communicator” for all 10 periods. The selected group member
sees this in an “Information Window", which appears on his/her screen at the
beginning of the experiment.
Communication
During the communication stage, the communicator can use his/her keyboard to
type one message to the others.
The communicator is free to send the message (s)he likes, including what (s)he
thinks is the best approach to the experiment, what (s)he plans to do, or what
(s)he would like the others to do.
However, there are two restrictions on the kind of messages that the communicator
can send.
1. First, the communicator is not allowed to identify him/herself to the oth-
ers. Thus, (s)he cannot reveal his/her real name, nicknames, or any other
identifying feature such as gender, hair, or seat number.
2. Second, there must be neither threats nor promises pertaining to anything
that is to occur after the experiment.
To enforce compliance with the above restrictions, all messages, before being
sent, are checked by a monitor (a member of the experiment team). Improper
messages are not be delivered. Instead, the sender receives a warning informing
him/her of his/her misconduct.
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The communicator has 4 minutes to write his/her message, but (s)he is free
to send it ahead of time. A clock will inform the communicator of the remaining
time.
The screen-shots that you will see in period 1 if you are the communicator
in your group are shown below, where the “X” replaces your type and the “Y”
replaces your endowment.
In periods 2–10, if you are the communicator, you will see the following screen.
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Please, remember to remain quiet during the whole experiment or the session
will be terminated and all payments canceled.
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C.1 Post Experimental Questionnaire
For items 1 to 4 and item 9, participants were asked to state their degree of agree-
ment (“not at all” to “very much”) on a 7 point Likert scale. All other items asked
for an integer input between 0 and 10. Belief elicitation was tailored with respect
to the player type indicated in italics after items 5 to 8. Except for the first four
items which measured group identification, every item appeared on a separate
screen. Originally, all items were in German.
1. I feel committed to my group.
2. I am glad to be in my group.
3. I feel solidarity with my group.
4. It is pleasant to be in my group.
5. According to your estimation, what is the other group members’ average
contribution to the project? (normal groups)
6. According to your estimation, what did the two members of type B con-
tribute on average to the project? (high-benefit members)
7. According to your estimation, what did the member of type A contribute to
the project? (low-benefit members in privileged groups)
8. According to your estimation, what did the other member of type B con-
tribute to the project? (low-benefit members in privileged groups)
9. The communicator’s message was constructed as to maximize his own pay-
off. (non-communicators)
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C.2 Categorization Methodology
Our categorization methodology follows Cooper and Kagel (2005) and Sutter and
Strassmair (2009). The set of categories is based on those obtained for treatment
C in Chapter 2. The new messages were screened in order to identify potentially
distinct arguments which were not represented in the original set of categories.
Since none were found, we adopt the previous set of categories and report it in Ta-
ble 4.3. For an exact description of how the original categories where established,
see Appendix A.1.
Two undergraduate research assistants separately coded all messages
obtained from treatment RC. If one message contained the argument(s) specified
by a category, then that category was assigned the value of 1 (otherwise, it was
assigned the value of 0). The correlation coefficient between the assistants’ cod-
ings was 0.64 and 0.85 for the sets of normal and privileged groups, respectively.
Finally, the two coders gathered and discussed their individual assessments and
arrived at a common coding. The result is reported in Table 4.4.
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C.3 Instructions
This appendix reports the instructions (originally in German) for all treatments.
Those for normal groups in the baseline treatment are displayed in full length
below. They contain all parts which are common to all six treatments. The in-
structions for privileged groups and the treatments RC and IC can be obtained
by inserting and replacing the appropriate paragraphs. The place holder [for
<treatment name>, replace the following paragraph] indicates which paragraphs have
to be replaced, where the replacement always has the same heading. The place
holder [for <treatment name>, insert paragraph <paragraph name> here] prescribes
where new paragraphs have to be inserted. Minor discrepancies between treat-
ments are indicated in italics.
C.3.1 Instructions for Normal Groups - Baseline Treatment
INSTRUCTIONS
Welcome! You are about to participate in an experiment funded by the Max
Planck Institute of Economics. Please remain silent and switch off your mobile.
You will receive 2.50 euro for showing up on time. Beyond this you can earn
more money. In order to do this, please read these instructions carefully. The
2.50 euro show-up fee and any additional amounts of money you may earn will
be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. Payments are carried out
privately, i.e., without the other participants knowing the extent of your earnings.
During the experiment, we shall not speak of euros but of ECUs (Experimental
Currency Units). ECUs are converted to euros at the following exchange rate: 1
ECU = 0.20 euro.
It is strictly forbidden to speak to other participants. If you have any questions
during the experiment please raise your hand.
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Detailed information on the experiment
Group formation
You will be placed in a group of three players. You will never learn the identity
of the other members of your group.
Decisions
The experiment consists of one period only. In this period, you (as well as the
other members of your group) receive an endowment of 25 ECUs. You have to
decide how many of these 25 ECUs you want to contribute to a project. The
ECUs contributed to the project yield income for you as well as for the other
members of your group (you will learn more about the “income from the project”
below). You can keep the ECUs that you do not contribute for yourself.
[for privileged groups, replace the following paragraph]
Period-earnings
More specifically, your period-earnings consist of two parts:
a) “Income from the project” = 0.6 × sum of all group members’ contributions
(in words, the income from the project is determined by multiplying the
sum of the contributions of all group members by 0.6);
b) “ECUs you keep” = 25 − your contribution to the project.
Thus, your period-earnings summarized in a formula are
Your period-earnings = Income from the project + ECU you keep
(0.6× sum of group’s contributions) + (10− your contribution)
Example:
Suppose that all three group members contribute 5 ECUs. Then both you and
your group members receive an “income from the project” of 9 ECUs (= 0.6 ×
15). The “ECUs you keep” are 20 (= 25− 5). Hence, your period-earnings are 9 +
20 = 29 ECUs.
[for treatments IC and RC, replace the following paragraph]
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Interaction with your group members
You as well as the other two members of your group decide simultaneously and
privately about the amount of ECUs you want to contribute to the project.
[for treatments IC and RC, insert paragraph Communication here]
The information you receive at the end of the experiment
You will receive information about 1) the number of ECU contributed by each
of your group members, with the individual contributions being sorted in de-
scending order, 2) the income from the project, and 3) your corresponding period-
earnings.
Your final payoff
At the end of the experiment, your period-earnings will be converted into euros
and paid out to you in cash, together with the show-up fee of 2.50 euros.
Before the experiment starts, you will have to answer some control questions
to verify your understanding of the rules of the experiment. Once everybody
has answered all questions correctly, four practice periods will be played [(only
for treatments IC and RC:), which will only include the decision situation, but not the
communication stage]. During these four practice periods, you will not be matched
with other persons in this room, but with a computer that will determine the
others’ decisions randomly. You will get no payment for these practice periods.
Please remain quietly seated until the experiment starts. If you have any questions,
please raise your hand now.
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C.3.2 Additional Instructions for Normal Groups
Communication
During the communication stage the communicator can use his/her keyboard to
type one message to the others. The communicator is free to send the message
(s)he likes, [(only for relevant communication:), including what (s)he thinks is the best
approach to the experiment, what (s)he plans to do, or what (s)he would like the others to
do.] [(Only for irrelevant communication:). Its content may e.g. be related to a current
topic or may be intended to entertain the other group members.]
However, there are two (only for irrelevant communication:) three restrictions on
the kind of messages that the communicator can send:
1. The communicator is not allowed to identify him/herself to the others.
Thus, (s)he cannot reveal his/her real name, nicknames, or any other iden-
tifying feature such as gender, hair, or seat number.
2. There must be neither threats nor promises pertaining to anything that is to
occur after the experiment.
3. [(Only for irrelevant communication:) Third, the communicator is not allowed to
write about the upcoming decision situation. Thus, (s)he, e.g., must not indicate
what (s)he thinks is the best approach to the experiment, what (s)he plans to do, or
what (s)he would like the others to do.]
To enforce compliance with the above restrictions, all messages, before being
sent, are checked by a monitor (a member of the experiment team). Improper
messages are not delivered. Instead, the sender receives a warning informing
him/her of his/her misconduct.
The communicator has 4 minutes to write his/her message, but (s)he is free
to send it ahead of time. A clock will inform the communicator of the remaining
time.
The screen-shots that you will see if you are the communicator in your group
are shown below.
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Please, remember to remain quiet during the whole experiment or the session
will be terminated and all payments will be canceled.
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C.3.3 Additional Instructions for Privileged Groups
Period-earnings
More specifically, your period-earnings consist of two parts:
a) “Income from the project” = type-factor × sum of all group members’ con-
tributions (in words, your income from the project is determined by mul-
tiplying the sum of the contributions of all group members by your type-
factor);
b) “ECUs you keep” = 25 − your contribution to the project.
Thus, your period-earnings summarized in a formula are
Your period-earnings = Income from the project + ECUs you keep
(type-factor× sum of group’s contributions) + (25− your contribution)
Before the experiment starts, you will be randomly assigned to either of two
types: type A or type B. Each group consists of one member of type A and
two members of type B. The types differ exclusively in their “income from the
project.” More specifically:
• If you are of type A, your type-factor is 1.6.
• If you are of type B, your type-factor is 0.6.
[(Only for the baseline condition:) At the beginning of the experiment, one member of
each group is randomly selected to be the “type A member.” Every participant will be
informed whether he or she is going to act as the “type A member” in an “Information
Window.”]
Example:
Suppose that all three group members contribute 5 ECUs. Then the “ECUs you
keep” are 20 (= 25 − 5) for both you and for your group members. The “income
from the project” is 24 ECU (= 1.6 × 15) if you are of type A and 9 ECU (= 0.6 ×
15) if you are of type B. Hence, your period earnings are 24 + 20 = 44 ECUs if you
are of type A and 9 + 20 = 29 ECUs if you are of type B.
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Interaction with your group members
You as well as the other two members of your group decide simultaneously and
privately about the amount of ECUs you want to contribute to the project.
Before making your contribution decision, the type A member of every group
is given the opportunity to communicate with his/her fellow members (how
communication is carried out is described below). In the following, we shall refer
to the type A member also as the “communicator.”
At the beginning of the experiment, one member of each group is randomly
selected to be the “type A member / communicator.” Every participant will be
informed whether he or she is going to act as the “type A member / communica-
tor” in an “Information Window.”
Communication
During the communication stage the communicator can use his/her keyboard to
type one message to the others. The communicator is free to send the message
(s)he likes, [(only for relevant communication:), including what (s)he thinks is the best
approach to the experiment, what (s)he plans to do, or what (s)he would like the others to
do.] [(Only for irrelevant communication:). Its content may e.g. be related to a current
topic or may be intended to entertain the other group members.]
However, there are two (only for irrelevant communication:) three restrictions on
the kind of messages that the communicator can send:
1. The communicator is not allowed to identify him/herself to the others.
Thus, (s)he cannot reveal his/her real name, nicknames, or any other iden-
tifying feature such as gender, hair, or seat number.
2. There must be neither threats nor promises pertaining to anything that is to
occur after the experiment.
3. [(Only for irrelevant communication:) The communicator is not allowed to write
about the upcoming decision situation. Thus, (s)he, e.g., must not indicate what
(s)he thinks is the best approach to the experiment, what (s)he plans to do, or what
(s)he would like the others to do.]
To enforce compliance with the above restrictions, all messages, before being
sent, are checked by a monitor (a member of the experiment team). Improper
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messages are not delivered. Instead, the sender receives a warning informing
him/her of his/her misconduct.
The communicator has 4 minutes to write his/her message, but (s)he is free
to send it ahead of time. A clock will inform the communicator of the remaining
time.
The screen-shots that you will see if you are the communicator in your group
are shown below.
Please, remember to remain quiet during the whole experiment or the session
will be terminated and all payments will be canceled.
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D.1 Additional Empirical Results
Table D.1: Panel Tobit Regressions: Main and Interaction Effects - Robustness
Check
Dep. variable: individual contributions
Random intercept: group
(3) (4)
Coefficient 95% CI (BCa) Coefficient 95% CI (BCa)
Competition 2.029*** [0.63; 3.37] 1.300 [-0.26; 2.96]
Sequential 1.670*** [0.53; 2.78] 0.683 [-1.58; 2.97]
Comp*Sequential – – 1.461 [-1.12; 4.43]
Period -0.214*** [-0.34; -0.11] -0.214*** [-0.34; -0.11]
Age -0.100** [-0.20; -0.01] -0.100** [-0.20; -0.01]
Gender -0.484 [-1.14; 0.06] -0.479 [-1.14; 0.07]
Constant 6.147*** [3.66; 8.35] 6.608*** [4.27; 9.35]
St. dev. random intercept 3.104*** [2.66; 3.59] 3.087*** [2.67; 3.61]
St. dev. residual 3.290*** [2.94; 3.88] 3.290*** [2.94; 3.88]
Log likelihood -4842.0 -4841.6
Note: The regressions are based on 2310 observations, 231 individuals, and 77 groups. 448
(293) observations are left (right) censored. The biased corrected and accelerated (BCa) con-
fidence intervals are based on a non-parametric bootstrap with 500 replications. Sampling
respects group composition. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at levels 1%, 5%, and 10%, based
on the BCa confidence intervals.
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Table D.2: Linear Mixed Effects Regressions: Main and Interaction Effects -
Robustness Check
Dep. variable: individual contributions
Random intercepts: group, individual
(5) (6)
Coefficient 95% CI (BCa) Coefficient 95% CI (BCa)
Competition 1.379*** [0.42; 2.23] 1.098** [0.03; 2.16]
Sequential 1.285*** [0.53; 2.03] 0.906 [-0.63; 2.35]
Comp*Sequential – – 0.561 [-1.15; 2.59]
Period -0.154*** [-0.23; -0.09] -0.154*** [-0.23; -0.09]
Age -0.076** [-0.13; -0.01] -0.075** [-0.13; -0.01]
Gender -0.290* [-0.60; 0.01] -0.285* [-0.60; 0.02]
Constant 6.011*** [4.37; 7.32] 6.181*** [4.63; 7.61]
St. dev. random intercepts
Group intercept 2.044*** [0.61; 0.82] 2.040*** [0.61; 0.82]
Individual intercept 1.009 [-0.19; 0.08] 1.009 [-0.19; 0.08]
St. dev. residual 2.262*** [0.75; 0.90] 2.262*** [0.75; 0.90]
Log likelihood -5375.3 -5375.1
Note: The regressions are based on 2310 observations, 231 individuals, and 77 groups.
The bias corrected and accelerated (BCa) confidence intervals are based on non-parametric
bootstraps with 500 replications. Sampling respects group composition. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate
significance at levels 1%, 5%, and 10%, based on the BCa confidence intervals.
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D.2 Instructions - Stage 1
This appendix reports the instructions (originally in German) for the first stage of
the experiment. Those for treatment S1-SeqNC are displayed below in full length.
They contain all parts of the instructions common to both treatments in this stage.
The instructions for treatment S1-SeqC can be obtained by inserting and replac-
ing the appropriate paragraphs. The placeholders [for treatment S1-SeqC, insert
paragraph < paragraph name > here] and [for treatment S1-SeqC, replace the following
paragraph] indicate which paragraphs have to be added or replaced, where the
replacement always has the same heading. Minor discrepancies between treat-
ments are indicated in italics.
D.2.1 Instructions for Treatment S1-SeqNC
INSTRUCTIONS
Welcome and thank you for participating in this experiment. Please remain silent
and switch off your mobile!
You will receive 2.50´euro for showing up on time. Beyond this you can earn
more money. In order to do this, please read these instructions carefully. The
2.50 euro show-up fee and any additional amounts of money you may earn will
be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. Payments are carried out
privately, i.e., without the other participants knowing the extent of your earnings.
During the experiment, we shall not speak of euros but of ECU (Experimental
Currency Units). ECU are converted to euros at the following exchange rate: 1
ECU = 0.80 euro.
The experiment consists of two parts. Some features of the experiment may
change from the first to the second part. The instructions for the first part follow
on this page. The instructions for the second part will be distributed after all
participants have completed the first part.
It is strictly forbidden to speak to other participants. If you have any questions
during the experiment please raise your hand.
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DETAILED INFORMATION ON THE FIRST PART
You will first learn about the basic decision situation. The description about the
experiment in the first part follows afterwards.
The Basic Decision Situation
Group formation
You will be placed in a group of three players. You will never learn the identity of
the other members of your group. Every group will be identified by an individual
color.
Decisions
You (as well as the other members of your group) receive an endowment of 10
ECU. You have to decide how many of these 10 ECU you want to contribute to
a project. The ECU contributed to the group project yield income for you as well
as for the other members of your group (you will learn more about the “income
from the project” below). You can keep the ECU that you do not contribute for
yourself (they yield income just for you).
[for treatments S1-SeqC, insert paragraph < Interaction with another group > here]
[for treatments S1-SeqC, replace the following paragraph]
Period earnings
More specifically, in every period your earnings consist of two parts:
a) “Income from the project” = 0.5 × sum of all group members’ contributions
(in words, the income from the project is determined by multiplying the
sum of the contributions of all group members by 0.5);
b) “ECU you keep” = 10 − your contribution to the project.
Thus, your period earnings summarized in a formula are
Your period earnings = Income from the project + ECU you keep
(0.5× sum of group’s contributions) + (10− your contribution)
144
Appendix to Chapter 5
Example:
Suppose that all three group members contribute 5 ECU. Then both you and your
group members receive an “income from the project” of 7.5 (= 0.5× 15) ECU. The
“ECU you keep” are 5 (= 10 − 5). Hence, your period earnings are 7.5 + 5 = 12.5
ECU.
The Experiment In The First Part
Interaction with your group members
This part of the experiment consists of one period only. This period entails the
following two stages:
1. One group member decides prior to the others on his/her own contribution.
In the following, we shall refer to the group member who decides first as
the “early contributor.”
2. Without learning the “early contributor’s” choice, the other two group mem-
bers decide simultaneously and privately on their own contributions. You
will learn about the format of these decisions below.
At the beginning of the first part of the experiment, one member of each group
is randomly selected to be the “early contributor.” Every participant will be in-
formed whether he or she is going to act as the “early contributor” in an “Infor-
mation Window.”
How you decide on your contribution
If you are the “early contributor,” you enter your contribution in the following
screen. You can insert any integer number from 0 to 10.
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If you are not the “early contributor,” you are going to be asked to indicate your
contribution for every possible contribution of the “early contributor.” The screen
on which you will make your decisions is displayed below.
In each of the 11 boxes you have to indicate how many ECU you wish to con-
tribute, conditional on the “early contributor’s” contribution printed on the left
of each box. In each box you can insert any integer from 0 to 10. Please bear
in mind that the “early contributor” already made his/her decision, which can
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not be revised. His/her choice determines which of your decisions will actually
count. However, since you do not know his/her choice when making your de-
cisions you will have to think carefully about all your decisions because all can
become relevant to your earnings. The following example should clarify this.
Suppose that the “early contributor” decided to contribute 5 ECU to the project.
Suppose furthermore that you decided on your contributions as displayed in the
table below.
“early contributor’s” decision 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
your contribution 0 10 0 7 8 8 0 3 2 8 0
Suppose furthermore, that the decisions of the third group member are identical
to yours. The decision that counts for both you and the third group member is the
one for the 5 ECU contribution of the “early contributor.” I.e. you both contribute
8 ECU to the project. The sum of contributions thus equals 5+ 8+ 8 = 21 ECU.
The information you receive
You will receive no information about any decision at the end of the first part
of the experiment. Only when the second part of the experiment is finished you
will be informed about the choices from the first part. This information includes
(1) the “early contributor’s” decision, (2) the corresponding decisions of the two
other group members, (3) the income from the project, and [(in treatment S1-SeqC)
(4) the total contributions in your group and the group your’s is paired with, and (5)] (4)
your resulting period earnings.
Additional information on the overall experiment
Your final payoff
Your final payoff will be based on only one of the two parts of the experiment.
The payoff relevant part will be randomly selected by the flip of a fair coin at
the end of the experiment (i.e., after everyone has finished the second part). The
outcome of this coin flip will be decisive for everyone. If the first part of the
experiment will be selected, you are going to be payed your period earnings in
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this part in addition to the 2.50 euro show-up fee. The coin flip is going to be
conducted by one of the participants of the experiment. To select the participant,
one experimenter will draw a ball from an urn containing as many balls as there
are participants in the experiment.
Before the experiment starts, we ask you to answer some control questions,
in order to assure that all participants completely and correctly understood the
rules of the experiment. Once everybody has answered all questions correctly,
six practice periods will be played. During these six periods, you will not be
matched with other persons in this room, but with a computer that will determine
randomly the others’ decisions. You will get no payment for these periods.
Please remain quietly seated until the experiment starts. If you have any questions,
please raise your hand now. Please click on OK if you finished reading the instructions.
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D.2.2 Additional Instructions for Treatment S1-SeqC
Interaction with another group
Your group will be randomly paired with another group of three. After the con-
tribution decisions, the total (i.e., the sum of) contributions to the project of your
group will be compared with the total contributions to the project of the other
group. The group with the higher total contributions (or the “winning” group)
receives a transfer from the group with the lower total contributions (or the “los-
ing” group). The “transfer you receive or pay” depends on the difference in total
contributions between the two groups and each group member will receive or
pay an equal share of the transfer. You will learn more about the “transfer you
receive or pay” below.
Period earnings
More specifically, in every period your earnings consist of three parts:
a) “Income from the project” = 0.4 × sum of all group members’ contributions
(in words, the income from the project is determined by multiplying the
sum of the contributions of all group members by 0.4);
b) “ECU you keep” = 10 − your contribution to the project;
c) “Transfer you receive or pay” = 0.1 × difference in total contributions be-
tween your group and the other group.
Thus, if you are a member of the winning group, your period earnings sum-
marized in a formula are
Your period earnings = Income from the project + ECU you keep
(0.4× sum of group’s contributions) + (10− your contribution)
+ Transfer you receive
(0.1× difference in total contributions)
If you are a member of the losing group, your period earnings summarized
in a formula are
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Your period earnings = Income from the project + ECU you keep
(0.4× sum of group’s contributions) + (10− your contribution)
− Transfer you pay
(0.1× difference in total contributions)
Example:
Suppose that all three members of your group contribute 5 ECU and all three
members of the other group contribute 0 ECU. Then your group’s total contri-
butions are 3 × 5 ECU = 15 ECU. The other group’s total contributions are 3 ×
0 ECU = 0 ECU. This means that your group receives the transfer and the other
group pays the transfer. The “transfer you receive” is 1.5 (= 0.1× (15− 0)) ECU.
The “income from the project” equals 6 (= 0.4 × 15) ECU. The “ECU you keep”
are 5 (= 10− 5). Hence, your period earnings are 6 + 5 + 1.5 = 12.5 ECU.
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D.3 Instructions - Stage 2
This appendix reports the instructions (originally in German) for the second stage
of the experiment. Those for treatment S2-SimNC are displayed below in full
length. They contain all parts which are common to all four treatments in this
stage. The instructions for the other treatments can be obtained by inserting and
replacing the appropriate paragraphs. The place holder [for treatment <treatment
name>, replace the following paragraph] indicates which paragraphs have to be re-
placed, where the replacement always has the same heading. The place holder
[for treatment<treatment name>, insert paragraph<paragraph name> here] prescribes
where new paragraphs have to be inserted. Minor discrepancies between treat-
ments are indicated in italics.
D.3.1 Instructions for Treatment S2-SimNC
DETAILED INFORMATION ON THE SECOND PART
The Basic Decision Situation
In this second part you will face the same basic decision situation as in the first
part of the experiment.
Group formation
The group composition is the same as in the first part of the experiment. I.e.
you are again interacting with the same group members. [(in S2-SimC and S2-
SeqC:) Also, the group yours is interacting with is the same as in the first part of the
experiment.]
The Experiment In The Second Part
[for treatments S2-SeqNC and S2-SeqC, replace the following paragraph]
Interaction with your group members in each period
This part of the experiment consists of 10 periods. At the beginning of every
period, each group member receives an endowment of 10 ECU. In each period,
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you as well as the other two members of your group decide simultaneously and
privately about the amount of ECUs you want to contribute to the project. The
screen on which you will make your decisions is displayed below. You can insert
any integer number from 0 to 10.
[for treatments S2-SeqNC and S2-SeqC, insert paragraph <How you decide on your
contribution> here]
[for treatments S2-SeqNC and S2-SeqC, replace the following paragraph]
Your guess with respect to the own group
In every period, besides making your contribution decision, you have to make a
guess. The target is to guess the average contribution of the other two members
of your group (rounded to the next integer, 0.5 is rounded up). You will be paid
for the accuracy of your guesses as follows:
• If your guess is the same as the target, you earn 3 ECU.
• If your guess deviates by 1 ECU from the target, you earn 2 ECU.
• If your guess deviates by 2 ECU or more, you earn nothing.
[for treatments S2-SimC and S2-SeqC, insert paragraph <Your guess with respect to the
other group> here]
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The information you receive after each period
After each period you will receive information about (1) the number of ECU con-
tributed by each of your group members [(in treatment S2-SimC and S2-SeqC) (1)
the “early contributor’s” decision, (2) the corresponding decisions of the other two group
members] being sorted in descending order, (2) the income from the project, [(in
treatment S2-SimC and S2-SeqC) (4) the total contributions in your group and the group
your’s is paired with,] (3) your resulting period-earnings, and (4) the earnings for
the accuracy of your guess.
Your final payoff
If the second part of the experiment is selected for payment, you are going to
be paid according to one randomly selected period. For this period you will re-
ceive the sum of your period earnings and the payoff for the accuracy of your
expectation [(in treatments S2-SimC and S2-SeqC) both your expectations]. In order
to determine which period is payoff relevant, the randomly selected participant
will draw a ball from an urn which contains 10 balls, numbered from 1 to 10. The
draw will be decisive for everyone.
Please remain quietly seated until the experiment starts. If you have any questions,
please raise your hand now. Please click on OK if you finished reading the instructions.
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D.3.2 Additional Instructions for Treatments S2-SeqNC and
S2-SeqC
Interaction with your group members in every period
This part of the experiment consists of 10 periods. At the beginning of every pe-
riod, each group member receives an endowment of 10 ECU. Each period consists
of the same two stages as in the first part of the experiment. The positions within
each group are the same as in the first part of the experiment. In particular, if
you were the “early contributor” in the first part, you are going to be the “early
contributor” in the second part as well.
How you decide on your contribution
If you are the “early contributor,” you enter your contribution in the following
screen. You can insert any integer number from 0 to 10.
If you are not the “early contributor,” you are not going to be asked to indicate
your contribution for every possible contribution of the “early contributor” like
in the first part of the experiment. Instead, you are informed about the “early
contributor’s” decision. Afterwards you can choose your own contribution. The
screen on which you will make your decisions is displayed below, where the “X”
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is the placeholder for the “early contributor’s” choice. You can insert any integer
number from 0 to 10.
Your guess with respect to the own group
In every period, besides making your contribution decision, you have to make a
guess about the following target.
• If you are the “early contributor,” the target is to guess the average contri-
bution of the other two group members (rounded to the next integer, 0.5 is
rounded up).
• If you are not the “early contributor,” the target is to guess the contribution
of the other group member who is in the same position as you.
You will be paid for the accuracy of your guesses as follows:
• If your guess is the same as the target, you earn 3 ECU.
• If your guess deviates by 1 ECU from the target, you earn 2 ECU.
• If your guess deviates by 2 ECU or more, you earn nothing.
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D.3.3 Additional Instructions for Treatments S2-SimC and
S2-SeqC
Your guess with respect to the other group
In every period you also have to guess the average contribution of the group
yours is compared with (rounded to the next integer). You will be paid for the
accuracy of your guesses as follows:
• If your guess is the same as the other group’s average contribution, you
earn 3 ECU.
• If your guess deviates by 1 ECU from the other group’s average contribu-
tion, you earn 2 ECU.
• If your guess deviates by 2 ECU or more, you earn nothing.
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